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Abstract 
 The legal literature on federalism has long taken for granted that 
Americans no longer meaningfully identify with, or feel strong loyalties 
to, their states. This assumption has led some scholars to reject 
federalism altogether; others argue that federalism must be reoriented to 
serve national values. But the issue of identity and loyalty sweeps far 
more broadly, implicating debates about the political safeguards of 
federalism, the ability of states to check national power, and the 
likelihood that states will produce policy innovations or good 
opportunities for citizen participation in government. The ultimate 
question is whether American federalism lacks the cultural and 
psychological support to sustain itself. 
 This article is the first comprehensive effort to assess whether 
contemporary American states are meaningfully distinctive from one 
another and whether contemporary Americans identify with their states. 
The death of state identity is an empirical claim, but no proponent of that 
claim has ever marshalled empirical evidence to support it. It is also a 
claim unique to legal scholarship: Scholars in political science, history, 
economics, cultural psychology, and other disciplines have developed 
extensive literatures on state political cultures. This article surveys those 
literatures and collects evidence on the states’ geographic, demographic, 
and policy diversity, states’ impact on political preferences, relative trust 
in state and federal institutions, state’s distinct historical narratives, and 
the impact of individual mobility among the states. I conclude that 
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reports of the death of state identity are greatly exaggerated—and that 
has important implications for American federalism. 
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What, then, will become of federalism if it has lost social support but 
retained its formal structure? 
    — Aaron Wildavsky1 
In the spring of 1861, General Winfield Scott asked Robert E. Lee, then a colonel 
in the U.S. Army, to take command of the Union’s field forces and put down the 
Rebellion. Colonel Lee respectfully declined and resigned his commission. He explained 
his decision in a letter to his sister: 
With all my devotion to the Union and the feeling of loyalty and duty of 
an American citizen, I have not been able to make up my mind to raise 
my hand against my relatives, my children, my home. I have therefore 
resigned my commission in the Army, and save in defense of my native 
State, with the sincere hope that my poor services may never be needed, I 
hope I may never be called on to draw my sword.2   
Lee’s decision—to place his loyalty to his State before his loyalty to his Nation—
probably seems inconceivable to most modern Americans. Modern attitudes might be 
better captured in a comment by Anthony Bourdain on a movement to have New 
Jersey—which lacks an official state song—adopt Bruce Springsteen’s classic “Born to 
Run.” Mr. Bourdain acknowledged that “Bruce was, and likely remains, New Jersey’s 
most famous product, our proudest citizen, our bard, our voice.”3 But as Bourdain 
mischievously points out, of course, “Born to Run” is a song “about getting the f__k out 
of Jersey.”4  
As Mr. Bourdain’s quip suggests, many contemporary Americans have a hard 
time taking state identity seriously. To be sure, regional distinctiveness survives to a 
greater degree than many bicoastal academics might credit. But even those of us who 
self-identify as “Texans” or “Californians” or “Vermonters” hardly view that attachment 
                                                      
1 AARON WILDAVSKY, FEDERALISM & POLITICAL CULTURE 45 (D. Schleicher & B. Swedlow, eds. 
1998). 
2 Letter to Mrs. Marshall, April 20, 1861, quoted in 1 DOUGLAS SOUTHALL FREEMAN, LEE: A 
BIOGRAPHY  443 (1934). 
3 Anthony Bourdain, New Jersey, in, STATE BY STATE: A PANORAMIC PORTRAIT OF AMERICA 300, 
301 (Matt Weiland & Sean Wilsey, eds. 2009) [hereinafter STATE BY STATE].  
4 Id. (quote modified to preserve the status of this journal as a family publication). 
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in the same sense as our national citizenship: When patriotism is discussed, it is 
allegiance to the nation.5 And for a large and (seemingly) ever-growing number of us, 
states are simply places where we happen to live. 
This essay undertakes, for the first time in the contemporary federalism literature, 
to explore whether distinctive state identities are really dead in America, and whether, 
and in what sense, that matters for American federalism.  Ever since the Rehnquist Court 
began reviving the notion of constitutional limitations on national power in the early 
1990s,6 American legal scholars have rejoined the age-old debate on the relationship 
between national and state “sovereignty.”7 That debate has become even more salient as 
an important social movement presses for further limitations on national power,8 the 
Supreme Court continues to decide landmark cases on the scope of both national and 
state power,9 and Europe’s great federal experiment confronts fundamental questions 
                                                      
5  See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FOR LOVE OF COUNTRY: DEBATING THE LIMITS OF 
PATRIOTISM  (Joshua Cohen, ed. 1996) [hereinafter NUSSBAUM, LOVE OF COUNTRY] (debating 
with various respondents the morality of cosmopolitanism versus nationalism, with nary a mention 
of loyalty to states). 
6 See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (striking down certain provisions of 
the federal Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 on the ground that 
they improperly “commandeered” state legislative processes); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 
549 (1995) (striking down the federal Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 on the ground that it 
fell outside Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause).  For a general survey, see Ernest A. 
Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEXAS L. REV. 1 (2004) [hereinafter Young, 
Two Federalisms]. 
7 See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court, 2009 Term—Foreword: Federalism All the 
Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2010) [hereinafter Gerken, All the Way Down]; Timothy Zick, 
Are the States Sovereign?, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 229 (2005); Ernest A. Young, Federalism as a 
Constitutional Principle, __ U. CINN. L. REV. __, (forthcoming 2015) [hereinafter Young, Taft 
Lecture]. 
8 See, e.g., ELIZABETH PRICE FOLEY, THE TEA PARTY: THREE PRINCIPLES (2012); Ilya Somin, The 
Tea Party Movement and Popular Constitutionalism, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 300 (2011). 
9 See, e.g., National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) 
(upholding the Affordable Care Act’s “individual mandate” that all persons purchase health 
insurance as a valid exercise of the taxing power, but striking down Congress’s effort to require 
states participating in Medicaid to expand coverage as an impermissible use of the spending 
power); Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (striking down most of Arizona’s effort 
to ratchet up immigration enforcement as preempted under the federal immigration laws).  
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about the ability and willingness of historically separate nations to function as one 
economy.10 Although the federalism debate in this country is often conducted in doctrinal 
terms,11 federalism doctrine is, to at least some extent, driven by and predicated on 
certain assumptions about the States. Where you stand on federalism doctrine is largely—
although not entirely—a function of whether you think states are worth caring about. 
Contemporary American debates about federalism have featured claims that state 
sovereignty is unnecessary, undesirable, and indeed unsustainable in the absence of 
commitments like Colonel Lee’s—that is, without the sort of social divisions that lead 
people to identify primarily with a subnational unit.12 Robert Schapiro, for example, 
argues that the Supreme Court need not protect enclaves of state policy autonomy 
because such autonomy would be meaningful only if it reflected distinctive state political 
communities—which no longer exist.13 Malcolm Feeley and Edward Rubin go so far as 
to assert that because all citizens of our Republic identify with the nation, federalism 
should not—and does not—exist at all.14 Other scholars draw more limited conclusions. 
Jim Gardner has insisted that the death of distinctive state identities should inform 
debates about interpretation of state constitutions,15 while Jessica Bulman-Pozen suggests 
that the states should be seen simply as narrower arenas for partisan competition between 
                                                      
10 See, e.g., JOHAN VAN OVERTVELDT, THE END OF THE EURO: THE UNEASY FUTURE OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION (2011); see also JURGEN HABERMAS, THE CRISIS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: A 
RESPONSE (2012) (recognizing that the European crisis is not simply one of economics but one of 
political identity). 
11 See, e.g., Neil Siegel, ed., The Constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act: Ideas from the 
Academy, 75 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., No. 3 (2012) (collecting articles); see generally Ernest A. 
Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity, Institutional Competence, and Compensating 
Adjustments, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1733 (2005).  
12 See Edward L. Rubin, Puppy Federalism and the Blessings of America, 574 ANNALS AM. 
ACAD. POLI. & SOC. SCI. 37 (2001). 
13 ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL 
RIGHTS (2009). 
14 MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD RUBIN, FEDERALISM: NATIONAL IDENTITY AND TRAGIC 
COMPROMISE (2008). 
15 See, e.g., JAMES A. GARDNER, INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS: A JURISPRUDENCE OF 
FUNCTION IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM (2005). 
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essentially the same broad forces that dominate American politics as a whole.16 But the 
common premise—widely shared throughout the contemporary federalism literature—is 
that most contemporary Americans no longer feel the strong sense of attachment to their 
states that Colonel Lee felt for Virginia or Mr. Springsteen feels for New Jersey.  
This view—which I call the “One Nation” argument—is a prominent and 
recurrent position. The prominent New Dealer and public administration scholar Luther 
Gulick proclaimed in 1933 that “[t]he American state is finished. I do not predict that the 
states will go, but affirm that they have gone.”17 In the late 1960s, Robert Dahl—
speaking as the president of the American Political Science Association—insisted that 
“the states do not stand out as important institutions of democratic self-government” and 
denied “that the states, on the whole, can tap any strong sentiments of loyalty or 
likemindedness among their citizens.”18  
The One Nation argument sees distinctive state identities as the purpose or end of 
federalism: constitutional limits on national power accommodate preexisting distinctive 
communities of persons who self-identify with their state communities. Absent such 
identities, the argument holds, there is no need for federalism as it has been traditionally 
understood.19 But the significance of state identity is not limited to this particular (and 
extreme) academic claim. Rather, identity plays a central—but almost universally 
unacknowledged—role with respect to three broader sets of federalism questions.  
First, a vigorous and longstanding debate about the “political safeguards of 
federalism” posits that various kinds of political actors—Members of Congress, state 
political party officials, state bureaucrats tasked with implementing federal statutory 
schemes—can protect state prerogatives through political and bureaucratic means, so that 
the courts can eschew, or at least scale back, judicial review to maintain the federal 
balance.20  But that only works if these officials feel some sort of loyalty to their states. 
                                                      
16 Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077, __ (2014). 
17 Luther Gulick, Reorganization of the State, 3 CIVIL ENGINEERING 420, 421 (1933). 
18 Robert A. Dahl, The City in the Future of Democracy, 61 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 953, 968 (1967). 
19 See FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 14, at 52. 
20 See generally Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States 
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954); 
Lynn A. Baker, Putting the Safeguards Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 46 VILL. 
L. REV. 951 (2001). 
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Second, a broad literature on the benefits of federalism posits that states will 
experiment and compete through policy innovation, and that states provide a good 
opportunity for mass political participation because they’re closer to the people. These 
dynamics are often analyzed in terms of Albert Hirschman’s famous theory of exit and 
voice. 21  But that theory posited an important but underdeveloped role for loyalty. 
Loyalty, for instance, is what causes dissatisfied people to stick around and raise their 
voice rather than exiting the jurisdiction. And loyalty to a state may help the losers of 
political fights accept the outcome as legitimate.  Opponents of same-sex marriage in a 
state, for instance, may be more inclined to accept the recognition of those marriages as 
legitimate if it’s the decision of a smaller political community in which they feel a 
meaningful sense of membership.22 We cannot assess the potentially crucial role of 
loyalty without a better sense of how much loyalty to states is out there. 
Finally, both James Madison and Alexander Hamilton explained the Framers’ 
theory of vertical checks and balances as grounded in a competition for loyalty between 
the national government and the States.23 It was important to this theory that neither side 
totally win this competition. The ideal was that each citizen would have significant 
loyalties to each political community, which would allow her to appeal to one when the 
other was misbehaving. The question, of course, is whether loyalties to states remain 
strong enough to provide a plausible alternative to national loyalty in times of stress. 
Think, for instance, about Virginia and Kentucky’s resistance to the Alien and Sedition 
Acts, Oregon’s resistance to the Patriot Act, California’s effort to fill the gap left by 
national inaction on global warming and air pollution, Texas’s and Arizona’s differing 
critiques of national immigration policy, or Colorado and Washington’s effective 
nullification of federal marijuana laws. Citizens’ loyalty to these jurisdictions figures 
                                                      
21 ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY:  RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, 
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970). 
22 See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty as Federalism Strategies: Lessons from the 
Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 1133 (2014) [hereinafter Young, Same-Sex 
Marriage]. 
23  See, e.g., Todd Pettys, Competing for the People’s Affection: Federalism’s Forgotten 
Marketplace, 56 VAND. L. REV. 329 (2003); Jacob T. Levy, Federalism, Liberalism, and the 
Separation of Loyalties, 101 AM. POL. SCI. REV 459, 465 (2007) (observing that, for the 
Federalists, “[l]oyalty to the states . . . [was] the general protection against the new constitutional 
order going awry”) 
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prominently in assessing whether we can expect such forms of dissent to persist or 
succeed.24 
There is thus a great deal at stake in debates about state identity. And these  
issues are as crucial now as it has been since the mid-19th century. Our politics reflects 
deep division over issues of economic and social policy, on issues from healthcare to 
same-sex marriage to immigration. Federalism may offer a way to live with these 
disagreements by vesting policymaking authority in smaller communities better able to 
reach consensus on divisive issues and allowing rights of exit to those opposed to the 
decisions reached in the jurisdiction where they live. But this only works if the states 
themselves represent meaningful communities of value. The One Nation argument thus 
dominates any other debates about federalism we might have. 
The death of state identity is an empirical claim, and that claim remains 
completely unproven. In order to get to the bottom of it, this article undertakes two tasks. 
First, I clarify what we mean by state identity and why it matters for federalism. In so 
doing, I canvass a wide and interdisciplinary set of work that has been largely neglected 
in the legal literature. Second, I survey—for the first time—a broad range of empirical 
research, as well as other forms of evidence, that bears on the death or persistence of state 
identity. The claim that state identity is dead has considerable intuitive appeal for law 
professors, and perhaps for other elites as well, but we are hardly a representative sample. 
In any event, the One Nation argument has got by on bare assertion for far too long. 
Evidence is out there, and it strongly suggests that the states remain quite distinctive in 
key ways, and that state identity remains a highly plausible concept both empirically and 
conceptually.  
 I explore these issues in six parts. Part One develops the One Nation argument 
and its conception of the relationship between identity and federalism.  Part Two unpacks 
the notion of “state identity” and explains why it has significance beyond the One Nation 
argument. In particular, I distinguish between two related concepts: distinctiveness and 
identity. Part Three focuses on state distinctiveness. I review a variety of facts about the 
states—their geography, demography, economic characteristics, as well as their history 
and politics—and discuss how these characteristics have shaped distinctive notions of 
state political culture. Part Four then turns to identity.  Because it is difficult to measure 
                                                      
24 See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Marijuana, Nullification, and the Checks and Balances Model of 
Federalism, in NEO-NULLIFICATION AND NEO-SECESSIONISM  (Sanford Levinson, ed., forthcoming 
2015). 
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identity directly, I explore several possible proxies, such as state efforts to preserve their 
own history, survey evidence concerning public trust in governmental institutions, and 
the extent of personal mobility in the contemporary United States. None of this evidence 
can conclusively demonstrate that most Americans have strong political commitments to 
distinctive state communities, but I believe there is sufficient evidence to disprove the 
One Nation proponents’ easy assumption that the states have been assimilated into a 
homogeneous mass. Americans’ political commitments remain—as they have always 
been—complicated enough to defy simple generalizations. But the states plainly matter 
more than the One Nation argument acknowledges.  
 Parts Five and Six consider, respectively, two possible counterarguments. In Part 
Five, I address whether Americans’ subnational identities, to the extent they exist, might 
more plausibly be focused on either local or regional communities. I conclude that while 
these identities may well be more salient for some people and in some places, they do not 
eclipse the importance of state identities. Not only does public opinion data indicate that 
states retain an importance independent of locality or region, but states provide an 
institutional reference point that neither regions nor localities can match. Part Six 
addresses the normative criticism that state identities are dangerous. As Colonel Lee’s 
story suggests, state identities may threaten the national identity and even, in some cases, 
amount to treason.25 Although one must acknowledge this danger, it seems equally likely 
that identity is additive rather than competitive—that is, that loyalties to the part may 
actually strengthen identity with the whole. In any event, state identities are only one 
category of competitors that threaten to undermine our ideal of national identity. And as 
more particularistic identities go, state identities may be considerably less threatening to 
social solidarity than many of the alternatives. 
I suspect that Robert E. Lee’s Virginia holds relatively little attraction even for 
those of us who care deeply about federalism. But the extreme circumstances and nature 
of Colonel Lee’s choice should not obscure the fact that our Founders envisioned 
Americans with dual loyalties to their states and to the nation, and that these loyalties 
were meant to serve as an integral part of the political system of checks and balances.26 
                                                      
25 See, e.g., Richard Cohen, Dispelling the Myth of Robert E. Lee, WASH. POST, April 25, 2011, 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/dispelling-the-myth-of-robert-e-
lee/2011/04/25/AFrXC1kE_story.html (arguing that Lee “was loyal to slavery and disloyal to his 
country—not worthy . . . of the honors accorded him”). 
26 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 28 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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Across our contemporary political landscape, Americans are using their states as critical 
vehicles to diverge from national policy on issues from same-sex marriage, drug policy, 
and environmental protection to healthcare and immigration.27 These processes of dissent 
and experimentation presuppose that states are meaningful political communities able to 
draw upon a reservoir of popular loyalty and support. New Jersey may not need a volk to 
participate in these processes, but it does need citizens who care for it. The question of 
state identity thus implicates the very wellsprings of American federalism. 
I. American Federalism and the “One Nation” Argument 
 Any account of federalism must rest on an understanding of the role states play in 
the political system. Constitutional text and history contribute to that understanding, but 
the underlying issues are political, cultural, even psychological. Doctrines of enumerated 
and reserved powers rest on assumptions about the respective political and cultural roles 
of the national and state governments. Arguments about the anti-commandeering doctrine 
or the political safeguards of federalism depend on intuitions about the loyalties of both 
elected officials and their constituents. These largely unexamined assumptions pervade 
the federalism literature and case law. Extreme claims about them—like the “One 
Nation” argument highlighted here—throw the issues into high relief, but those claims 
are just the tip of the iceberg. No issue of federalism doctrine or theory is entirely 
separable from the question of what the states are, and whether people care about them. 
Edward Rubin, who once taught across the Delaware River from New Jersey at 
the University of Pennsylvania, proclaimed the death of American state identity over a 
decade ago in a well-known essay with the catchy title of Puppy Federalism.28 Dean 
Rubin argued that polities opt for federalism as an organizing principle only to cope with 
“a basic lack of national unity, an unwillingness of some groups to submit themselves to 
centralized control, to regard themselves as members of a single polity that must, for 
                                                      
27 See, e.g., Young, Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 22, at 1135-36; Heather K. Gerken, A New 
Progressive Federalism, DEMOCRACY, Spring 2012, available at 
http://www.democracyjournal.org/24/a-new-progressive-federalism.php?page=all [hereinafter 
Gerken, Progressive Federalism]; Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical 
Marijuana and the States’ Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421 
(2009). 
28 See Rubin, supra note 12. Dean Rubin’s essay built on a more extended article, with another 
catchy title, that he wrote with Malcolm Feeley in 1994.  See Edward Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, 
Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 903 (1994).   
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better or worse, reach collective decisions.”29 Building on this observation in a more 
recent book, Dean Rubin and Malcolm Feeley characterized the need for federalism to 
accommodate clashing identities as a “tragic compromise.”30  
The critical issue for Dean Rubin and Professor Feeley is precisely Colonel Lee’s 
question: “whether [the citizen] regards herself primarily as a member of the nation or as 
a member of the subunity to which she belongs.”31 Although “[f]or most of its history, the 
United States was a nation that needed federalism,”32 Rubin thinks that those days are 
now plainly behind us: 
At present, the United States is a socially homogenized and politically 
centralized nation.  Regional differences between different parts of the 
nation are minimal, and those that exist are based on inevitable economic 
variations, rather than any historical or cultural distinctions. . . .  With the 
minor exceptions of Utah and Hawaii, there is no American state with a 
truly distinctive social profile. . . .  Our political culture is more uniform 
still. . . .  Most important, the primary political loyalty of the vast 
majority of Americans is to the nation.33 
It follows that the death of state identity makes federalism largely irrelevant.  Rubin and 
Feeley explain that “[o]nly when [the people’s] identity is divided between the nation and 
a geographic region or exclusively linked to such a region will they want the region to 
possess some level of autonomy, so that it can make choices that the center cannot 
                                                      
29 Rubin, supra note 12, at 40. 
30 FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 14; see also Ernest A. Young, What Does It Take to Make a 
Federal System? On Constitutional Entrenchment, Separate Spheres, and Political Identity, 45 
TULSA L. REV. 831 (2011) [hereinafter Young, Review] (reviewing both the Schapiro and the 
Feeley and Rubin books). One might have hoped, now that Dean Rubin makes his home at 
Vanderbilt Law School in Nashville, Tennessee—just twelve miles from the Grand Ole Opry!—
that he might not still think all the states are the same. But the new book restates and builds upon 
the argument that Rubin and Professor Feeley have been making since 1994. 
31 Rubin, supra note 12, at 40; see also FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 14, at 61(asserting that the 
“attitudinal criteria” for federalism are “the willingness to die and the willingness to kill” on 
behalf of a separate, subnational community); but see infra at ___ (questioning these criteria). 
32 Rubin, supra note 12, at 43.  
33 Id. at 45-46. 
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countermand. In other words, regional autonomy will only be appealing to people if the 
region itself is meaningful to people, that is, if it relates to their sense of political 
identity.”34 
 Because we no longer need real federalism, Dean Rubin argues, all that persists 
is “a certain nostalgia for our bygone federalist system” motivated by mistaken notions of 
constitutional fidelity, anti-regulatory politics, and “the yearning of many Americans for 
the simplicity of the premodern era.”35 This diagnosis is consistent with Rubin’s and 
Feeley’s earlier psychoanalysis of federalism as a “national neurosis.”36 In a somewhat 
more gentle mode, Dean Rubin argued that our federalist structure of vertical separation 
of powers has atrophied into “puppy federalism; like puppy love, it looks somewhat 
authentic but does not reflect the intense desires that give the real thing its inherent 
meaning.”37 Feeley and Rubin attribute the (supposed) incoherence of Supreme Court 
doctrine on the subject to this lack of an actual need for federalism.38 “It is time,” Rubin 
                                                      
34 FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 14, at 16. This is, to put it mildly, not necessarily so.  As many 
scholars have demonstrated, particular states may slice the national electorate differently, so that 
national minorities are local majorities. See infra notes __ - __ and accompanying text. Those 
national minorities may strongly prefer state autonomy, which allows them to exercise power, 
even if they have no particular attachment to the state as a matter of personal identity. See, e.g., 
Bulman-Pozen, supra note 16, at __. I prefer, however, to jump off the Rubin-Feeley train at a 
different point. For a more focused critique of the entire argument, see Ernest A. Young, What 
Does It Take to Make a Federal System? On Constitutional Entrenchment, Separate Spheres, and 
Political Identity, 45 TULSA L. REV. 831 (2011) (reviewing both the Schapiro and the Feeley and 
Rubin books). 
35 Rubin, supra note 12, at 46. 
36 See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 28. 
37 Rubin, supra note 12, at 38. 
38 See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 28, at 126 (“Because federalism has ceased to be an operative 
principle in modern American government, decisions that strike down national legislation in its 
name are little more than either random firings of a nostalgia-driven dissatisfaction with modernity 
or political tropisms that reflect the judges’ underlying views about substantive and otherwise 
nonjusticiable matters of policy.”). One could certainly quibble about whether the Court’s 
federalism doctrine is any more incoherent than, say, its doctrine on separation of powers, equal 
protection, or fundamental rights. Constitutional law is hard, and it rarely lends itself to simple 
solutions. 
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concludes, “to stop being fooled by political rhetoric and mistaking puppy federalism for 
the real thing. Real federalism is gone; America is a centralized administrative state.”39 
I will call this position the “One Nation” argument. For Dean Rubin and 
Professor Feeley, it is an argument for abandoning federalism altogether. But the 
argument need not pay out in that way; as Robert Schapiro’s recent work suggests, the 
One Nation thesis may argue instead for re-orienting our federalism to serve the 
objectives of the national political community. “To the extent that states do reflect 
integral communities of value, with moral and cultural views different from those of 
other states, then allocating certain kinds of power to the states make sense,” Dean 
Schapiro writes, but “[w]ithout division on key principles, federalism is not necessary.”40 
In place of traditional or “dualist” models of federalism, however, Schapiro advocates a 
“polyphonic” conception that would “protec[t] . . .  the institutional integrity of multiple 
sources of power and . . . promot[e] . . . the dynamic interaction of those centers of 
authority.”41 All of this is meant to further a fundamental shift in federalism’s orientation: 
Federalism should no longer be about drawing boundaries between state and federal 
power, but rather a means of harnessing the capacities of both state and federal 
governments to serve national ends.42  
James Gardner’s work on state constitutionalism deploys the One Nation 
argument in a more focused way. Much of Professor Gardner’s work rejects “character-
based” interpretation of state constitutions—that is, interpretation relying on the notion 
that “the people of the various states have demonstrably distinct characters of their own,” 
such that “state constitutions . . . are self-conscious expressions of the values and 
                                                      
39 Id. at 49.  
40 SCHAPIRO, supra note 13, at 27. 
41 Id. at 96. In music, polyphony describes “the simultaneous and harmonious combination of a 
number of individual melodic lines”—as in Bach’s fugues or Pachelbel’s canon.  Id. at 94 (quoting 
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE (draft revision June 2007), http://www.oed.com/). While 
Rubin and Feeley urge that any decentralization in our system should not be constitutionally 
entrenched, see FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 14, at 50-54, Schapiro’s conception “remains 
federalist” in the sense that “the allocation of authority between the states and the national 
government has constitutional status,” but this constitutional allocation does not protect exclusive 
domains of state authority. SCHAPIRO, supra note 13, at 96-97. 
42 See id. at 176. 
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character of the respective state polities.”43 Gardner thus attacks notions of “romantic 
subnationalism” that would recognize any meaningful form of state political identity.44 
For him, “a view of the American states as distinct and cohesive political 
subcommunities whose inhabitants comprise peoples with integrated histories and 
corresponding sets of values that suffice to set them apart not only from one another, but 
from the national community” is “not only implausible on its own merits, but points us 
down exactly the wrong path.”45 
Although important differences separate these scholars, they each reject 
traditional notions of constitutional federalism based on a judgment that the American 
states are no longer distinctive in any meaningful way. Their positions implicitly assume 
that the citizens of any given state will not strongly identify with that state unless it is 
distinctive in some important way from other states. And because the states do not, in 
Dean Schapiro’s phrase, “reflect integral communities of value,”46 these positions infer 
that there is no particular reason to protect their constitutional autonomy to make policy 
choices different from those of the national government.47 This, then, is the One Nation 
argument: Traditional conceptions of federalism are obsolete in a world where Americans 
no longer strongly identify with their states.   
Dean Rubin’s and Professor Feeley’s assertion that we are one nation revolves 
around a central empirical claim—that the American people, sociologically speaking, feel 
no significant loyalty to their states—and yet makes no attempt to come forward with 
                                                      
43 See GARDNER, supra note 15, at 53-54. See also James A. Gardner, Southern Character, 
Confederate Nationalism, and the Interpretation of State Constitutions: A Case Study in 
Constitutional Argument, 76 TEXAS L. REV. 1219 (1998) [hereinafter Gardner, Southern 
Character]; James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 
761, 818 (1992) [hereinafter Gardner, Failed Discourse]. 
44 See GARDNER, supra note 15, at 53. 
45 Id. at 56. 
46 SCHAPIRO, supra note 13, at 27. 
47 Professor Schapiro does think that the Constitution protects “the institutional integrity of states” 
and “[t]he continued functioning of each state’s political apparatus.” Id. at 96. But that protection 
does not extend to limit national power to encroach on the States’ regulatory jurisdiction. Id. at 96-
97. 
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evidence to support that claim. 48 We ought, as scholars, to be able to do a little better 
than that. Many law professors spend much of their time in either large metropolitan 
areas or university towns, and many of us teach at “national law schools” that virtually 
ignore state law. We ought to be on the lookout for “availability bias”—that is, the 
fallacy of generalizing from one’s own experience.49 The likelihood that most law 
professors experience a relatively homogeneous national community with relatively little 
state-by-state variation doesn’t establish that other Americans live the same way.   
This essay tries to get some empirical traction on the question of state identity. 
The importance of that question transcends the One Nation argument.  Another important 
school of thought, exemplified by Heather Gerken and Jessica Bulman-Pozen,50 accepts 
the notion that citizens no longer identify with their states but maintains that American 
federalism nonetheless provides important benefits, such as the opportunity for national 
minorities to exercise power in states where they happen to enjoy majority support.51 This 
view tends to assume that the only thing distinctive about any given state is that it may 
offer a different correlation of political forces from the nation as a whole, and that 
citizens’ attachments to their states reflect only the instrumental value of the political unit 
in achieving their policy goals.52 Although this “Partisan Federalist” view would retain 
the federal structure for instrumental reasons, discounting notions of identity and 
                                                      
48 Indeed, those steeped in the empirical detail of state and local politics tend to come to the 
opposite conclusion—that is, that federalism remains necessary to accommodate the vast diversity 
of American politics. See MICHAEL BARONE, SHAPING OUR NATION: HOW SURGES OF MIGRATION 
TRANSFORMED AMERICA AND ITS POLITICS 12-13 (2013); Virginia Gray, The Socioeconomic and 
Political Context of States, in POLITICS IN THE AMERICAN STATES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 1, 
6 (Virginia Gray & Russell L. Hanson, eds., 8th ed. 2004). 
49 See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 129-36 (2011) (discussing the availability 
bias); ANDREW GELMAN, RED STATE, BLUE STATE, RICH STATE, POOR STATE: WHY AMERICANS 
VOTE THE WAY THEY DO 36-37 (2008) (arguing that availability distorts the way we think about 
states). 
50 [cites] 
51 See, e.g., Gerken, Progressive Federalism, supra note 27; Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by 
Deciding, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1745 (2005); see also Bulman-Pozen, supra note 16, at __ (arguing 
that states play an important role in partisan competition because, at any given time, each party 
will control a certain number of states). 
52 See, e.g., Bulman-Pozen, supra note 16, at 1110 (denying that the states are inherently 
distinctive). 
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attachments has important implications for explaining how our federalism operates and 
what is necessary to preserve it.53   
Likewise, longstanding debates about the extent to which courts should enforce 
constitutional limits on national power have focused on various “political safeguards” of 
federalism as an alternative to judicial review. 54  These safeguards include the 
representation of the states in Congress, the links between national and state-level 
political parties, and various entities that make up the intergovernmental lobby.55 Similar 
claims have been made concerning the ability of state executive officials to influence 
federal policy and resist federal mandates in the context of cooperative federalism 
arrangements.56 The plausibility of all these arguments and the vigor of the safeguards for 
state autonomy that they posit depend in significant part on the degree of loyalty that a 
state’s federal representatives, political party officials, and executive officers feel toward 
the state as a distinct political community. For all these reasons, then, it is worth 
exploring the current state of state identity. 
II. What is State Identity, and How Do We Tell If It’s Dead? 
Not long ago, the Garden State fended off a proposal by the federal Office of 
Management and Budget to roll North and South Jersey into newly designated 
“megapolitan” areas of New York and Philadelphia for census purposes.57 This proposal 
would have lent the Presidential imprimatur to the old saw that New Jersey is a state 
                                                      
53 See, e.g., Young, Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 22, at __; Young, Marijuana Nullification, 
supra note 24, at __.  
54 See, e.g., Wechsler, supra note 20. 
55 See Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back Into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000); JOHN D. NUGENT, SAFEGUARDING FEDERALISM: HOW STATES 
PROTECT THEIR INTERESTS IN NATIONAL POLICYMAKING (2009). 
56 Heather K. Gerken, Exit, Voice, and Disloyalty, 62 DUKE L. J. 1349 (2013); Jessica Bulman-
Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L. J. 1256 (2009). 
57 See Angela Starita, Census, Restoring State’s Identity, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2000, available at 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A0DE6DB1339F933A2575AC0A9669C8B63; 
Executive Office of the President, Recommendations From the Metropolitan Area Standards 
Review Committee to the Office of Management and Budget Concerning Changes to the Standards 
for Defining Metropolitan Areas, Part IV, 64 Fed. Reg. 56628 (Oct. 20, 1999). 
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whose two principal cities lie outside its borders.58 From OMB’s perspective, “New 
Jersey” would have ceased to exist. OMB’s general willingness to redefine relevant 
political communities without regard to state borders appears symptomatic of Dean 
Rubin’s contention that the American states have become homogenized. We can all cite 
examples from our own experience to bolster that contention. As Matt Weiland laments, 
“one city blurs into another; the same architects build the same buildings, the same stores 
line the same streets, the same songs play on the radio; regional accents fade and 
everyone seems to be from somewhere else.”59 
I chose New Jersey for my title because, at least in the popular mind, it 
epitomizes Mr. Weiland’s worry about the death of distinctive state character. A 
longstanding tradition describes the Garden State as generic. Writing in the 1920s, 
Edmund Wilson devastatingly described it as a place “where people do not live to 
develop a society of their own but where they merely pass or sojourn on their way to do 
something else.”60 Contemporary writers strike much the same note. Luc Sante wrote in 
2003 that “the state’s identity is pretty thin. . . .  The New Jerseyan is generally seen as 
the embodiment of upwardly mobile rootlessness and material self-satisfaction.”61 The 
state has come a long way from a time when “New Jersey troops reporting for duty at 
                                                      
58 See, e.g., Edmund Wilson, Jr., New Jersey: The Slave of Two Cities, in, THESE UNITED STATES: 
PORTRAITS OF AMERICA FROM THE 1920S 243, 243 (Daniel H. Borus, ed. 1992) (first published 
June 14, 1922) [hereinafter THESE UNITED STATES 1920S] (“The chances are . . . that New Jersey 
seems to you essentially a region that one traverses to go somewhere else, a kind of suburb and No 
Man’s Land between New York and Philadelphia.”). 
59 Matt Weiland, Preface, in STATE BY STATE, supra note 3, at xiv. 
60 Wilson, supra note 58, at 243.  On the other hand, nearly every time that I have presented this 
paper to colloquia around the country (not yet in New Jersey, alas), someone has collared me 
afterwards to insist that New Jersey does, in fact, have a distinctive identity.  The asserted 
distinctiveness nearly always has something to do with either Bruce Springsteen60 or the Sopranos. 
See, e.g., Bourdain, supra note 3, at 301. 
61 Luc Sante, New Jersey: On Mediocrity’s Cutting Edge, in JOHN LEONARD, ED., THESE UNITED 
STATES: ORIGINAL ESSAYS BY LEADING AMERICAN WRITERS ON THEIR STATE WITHIN THE UNION 
271, 274 (2003) [hereinafter THESE UNITED STATES 2003]. 
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Valley Forge . . . initially refused to swear allegiance to the ‘United States of America’ 
because, as they said, ‘New Jersey is our country.’”62 
This transformation of New Jersey fits into a broader and familiar historical 
narrative. The American colonies were highly diverse at the Founding in terms of 
demographics, systems of government, religious belief, and economic interests, and 
Americans felt strong loyalties toward their newly-independent state communities.63  But 
“[i]n the last half of the eighteenth century the peoples of the colonies and states 
developed a common American identity that coexisted with other, primarily state and 
local, identities.”64 Foreign threats to the early Republic strengthened this sense of 
nationhood, but as those threats subsided and disputes arose between North and South, 
“[s]ectional and economic identities emerged and increasingly divided the country, 
leading to the Civil War.” 65  “That war,” Samuel Huntington explains, “solidified 
America as a nation by the end of the nineteenth century.”66 Other scholars argue that we 
                                                      
62 ANDRO LINKLATER, THE FABRIC OF AMERICA: HOW OUR BORDERS AND BOUNDARIES SHAPED 
THE COUNTRY AND FORGED OUR NATIONAL IDENTITY 44 (2007). 
63 See generally ALAN TAYLOR, AMERICAN COLONIES: THE SETTLING OF NORTH AMERICA (2002); 
see also DAVID C. HENDRICKSON, PEACE PACT: THE LOST WORLD OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING 
(2003) (arguing that the Founding was a “peace pact” meant to stave off violent conflict among 
the states by creating a federal union similar to the interstate settlements that had existed among 
European countries); DAVID HACKETT FISCHER, ALBION’S SEED: FOUR BRITISH FOLKWAYS IN 
AMERICA (1989) (exploring the origins of dramatic differences between colonial cultures in 
Puritan New England, aristocratic Virginia, the Quaker Delaware Valley, and the Scotch-Irish 
backcountry); DANIEL J. ELAZAR, THE AMERICAN MOSAIC, THE IMPACT OF SPACE, TIME, AND 
CULTURE ON AMERICAN POLITICS 59 (1994) [hereinafter ELAZAR, MOSAIC] (“British America’s 
first generation saw an attempt to allow religious pluralism on a strictly territorial basis; that is, 
particular religious groups were given, or claimed, exclusive control over particular territories.”). 
64 SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, WHO ARE WE? THE CHALLENGES TO AMERICA’S NATIONAL IDENTITY 
17 (2004). 
65 Id. 
66 Id.  See also ROBERT PENN WARREN, THE LEGACY OF THE CIVIL WAR 4, 6-7 (1961) (observing 
that “we became a nation . . . only with the civil war” and that after it, the nation “gives us our 
most significant sense of identity”). 
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did not truly become a unified nation until the Second World War.67 In any event, 
“American nationalism became preeminent as the United States emerged on the world 
scene and in the following century fought two world wars and a cold war.”68 One can 
hardly doubt that, as national identity increased in importance, state identity suffered at 
least a relative decline and, possibly, an absolute one as well. But to acknowledge this 
hardly demonstrates that the states have become identical and unimportant, or that state 
identity no longer remains strong enough to play an important role in our federalism.  
Proponents of the One Nation argument would no doubt agree with Anthony 
Bourdain assertion that “now . . . the whole country looks like Jersey.”69 But evidence of 
continued state distinctiveness and attachments is all around us. If one leaves behind the 
suburbs, it would be hard to claim that Newark feels like Austin, San Francisco, or even 
Manhattan, that the Jersey landscape resembles Yosemite, the Texas  Panhandle, or the 
coast of Maine, or that people in Jersey are indistinguishable from the denizens of 
Laredo, Berkeley, or Wichita. Or consider the 2012 electoral season, which presented our 
federalism in all its fascinating (and frustrating) glory. During the interminable 
Republican primaries, each new state presented a radically different playing field, with a 
different correlation of political forces (e.g., evangelicals in South Carolina, Yankees and 
crossover voters in New Hampshire, Catholics in Pennsylvania), a unique set of salient 
issues (immigration in Texas and Arizona, abortion in Pennsylvania, ethanol subsidies in 
Iowa), and even styles of campaigning (door-to-door in New Hampshire, TV ad blitzes in 
Michigan and Florida).70 In the general election, the varied characteristics of each state 
profoundly shaped the electoral strategies of the candidates, and the outcomes in each 
state reflected considerable political divergence.71 Closer to home, I am continually 
surprised by the proportion of my Duke students avowing a strong attachment to North 
                                                      
67 BARONE, supra note 48, at 269 (observing that “over the next three generations [following the 
Civil War] the North and the South remained within the same national boundaries but lived largely 
apart from each other,” but “World War II had an opposite, annealing effect”). 
68 HUNTINGTON, supra note 64, at 17. 
69 Bourdain, supra note 3, at 301. 
70 [cites] 
71 [cites] 
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Carolina—even at the private, more cosmopolitan rival of the state’s flagship university 
in Chapel Hill.72 
   Recognizing that the plural of “anecdote” is not “data,” we need a better factual 
basis for current discussions of state identity. State identity is neither easy to define nor 
easy to measure, and social scientists have long acknowledged that “[w]e have very little 
empirical data on the characteristics of political culture within American states.”73 I do 
not purport to have solved either the definitional or the measurement problem here. But it 
is possible to move the ball forward on both fronts: We can be more precise about the 
various things we may mean when we talk about state identity, and that in turn will help 
us assess the several different sorts of evidence concerning whether it still exists and to 
what extent. 
A. Identity, Distinctiveness, and Political Culture 
The general problems of federalism, nationalism, and political loyalty are all very 
old, but use of the term “identity” in connection with such social questions is much more 
recent.74 One would like to begin with a cogent definition, but the term itself is both 
                                                      
72 After all, a favorite canard slung about by Tarheel types is that Duke students all hail from—you 
guessed it—New Jersey. See, e.g., Natethegreat155, Why We (Still) Hate Duke, 
THESPORTSJURY.COM, Jan. 14, 2011, available at http://thesportsjury.com/cbb/why-we-still-hate-
duke/.  Actually, North Carolina and California tied for the most students in the Duke undergrad 
class of 2016; New Jersey came in fifth. Duke University Office of News and Communications, 
Quick Facts about Duke, http://newsoffice.duke.edu/all-about-duke/quick-facts-about-duke 
(visited April 17, 2013). Although Duke has a higher New Jersey percentage, it is worth 
remembering that UNC has over twice as many New Jerseyan undergrads as Duke. Compare 
Profile of the Class of 2018, Duke 
Univ., http://admissions.duke.edu/images/uploads/process/DukeClass2018Profile.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 16, 2015) (93 New Jersey undergrads in the Class of 2018), with Student Headcount by State 
of Origin, Fall 2014, Univ. of N.C. (Sept. 16, 2014), http://oira.unc.edu/files/2014/09/Student-
Headcount-by-State-of-Origin-Fall-2014.pdf (197 New Jersey undergrads in the Class of 2018). 
73 Samuel C. Patterson, The Political Cultures of the American States, 30 J. POLITICS 187, 195 
(1968). 
74 See KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, THE ETHICS OF IDENTITY 65 (2005) (“The contemporary use of 
‘identity’ to refer to such features of people as their race, ethnicity, nationality, gender, religion, or 
sexuality first achieved prominence in the social psychology of the 1950s—particularly in the 
work of Erik Erikson and Alvin Gouldner.”); Rogers Brubaker & Frederick Cooper, Beyond 
‘identity,’ 29 THEORY & SOCIETY 1, 2-4 (2000) (same). For a detailed etymology, see WILLIAM 
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ambiguous and controversial. William Mackenzie wrote in the mid-1970s that “identity” 
was a word “driven out of its wits by over-use”;75 more recently, Rogers Brubaker and 
Frederick Cooper have argued that “‘[i]dentity’ . . . tends to mean too much (when 
understood in a strong sense), too little (when understood in a weak sense), or nothing at 
all (because of its sheer ambiguity).”76 
The One Nation argument identifies identity as a precondition for federalism: 
Professor Feeley and Dean Rubin assert that “regional autonomy will only be appealing 
to people if the region itself is meaningful to people, that is, if it relates to their sense of 
political identity.”77 They seem to suggest, however, that only an exceptionally strong 
form of identity will do. The “attitudinal criteria” for federalism are not met, they assert, 
unless people are “willing to die” and “willing[] to kill” in order “to establish a separate 
or quasi-autonomous regime.” 78  Certain fringe movements aside, 79  that level of 
commitment to state separatism surely died at Appomattox. 
It is unclear why willingness to engage in separatist violence should be the 
criterion. In a less polemical moment, Professor Feeley and Dean Rubin recognized that 
“[p]olitical identity need not be universal, exclusive, or even primary in order to be an 
important determinant of people’s attitudes.”80  This weaker conception is far more 
                                                                                                                                                    
JAMES MILLAR MACKENZIE, POLITICAL IDENTITY 19-27 (1978) (tracing the use of “shared 
identity” back to Aristotle). 
75 MACKENZIE, supra note 74, at 11. 
76 Brubaker & Cooper, supra note 74, at 1. 
77 FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 14, at 16. 
78 Id. at 61. 
79 See, e.g., Simon Romero, In Small Town, the Fight Continues for Texas Sovereignty, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 13, 2005, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/13/national/13overton.html.  
Indeed, in its current form, even the “Republic of Texas” movement may not meet the 
Feeley/Rubin criteria.  See id. (suggesting that the organization has entered a “kinder, gentler” 
phase). 
80 FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 14, at 11; see also id. (“[Political identity] need only be a means of 
self-interpretation that is readily and widely deployed in a variety of situations.  That is sufficient 
for it to serve as an important consideration in virtually any political setting and as a determinative 
one in a good number of situations.”); id. at 50 (acknowledging “the complex, variable character 
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consistent with discussions of identity in both public discourse81 and the social science 
literature82 than the violence-only notion.83 No one thinks that Scottish identity doesn’t 
exist simply because modern-day Scots seem (mostly) unwilling to paint their faces blue 
and whack the English with claymores.84 Even in the wake of the Scottish secession 
referendum’s defeat, distinctive Scottish identity and loyalty continues to have important 
political consequences.85 
It will help to begin with Professor Mackenzie’s elegant question, “in what 
context do ‘I’ properly use the word ‘we’?”86 This formula catches two aspects of identity 
central to my present purpose: a notion of self-understanding as well as a sense of 
                                                                                                                                                    
of political identity,” and noting that “[m]any people possess a dual identity or multiple identities 
or experience shifts from one identity to another”). 
81  See, e.g., NATAN SHARANSKY WITH SHIRA WOLOSKY WEISS, DEFENDING IDENTITY: ITS 
INDISPENSABLE ROLE IN PROTECTING DEMOCRACY  7 (2008) (“The individual understands himself 
or herself in terms of a community, not only as a singular independent person but also as an 
individual attached to others and interdependent with them. . . . Identity in this sense is a kind of 
communal self.”). 
82 See, e.g., THOMAS RISSE, A COMMUNITY OF EUROPEANS? TRANSNATIONAL IDENTITIES AND 
PUBLIC SPHERES 9 (2010) (“Social identities are collectively shared social constructions linking 
individuals to social groups, national or supranational imagined communities in our case.”). 
83 See, e.g., Brubaker & Cooper, supra note 74, at 6-8 (discussing five different usages of 
“identity” among scholars, none of which are limited to willingness to engage in violence).  
Professors Brubaker and Cooper worry that “weak” formulations of identity both depart from “the 
common-sense meaning of the term,” which typically connotes “strong notions of group 
boundedness and homogeneity,” and may be “too weak to do useful theoretical work.” Id. at 10-
11.  But this concern has to with whether identity must necessarily entail an “emphasis on 
sameness over time or across persons,” id. at 10, not whether identity must be sufficiently 
compelling to motivate violent behavior. 
84 See generally AILSA HENDERSON, HIERARCHIES OF BELONGING: NATIONAL IDENTITY AND 
POLITICAL CULTURE IN SCOTLAND AND QUEBEC (2007). 
85  See After the No Vote, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 19, 2014, 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/blighty/2014/09/scotlands-referendum-1 (discussing efforts “to 
crack on with the promised devolution” that the U.K. government assured Scotland would occur if 
it remained in the Union, and concluding that “the United Kingdom will stay united. But it will 
also be looser and constitutionally messier than in the past”). 
86 MACKENZIE, supra note 74, at 12. 
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commonality and connectedness.  The first involves “one’s sense of who one is, of one’s 
social location, and of how (given the first two) one is prepared to act.”87 The second 
connotes an “emotionally laden sense of belonging to a distinctive bounded group, 
involving both a felt solidarity or oneness with fellow group members and a felt 
difference from or even antipathy to specified outsiders.”88   
This is all pretty fuzzy, however. My ultimate concern is with the institutional 
dynamics of federalism. I want to know, for example, whether Members of Congress can 
really be counted upon to protect the interests of their states as distinct political 
communities (as opposed to voting their ideology or maximizing their personal chance of 
re-election).89 Likewise, I seek to assess how likely a state’s citizens are to display 
“loyalty,” in Albert Hirschman’s sense, as opposed to choosing “exit” when conditions 
head South.90 Martha Nussbaum has written that individuals cannot be expected to make 
sacrifices on behalf of their fellow citizens unless they feel “love” and communal 
attachment for the common political community;91 I want to find out whether any of that 
affection is left in the American states. Although Dean Rubin and Professor Feeley’s 
criterion of “willingness to fight and die” is too extreme, they are right to ask what people 
are willing to do for their states. “Understood as a ground or basis of social action,” 
Professors Brubaker and Cooper write, “‘identity’ is often opposed to ‘interest’ in an 
effort to highlight and conceptualize non-instrumental modes of social and political 
action.”92  Put simply, my question is whether contemporary Americans understand 
themselves as sufficiently attached to their state political communities for that attachment 
to make a difference in decisions that affect the federal structure.93 
                                                      
87 Brubaker & Cooper, supra note 74, at 17. 
88 Id. at 19; see also SHARANSKY, supra note 81, at 7 (“[I]dentity means identification: solidarity 
with others with whom you identify.”). 
89 See, e.g., Wechsler, supra note 20. 
90 See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 21, at 36-38. 
91 See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POLITICAL EMOTIONS: WHY LOVE MATTERS FOR JUSTICE (2013). 
92 Brubaker & Cooper, supra note 74, at 6 (emphasis in original). 
93 Again, Scotland provides a useful example.  Scots did not identify strongly enough with 
Scotland, to the exclusion of their broader British identity, to secede.  But Scottish identity was 
strong enough that Westminster had to make significant concessions of autonomy to stave off 
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Multiple literatures address identity. An extensive literature on nationalism draws 
primarily on political science, history, and philosophy,94 and another voluminous body of 
work on aspects of multiculturalism, especially racial and ethnic identity, adds in cultural 
anthropology and social psychology. 95   A comparative politics literature addresses 
identity as an aspect of international development, 96  and a psychological literature 
addresses personal identity.97  I will emphasize the nationalism literature, because it is 
more closely attuned to questions of politics and governance, while borrowing some from 
other disciplines as well.   
At the outset, one may well ask whether any of these literatures can appropriately 
be brought to bear on state identities within a federal system.  Benedict Anderson 
famously defined a nation as “an imagined political community—and imagined as both 
inherently limited and sovereign.”98  He acknowledged, however, that “[i]n fact all 
communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even 
these) are imagined.”99 If state communities in fact exist, then, they will be “imagined” in 
the same sense, and raise at least some of the same problems, as national communities. 
The analogy might fail, however, along either of the dimensions that Professor 
Anderson identifies as crucial: the inherent limits or the sovereignty of the community. 
Perhaps states are too limited in scope to foster a distinctive state identity. But this seems 
                                                                                                                                                    
secession.  The future of devolution in the U.K. will likely depend on whether that situation 
persists. 
94 See, e.g., BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES (rev. ed. 2006); DAVID MILLER, ON 
NATIONALITY (1995); NUSSBAUM, LOVE OF COUNTRY, supra note 5; ANTHONY D. SMITH, 
NATIONAL IDENTITY  (1991). 
95 See, e.g., APPIAH, supra note 74; MULTICULTURAL STATES: RETHINKING DIFFERENCE AND 
IDENTITY (David Bennett, ed.1998). 
96 See, e.g., POLITICAL CULTURE AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (Lucian W. Pye & Sidney Verba 
eds. 1969); see also MACKENZIE, supra note 74, at 29-34 (discussing this literature). 
97 See, e.g., PETER J. BURKE & JAN E. STETS, IDENTITY THEORY (2009). 
98 ANDERSON, supra note 94, at 6. 
99 Id. 
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unlikely, at least in the context of American federalism. As the map below demonstrates, 
the American states have populations equivalent to major nations around the world. 100 
 
As a matter of scale, Ohio has a similar population to Greece, Oregon is the size of 
Palestine, and New Jersey has as many people as Azerbaijan. Neither Greece, Palestine, 
nor Azerbaijan seems to have found itself too small to have nationalists.101 Similar 
                                                      
100 See Frank Jacobs, US States as Countries of Equal Population, Strange Maps, bigthink.com, 
June 6, 2009, available at http://bigthink.com/strange-maps/388-us-states-as-countries-of-equal-
population (map depicts analogous countries by flag; full listing is in comment 36).  For a similar 
map, using some different countries, see Stateside Substitutes: Comparing US States with 
Countries, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 13, 2011, available at 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/dailychart/2011/01/comparing_us_states_countries.  
101 Wyoming, our smallest state population-wise, has a comparable population to that of the 
Solomon Islands.  See id.  On nationalist movements within that island republic, see Solomon 
Islands, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, available at 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/553556/Solomon-Islands/53970/History#ref513786 
(visited Dec. 7, 2012) (describing “a nationalist movement known as Maasina Rule, which lasted 
from 1944 to 1952”). 
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comparisons can be made as a matter of physical size.  New Jersey, for example, is 
slightly larger than Israel.102 The next map103 facilitates a vivid comparison of the size of 
well-recognized nation-states to American states: 
 
By either measure, then, that the American states are hardly too small to serve as objects 
of political identity. 
                                                      
102 See Diana Hartman, Americans, Know Thy World: The Size of a Country (Part One: A-L), 
blogcritics, Feb. 15, 2007, available at http://blogcritics.org/culture/article/americans-know-thy-
world-the-size/; see also How Big are the States in America?, wisegeek.com, 
http://www.wisegeek.com/how-big-are-the-states-in-america.htm (visited Dec. 7, 2012).  
103  James Martin, Europe v. US Size Comparison Map, About.com, available at 
http://goeurope.about.com/od/europeanmaps/l/bl-country-size-comparison-map.htm (visited Dec. 
7, 2012).  My own sense of state identity compels me to point out that Texas is bigger than France.  
See id. 
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What about sovereignty? In analyzing questions of political identity, we will do 
better to use “sovereignty” somewhat loosely. As David Miller points out, one of the 
main issues in debates about nationalism is “whether each nation has a right to its own 
state.”104 Hence, “‘nation’ must refer to a community of people with an aspiration to be 
politically self-determining, and ‘state’ must refer to the set of political institutions that 
they may aspire to possess for themselves.”105  When we invoke Weber’s concept of a 
“set of political institutions” that “successfully claims a monopoly of legitimate force in a 
particular territory”106 or Blackstone’s older notion of a “a supreme, irresistible, absolute, 
uncontrolled authority, in which the jura summi imperii, or the rights of sovereignty, 
reside,” 107  we are generally talking about the state—that is, the institutions of 
government—not the underlying nation.108 The Palestinians have managed quite a bit of 
nationalism despite lacking, for much of their history, a set of state political institutions 
with control over a territory, and the member states of the European Union retain strong 
national identities despite having ceded far too much political authority to Brussels to be 
considered “sovereign” in the Blackstonian sense.109   Indeed, a prominent view in 
international relations theory redefines sovereignty as the ability to participate in 
                                                      
104 MILLER, supra note 94, at 19. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. (citing Max Weber). 
107 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *49 (Chicago, 1979) 
(1765). 
108 See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 94, at 14 (distinguishing between “national identity” and a 
“conception of the state”); FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE ORIGINS OF POLITICAL ORDER: FROM 
PREHUMAN TIMES TO THE FRENCH REVOLUTION  12-17 (2011) (distinguishing between the state as 
a set of political institutions and the underlying society); PHILIP BOBBITT, THE SHIELD OF 
ACHILLES: WAR, PEACE, AND THE COURSE OF HISTORY 81 (2002) (“The modern state . . . is an 
entity quite detachable from the society that it governs as well as from the leaders who exercise 
power.”). 
109 See generally THOMAS RISSE, A COMMUNITY OF EUROPEANS? TRANSNATIONAL IDENTITIES 
AND PUBLIC SPHERES 40-41 (2010) (collecting recent survey data); Anthony D. Smith, National 
Identity and the Idea of European Unity, 68 INT’L AFFAIRS 55 (1992); see also Ernest A. Young, 
The European Union: A Comparative Perspective, 1 OXFORD GUIDE TO EUROPEAN LAW __, __-__ 
(forthcoming 2015) [hereinafter Young, European Union] (discussing the persistence of Member 
State identity in Europe and its implications for European federalism). 
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cooperative efforts at international governance that significantly limit autonomy,110 and 
historical scholarship demonstrates that many of the Founders thought of their new Union 
in precisely these terms.111 
It thus seems possible to speak of nationalist-type identities in the American 
states despite the fact that those states lack a full measure of sovereignty. After all, the 
national government lacks full sovereignty, too; as Justice Kennedy has observed, “[t]he 
Framers split the atom of sovereignty.”112  But this juristic reality has not prevented the 
development of nationalism in the United States.113 The fact that two governments share 
authority over any given patch of territory in this country certainly complicates American 
notions of political identity. Indeed, the central story of American history in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth century was the growth of an American national identity 
that could compete with, and eventually eclipse, the identification of Americans with 
their states.114 But the fact that state identity must coexist and possibly compete with 
other identities hardly renders it incoherent; after all, as Anthony Smith has observed, 
“the self is composed of multiple identities and roles—familial, territorial, class, 
religious, ethnic and gender.”115 I return to this problem of competing national and state 
identities in some depth in Part VI. For present purposes, however, my point is simply 
                                                      
110 See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE 
WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1998). 
111 See HENDRICKSON, supra note 63, at 28 (arguing that the Founders considered “the making of 
the union and the Constitution to be an experiment in international cooperation”).  
112 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see 
generally GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969) 
(discussing the Founders’ views on sovereignty). 
113 See, e.g., Graham E. Fuller, America’s Uncomfortable Relationship with Nationalism, Stanley 
Foundation Policy Analysis Brief, July 2006, available at 
http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/pab/pab06nationalism.pdf. 
114 See, e.g., WILFRED M. MCCLAY, THE MASTERLESS: SELF AND SOCIETY IN MODERN AMERICA 
9-39 (1994) (discussing the role of the Civil War in consolidating a national identity in America 
for people in the victorious North). 
115 SMITH, supra note 94, at 4. 
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that the American states’ role as political subdivisions of a larger federal polity does not 
inherently disqualify them as loci for political identity. Ask any Québéçois.116 
The difficulty in thinking of American states as objects of nationalist-type 
sentiment arises not from some categorical difference between those states and other 
political communities, but rather from a sense that our states lack the current linguistic or 
ethnic distinctiveness or the separate history that characterize a Quebec or a Scotland.117 I 
demonstrate in Part III that the homogeneity of our states has been exaggerated. 
Moreover, our history illustrates that ethnic homogeneity is not everything. As David 
Potter has pointed out, “[e]thnically, America has probably never shown a greater degree 
of sameness than at the time when the nation was dividing and moving toward civil 
war.”118 Nonetheless, it is not my thesis that any American state has developed a separate 
political identity on a par with the Québécois or the Scots. The question, rather, is 
whether individuals identify with their states in ways that meaningfully impact the 
working of our federal system. The literature on national identity is a helpful starting 
point in assessing that question. 
David Miller’s influential work on nationality offers five elements that, taken 
together, “serve to distinguish nationality from other collective sources of personal 
identity.”119 First, he argues, “national communities . . . exist when their members 
recognize one another as compatriots, and believe that they share characteristics of the 
relevant kind.” 120  Second, nationality “is an identity that embodies historical 
continuity.”121 It is “a community of obligation. Because our forebears have toiled and 
spilt their blood to build and defend the nation, we who are born into it inherit an 
                                                      
116 See, e.g., JAMES M. MCPHERSON, IS BLOOD THICKER THAN WATER? CRISES OF NATIONALISM 
IN THE MODERN WORLD  (1998) (discussing Quebec’s bid for autonomy as a crisis of 
nationalism). 
117 Cf. The Scottish Government, Scotland’s Future—Your Guide to an Independent Scotland, 
http://www.scotreferendum.com/reports/scotlands-future-your-guide-to-an-independent-scotland/ 
(visited March 31, 2014) (website of executive branch of devolved Scottish government, making 
case for voting for independence in referendum scheduled for September 2014). 
118 DAVID M. POTTER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS, 1848-1861, at 8 (1976). 
119 MILLER, supra note 94, at 27. 
120 Id. at 22. 
121 Id. at 23. 
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obligation to continue their work, which we discharge partly towards our contemporaries 
and partly towards our descendants.”122 Third,  “national identity . . . is an active identity” 
defined “by the decisions that [the nation] takes.” 123   This political component 
differentiates national and other forms of political identity from merely ethnic identity; as 
Anthony Smith explains, “‘national’ identity involves some sense of political community, 
however tenuous.”124  Setting aside communities aspiring to have their own nations, like 
the Palestinians, “[a] political community in turn implies at least some common 
institutions and a single code of rights and duties for all the members of the 
community.”125   
“The fourth aspect of a national identity,” Professor Miller argues, “connects a 
group of people to a particular geographical place.”126 A nation is “a predominantly 
spatial or territorial conception,” whereby “[t]he homeland becomes a repository of 
historic memories and associations, the place where ‘our’ sages, saints and heroes lived, 
worked, prayed and fought.”127 Finally, “the people who share [a national identity] should 
have . . . a common public culture.”128  
This account of nationality emphasizes the civic aspects of national identity—
that is, the idea of common political institutions, history, and ideals. It may be contrasted 
with “an ‘ethnic’ conception of the nation,” distinguished by “its emphasis on a 
community of birth and native culture.”129 In this ethnic conception—the volk, in German 
                                                      
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 24. 
124 SMITH, supra note 94, at 9. 
125 Id.  For Smith, this “community of laws and institutions with a single political will” implies “a 
sense of legal equality among the members of that community.”  Id. at 10. 
126 MILLER, supra note 94, at 24. See also id. at 25 (“It is this territorial element that has forged the 
connection between nations and states, since . . . a state is precisely a body that claims legitimate 
authority over a geographical area.”). 
127 SMITH, supra note 94, at 9. 
128 MILLER, supra note 94, at 24; see also SMITH, supra note 94, at 11 (“[N]ations must have a 
measure of common culture and a civic ideology, a set of common understandings and aspirations, 
sentiments and ideas, that bind the population together in their homeland.”). 
129 SMITH, supra note 94, at 11; see generally id. at 12 (“Geneology and presumed descent ties, 
popular mobilization, vernacular languages, customs and traditions: these are the elements of an 
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parlance130—“the place of law in the Western civic model is taken by vernacular culture, 
usually languages and customs.”131It is important to recognize, however, that “[i]n fact 
every nationalism contains civic and ethnic elements in varying degrees and different 
forms.”132 
We might also contrast civic nationalism with what Jurgen Habermas and others 
have called “constitutional patriotism”—a form of identity predicated exclusively on 
certain common political ideals, such as a commitment to basic human rights. 133 
Proponents of this view have urged, for example, that the disparate nationalities of the 
European Union may find a viable sense of collective political identity by emphasizing 
their commitment to human rights and other “European values.”134 Civic nationalists 
have argued, on the other hand, that constitutional patriotism is too thin—that it neglects 
                                                                                                                                                    
alternative, ethnic conception of the nation, one that mirrored the very different route of ‘nation-
formation’ travelled by many communities in Eastern Europe and Asia and one that constituted a 
dynamic political challenge.”). Professor Smith calls the civic account “the standard, Western 
model of the nation,” in contrast with a “non-Western model” that “sprang up . . . notably in 
Eastern Europe and Asia.” Id. In order to avoid any debates about whether Germany, for example, 
counts as “the West”—as a native of West Texas, I’m not even sure Houston counts as “the 
West”—I will use the “civic” and “ethnic” terminology. 
130  See, e.g., “People” in German: Leute-Menschen-Volk, ABOUT.COM, 
http://german.about.com/library/weekly/aa021206a.htm, visited March 31, 2014 (distinguishing 
between three words for “people” in German; “volk” is used “when speaking of people as a nation, 
a community, a regional group, or ‘we, the people.’”). 
131 SMITH, supra note 94, at 12. 
132 Id. at 13 (describing the French experience as an example); Graham E. Fuller, America’s 
Uncomfortable Relationship with Nationalism, Stanley Foundation Policy Analysis Brief, July 
2006, at 2-3, available at http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/pab/pab06nationalism.pdf 
(pointing out that American nationalism has both civic and ethnic components).  On civic and 
ethnic nationalism, see, e.g., MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, BLOOD AND BELONGING: JOURNEYS INTO THE 
NEW NATIONALISM 5-9 (1993); Gardner, Southern Character, supra note 43, at 1282-87. 
133 See, e.g., Jürgen Habermas, Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future 
of Europe, 12 PRAXIS INT’L 1 (1992-93); JAN-WERNER MÜLLER, CONSTITUTIONAL PATRIOTISM 
(2007). 
134 [cites] 
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common ties of culture and shared history that are necessary to flesh out and particularize 
a commitment to values that are universal in nature.135  
Professor Miller’s criteria, which broadly overlap with the emphases of other 
leading scholars on nationalism, fall into two broad categories: distinctive characteristics 
of the community (its geography, history, and culture), and attitudes held by its citizens 
(a sense of common connection and membership). I will use “distinctiveness” to describe 
the first category and confine “identity” to the second. Identity and distinctiveness are not 
necessarily related. After all, I identify strongly with my own family, even if Tolstoy was 
right that “[a]ll happy families are alike.” 136  Nonetheless, it seems plausible to 
hypothesize that persons may be more likely to identify with a state if they can 
meaningfully distinguish that state from other states. Much of the federalism literature 
(including state-identity skeptics like Dean Rubin and Professor Feeley) has assumed that 
identity is related to distinctiveness. In a search for meaningful proxies for state identity, 
state-by-state variation on political, social, demographic, and cultural matters seems at 
least relevant, if not conclusive. Moreover, certain phenomena seem likely to provide 
evidence of both: a distinctive political culture or artistic tradition, for example, not only 
helps distinguish one state from another but also develops only as a result of commitment 
by a significant subset of a state’s citizens to focus on issues and themes particular to the 
state-level community.  
Distinctiveness and identity play an important role with respect to two sets of 
concerns that permeate the literature on constitutional federalism. The first has to do with 
the virtues (and vices) of federalism, 137  while the second involves federalism’s 
preservation. These two sets of concerns may help us sharpen what we are looking for 
when we speak of state “distinctiveness” and “identity.” 
                                                      
135 See MILLER, supra note 94, at 162-63. It may not be quite fair to charge constitutional patriots 
with neglecting these more particular elements entirely. See, e.g., MÜLLER, supra note 133, at 10 
(“Political agency . . . as envisaged by the proponents of constitutional patriotism, has been 
conceived as animated by a set of universalist norms, but enriched and strengthened by particular 
experiences and concerns.”). Nonetheless, the two approaches differ in emphasis. 
136 LEO TOLSTOY, ANNA KARENIN 13 (Rosemary Edmonds, trans. 1978) (1873-1877). 
137 See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317 (1997); Michael W. 
McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484 (1987); 
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B. Distinctiveness, Identity, and the Ends of Federalism 
 The Iraqi Constitution created a federal system precisely because “Iraq is a 
country of multiple nationalities, religions, and sects.”138 In the terms I have been using, 
Iraq was composed of subunits that had highly distinctive histories and cultures, religious 
and ethnic composition, and political preferences, and many Iraqis strongly identified 
with these subunits. From the standpoint of the One Nation argument, Iraq was a 
paradigm case of a country that needs federalism:  Iraq’s combustible mixture of 
religious sects and nationalities could be contained only by allowing each subgroup to 
have its own way on points of disagreement between the disparate communities, and by 
satisfying the need for recognition frequently voiced by distinctive cultural and political 
communities.139 As I have already discussed, proponents of the One Nation argument see 
this scenario as the only one warranting a federal solution.140 
 The question, however, is not whether a society would be ungovernable without 
federalism, but rather simply whether federalism will make a society better off. It is not 
difficult to see that more conventional accounts of the values of federalism also rely on 
notions of state distinctiveness and/or identity.  Consider, for example, the argument that 
at least some kinds of policy are best made on a decentralized basis so that they can be 
more closely tailored to local preferences and conditions. As Michael McConnell has 
explained, “[s]o long as preferences for government policies are unevenly distributed 
among the various localities, more people can be satisfied by decentralized decision 
making than by a single national authority.”141 This only works, however, if the states are 
at least somewhat distinctive in the sense that they feature different distributions of 
preferences than the nation as a whole.  The same thing is true when we speak of tailoring 
policy not to local preferences, but to conditions; efforts at pollution control, for example, 
may be more successful where they can be chosen or adapted on the basis of local 
climate, population density, hydrological conditions, and the like.142  The only difference 
                                                      
138  Iraqi Const., Section One, art. 3 (available at 
http://www.uniraq.org/documents/iraqi_constitution.pdf). 
139 See, e.g., MILLER, supra note 94, at 149 (discussing demands for recognition). 
140 Id. 
141 McConnell, supra note 137, at 1493.   
142 See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 137, at __; DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE __ 
(1995). 
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is that here the important kind of distinctiveness lies not in diverse policy preferences of 
the citizenry but in the physical or demographic characteristics of the local environment. 
While both versions of this argument for policy diversity depend on some level 
of state distinctiveness, neither hinges on identity. In Professor McConnell’s example, 
nothing turns on whether the good citizens of State A or B care about or identifies with 
their home jurisdiction. It is enough that the states are distinctive in some way—that they 
have distinct conditions or qualities or simply contain diverse correlations of political 
forces.143 Identity may play a somewhat more important role, however, in other standard 
arguments for federalism. 
 Consider, for example, the argument that federalism permits beneficial policy 
competition among the states.  As Professor McConnell states the argument, “smaller 
units of government have an incentive, beyond the mere political process, to adopt 
popular policies. If a community can attract additional taxpayers, each citizen's share of 
the overhead costs of government is proportionately reduced.”144  For my purposes, two 
things are worth noting about this argument.  First, nothing depends on the states being 
distinctive in some profound historic or cultural sense; if we had fifty identical state 
jurisdictions, competitive pressures might well encourage them to offer divergent policies 
in order to attract more citizens and capital.  The distinctiveness that matters here is that 
states have the opportunity to develop distinctive policies and, more fundamentally, that 
state governments are responsive to their citizens’ preferences.  
Second, identity may play an important role in facilitating interstate competition. 
We might ask, for example, why the citizens pressing for more competitive policies 
within their state have not simply moved to a more competitive state themselves? In 
Professor Hirschman’s terms, state citizens who advocate competitive policy innovations 
are exercising “voice” rather than “exit,” and the decision to do so often relies on a third 
factor:  “loyalty.”145 The kind of identity that matters, then, is the sort of attachment that 
                                                      
143  See also Bulman-Pozen, supra note 16, at __ (emphasizing the diversity of political 
predominance under federalism while denying that states are distinctive or intrinsic objects of 
loyalty). 
144 McConnell, supra note 137, at 1498. 
145 HIRSCHMAN, supra note 90, at ___. 
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may press citizens to support policy change within their home jurisdiction rather than 
simply seeking greener pastures somewhere else.146 
Similar points can be made about arguments for federalism based on the value of 
state-level policy experimentation—Justice Brandeis’s famous vision of the states as 
“laboratories of democracy.”147 The type of distinctiveness that matters is not the initial 
conditions of the states but rather their willingness and opportunity to try divergent policy 
approaches to common problems.148 But the willingness and ability of states to conduct 
policy experiments at all depends, as just noted, on having citizens that identify 
sufficiently with the state to remain in place and work for reform rather than exercising 
their rights of exits when unfavorable conditions arise. On the other hand, both the 
competition and experimentation rationales also trade on some degree of exit—that is, on 
a subset of the population being willing to move. That mobility, after all, incentivizes 
competition and rewards successful experiments. These aspects of federalism may work 
best when some subset of a state’s population is sufficiently loyal to remain in place and 
work for reform, but another significant subset is mobile and ready to exit in search of 
better conditions elsewhere. State identity, in other words, need not be universally shared. 
A second set of federalism values stems not from policy diversity but from the 
ways in which federalism may enhance the operation of the political system as a whole. 
These include citizen participation in politics, which is often thought to be easier at the 
state and local level,149 and voluntary compliance with the law, which is more likely 
when the local population had a hand in making that law and feels that it reflects their 
preferences.150 To the extent that majority preferences in a particular state diverge from 
the nation as a whole, federalism permits “dissenting by deciding”; if national dissenters 
                                                      
146 See, e.g., Young, Federalism Strategies, supra note 27, at __. 
147 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
148 To the extent that states are deeply distinctive, however, that fact may undermine the value of 
one state’s successful experiment to other states, as it may be unclear that the successful prototype 
can be adapted to divergent conditions in other jurisdictions. 
149 See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991); Deborah Jones Merritt, The 
Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7-
8 (1988). 
150 See McConnell, supra note 137, at 1508. 
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control a state government, after all, they have the opportunity not only to voice their 
arguments but also to enact them into law.151 
Most important among this latter group of federalist virtues is the ability of states 
to check central power.152  Although the days in which the state might oppose national 
power militarily may be behind us,153 states also serve important checking functions 
within the sphere of democratic politics.  Throughout our history, state governments have 
provided a rallying point for opposition to national policy.154  State legislatures may issue 
protests against unconstitutional or otherwise illegitimate national action,155 direct their 
own officials not to cooperate in the enforcement of federal law (or to enforce it 
differently than federal policy mandates),156 file lawsuits challenging national policy,157 
                                                      
151 See Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, supra note 51; see also Bulman-Pozen, supra note 16, at 
__; Ernest A. Young, Welcome to the Dark Side: Liberals Rediscover Federalism in the Wake of 
the War on Terror, 69 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1277, 1286-87 (2004). 
152 See generally Young, Taft Lecture, supra note 7, at __. 
153 See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 28, at ___. 
154 See Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle, 111 
HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2218 n.177 (1998) (noting that “Rubin and Feeley’s argument . . . ignores 
the degree to which the political structures of state and local governments provide organizing 
points for the development and maintenance of political opposition to the national government”). 
155 See, e.g., James Madison, Report on the Resolutions (1800), reprinted in 6 THE WRITINGS OF 
JAMES MADISON 341 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906) (articulating Virginia’s and Kentucky’s opposition 
to the federal Alien and Sedition Acts). ; see also Jackson, supra note 154, at 2219 n.181 (noting 
that “states are structurally better protected from federal overreaching than any discrete group of 
individuals, even a political majority, because their existing organization facilitates political 
action”). 
156 See, e.g., Ann Althouse, The Vigor of Anti-commandeering Doctrine in Times of Terror, 69 
BROOKLYN L. REV. 1231 (2004) (discussing state and local noncooperation with the Patriot Act); 
Michael Boldin, Liberty Preservation: The states say ‘NO’ to NDAA, TENTH AMENDMENT 
CENTER, April 8, 2013, available at http://tenthamendmentcenter.com/2013/04/08/liberty-
preservation-the-states-say-no-to-ndaa/ (reporting on Virginia legislation and pending bills in 
California, Michigan, Montana, and Texas to prohibit state agencies from supporting the indefinite 
detention provisions of the 2012 National Defense Appropriations Act). 
157 See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Popular Constitutionalism and the Underenforcement Problem: 
The Case of the National Healthcare Law, 75 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 157, 198-99 (2012) 
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or simply take the lead in legislative reform where the national government has failed to 
do so.158   
None of these process values is likely to be fully realized if the states are not 
distinctive from one another or if citizens do not identify, at least somewhat, with their 
states. The distinctive correlation of political forces in any given state is one of the spurs 
to popular participation; it gives political parties an incentive to mobilize support state-
by-state rather than focusing on the national level.159 And dissenting by deciding by 
national minorities is only possible if a state has a different profile from not only the 
nation but from other states. Likewise, individual states are most likely to act as a 
political check on the center if they diverge from national norms. 
Identification and loyalty may play an even more critical role. As Professor 
Hirschman noted, loyalty “activates voice”; that is, felt attachments to one’s home 
community encourage discontented citizens to stay and work for reform rather than 
simply to exit.160  When the going gets rough, citizens’ self-identification as loyal 
members of a state political community may be a key to ensuring that the state retains the 
resources necessary to recover and reform.  This kind of loyalty may also encourage the 
sort of communal action and compromise necessary to overcome political disagreement; 
as George Fletcher puts it, “loyalty is the beginning of political life, a life in which 
interaction with others becomes the primary means of solving problems.” 161   Self-
identification with a particular state may even encourage citizens who disagree with 
                                                                                                                                                    
(discussing the role of States in opposing federal policies such as the Affordable Care Act); 
Merritt, supra note 149, at 5 (noting that states are “indefatigable litigants”). 
158 See, e.g., GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1789-
1815, at 520 (“[B]y the early nineteenth century every Northern state had provided for the 
eventual end of slavery.”); Merritt, supra note 149, at 6-7. 
159 See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 16, at __. 
160 HIRSCHMAN, supra note 90, at 78. 
161 GEORGE P. FLETCHER, LOYALTY: AN ESSAY ON THE MORALITY OF RELATIONSHIPS 5 (1993); 
see also GABRIEL A. ALMOND & SIDNEY VERBA, THE CIVIC CULTURE 246 (1963) (“The attitude 
most relevant to long-term political stability may not be the individual’s level of satisfaction with 
governmental out-put or with his role as participant” but rather “a more diffuse sense of 
attachment or loyalty to the political system—a loyalty not based specifically on system 
performance”). 
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particular state policies to nonetheless feel an investment in them162—a result that may 
facilitate both compromise and political reform.  I have argued elsewhere, for example, 
that proponents of same-sex marriage are most likely to achieve lasting social acceptance 
if they prevail legally through channels that opponents perceive as legitimate and 
democratic; having “had their say,” opponents may well be more likely to accept the 
results.163 
States are also more likely to be effective checks on the central government if 
they enjoy the loyalty of their citizens.  Writing about national identity, Sidney Verba 
argued that “[i]t is the sense of identity with the nation that legitimizes the activities of 
national elites and makes it possible for them to mobilize the commitment and support of 
their followers.” 164   Commenting on this passage, Samuel Patterson observed that 
“[s]ystem identification, pride, commitment, and loyalty may be associated with political 
sub-systems as well,” and he concluded that “[i]n a federal structure, the states are likely 
to constitute important focuses for identification, loyalty, and pride.” 165  This was 
evidently the view of our Founders, who viewed federalism as a competition between the 
national and state governments for the loyalty of the sovereign People. 166  More 
contemporary conceptions of the “political safeguards” of federalism ultimately rest on 
the same premise. 167   As I discuss further in Part VI, the Federalists envisioned 
Americans identifying with both their national and state governments, with each level of 
loyalty becoming more salient to the extent that the other level performed poorly or 
presented a threat to liberty.168  State identities thus need not be exclusive or even 
                                                      
162 See, e.g., MORTON GRODZINS, THE LOYAL AND THE DISLOYAL 21 (1956). 
163 See Young, Federalism Strategies, supra note 27, at ___. 
164  Sidney Verba, Comparative Political Culture, in POLITICAL CULTURE AND POLITICAL 
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 96, at 512, 529. 
165 Patterson, supra note 73, at 191, 198. 
166 See, e.g., The Federalist Nos. 45 & 46 (James Madison); Pettys, supra note 23; see generally 
Jacob T. Levy, Federalism, Liberalism, and the Separation of Loyalties, 101 AM. POL. SCI. REV 
459 (2007). 
167 See generally Wechsler, supra note 20; see also Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process 
Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349, 1356-57 (2001) (discussing the relation between Wechsler’s 
theory and the ability of states to attract the loyalty of their citizens).  
168 See infra notes __-__ and accompanying text. 
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primary; rather, a healthy federalism simply requires that each level of government enjoy 
sufficient loyalty to maintain popular support, develop and implement distinctive politics, 
and—in a pinch—channel popular dissent from national policy. 
Loyalties to states are critical not only to preserving liberty, but also to 
preserving federalism itself. For decades, legal scholars and jurists have debated whether 
constitutional limits on national power require judicial enforcement for their preservation; 
the alternative, as Herbert Wechsler famously put it, is to rely on “political safeguards”—
chiefly, the states’ representation in Congress—to safeguard the institutional autonomy of 
state governments.169  More recent entries into this debate have expanded the scope of 
“political safeguards” to include, for example, the role of state political parties and 
autonomous behavior by state bureaucrats charged with implementing federal law and 
state lobbying efforts in Washington, D.C.170  These institutional mechanisms seem 
unlikely to function well, however, unless the state representatives and officials involved 
identify strongly with their native jurisdictions. Put in Albert Hirschman’s terms,171 the 
political safeguards of federalism offer the states an avenue for “voice,” but voice will 
often be ineffective unless it is supported by “loyalty.” 
If all this is right, then the “One Nation” argument errs by assuming that 
accommodating strong and discordant state identities is the only purpose or end of 
federalism. The federalist virtues of policy diversity and experimentation, participatory 
politics, and checks and balances have value whether or not citizens strongly identify 
with their states; they thus offer reasons to care about—and seek to preserve—
constitutional federalism even if it could be shown that strong state identities no longer 
exist. But I have suggested that these virtues are unlikely to persist or be effective without 
both state distinctiveness and some measure of citizen identity with and loyalty to the 
states. We should think of identity, then, as an important means of sustaining federal 
                                                      
169 Compare, e.g., Wechsler, supra note 20; JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE 
NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME 
COURT ___ (1980); Kramer, supra note 55 (all arguing that judicial review should be minimal or 
nonexistent), with Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of 
Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L. J. 75, 106-33 (2001); Saikrishna Prakash & John Yoo, The Puzzling 
Persistence of Process-Based Federalism Theories, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1459 (2001) (each arguing 
that “political safeguards” are incomplete). 
170 See, e.g., Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 56; NUGENT, supra note 55. 
171 HIRSCHMAN, supra note 21. 
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structures that we may value for other reasons. If we care about the structural values of 
federalism, we need the states to be robust and distinctive political communities in their 
own right. Concerns that state identity may be waning—if not dead already—thus present 
a threat to important constitutional values. 
C. Looking for Political Community in the States 
 For over half a century, the Member States of the European Union have been 
pursuing a grand experiment in “ever closer union.”172  That project presents a puzzle for 
students of federalism.  Most observers agree that “[t]he scope of Community activity is 
now so broad that few if any areas of national policy are immune from its effects.”173 And 
yet the EU is generally perceived to be far less centralized than the United States.174  
What factors maintain the EU’s relatively decentralized equilibrium in the absence of 
strong constraints on Brussels’ legislative powers?   
Part of the answer plainly has to do with identity: Most Europeans continue to 
perceive themselves primarily as Germans, Frenchmen, and Poles rather than 
Europeans.175 The European experience suggests that culturally distinct communities 
within a polity do play an important role in sustaining the constitutional autonomy of the 
decentralized political units to which they are attached. New Jersey, in other words, 
might well be more independent of the national political establishment in Washington, 
D.C. if it had its own volk. But what if it doesn’t? If Colonel Robert E. Lee had been a 
                                                      
172 The phrase is from the preamble to the Treaty of Rome (1957).  See generally LUUK VAN 
MIDDELAAR, THE PASSAGE TO EUROPE: HOW A CONTINENT BECAME A UNION (2013). 
173 Gareth Davies, Subsidiarity: The Wrong Idea, in the Wrong Place, at the Wrong Time, 43 
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 63, 63 (2006); see generally Young, European Union, supra note 109, at 
__. 
174 See, e.g., Andrew Moravcsik, The European Constitutional Settlement, in SOPHIE MEUNIER & 
KATHLEEN R. MCNAMARA, EDS., MAKING HISTORY: EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND 
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AT FIFTY, 23, 24 (2007); see also Young, European Union, supra note 
109, at __.   
175 See, e.g., VAN MIDDELAAR, supra note 172, at 217; Hartmut Kaelble, Identification with 
Europe and Politicization of the EU Since the 1980s, in JEFFREY T. CHECKEL & PETER J. 
KATZENSTEIN, EDS., EUROPEAN IDENTITY 193, 205-08 (2009) (surveying evidence that national 
allegiances remain primary); Smith, supra note 109, at __. 
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citizen of contemporary New Jersey, is it even conceivable that he would have preferred 
his state allegiance to his national one? 
Most American legal academics think not.  Certainly, the conventional wisdom is 
that (a) the states of contemporary America are fundamentally similar to one another; and 
(b) contemporary Americans feel little or no attachment to those states. But is there any 
way to test these propositions? The only serious effort occurs in James Gardner’s work 
on state constitutionalism, which is directed against some state courts’ tendency to 
interpret their state constitutions in light of Professor Gardner emphatically rejects this 
notion on the ground that “Americans are now a people who are so alike from state to 
state, and whose identity is so much associated with national values and institutions, that 
the notion of significant local variations in character and identity is just too implausible to 
take seriously as a basis for a distinct constitutional discourse.” 176  Several other 
prominent scholars have likewise argued that state courts cannot draw on distinctive 
constitutional traditions,177 but only Gardner has made any effort at all to support the 
claim that state identity does not exist.178 
Because they represent the only effort in the legal literature to actually support 
assertions about the death of state identity, Professor Gardner’s arguments are worth 
considering in some detail. He makes three claims. The first two rest on “the most 
                                                      
176 Gardner, Failed Discourse, supra note 43, at 818.   
177 See, e.g., Robert A. Schapiro, Identity and Interpretation in State Constitutional Law, 84 VA. L. 
REV. 389, 393 (1998) [hereinafter Schapiro, State Constitutional Law] (arguing that “[t]he 
community model . . . represents a questionable understanding of state identity and gives rise to 
pointless, indeed oftensilly, debates about state character”); Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and 
Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1147, 1149-50 (1993) [hereinafter Kahn, 
State Constitutionalism] (observing that “[b]ecause public life is experienced in and through the 
national community, we typically find little sympathy for a local community’s effort to maintain a 
unique public identity,” and concluding that “[i]f states are no longer the locus of a vibrant, 
community experience, then a state constitutionalism that looks to the unique state community for 
its sources of decisionmaking promises to remain a marginal factor in American public life”). 
178 Professors Schapiro and Kahn and each treats the death of state identity as largely self-evident; 
at best, they cite a unifying factor or two which might be thought to nationalize the culture, see, 
e.g., Kahn, State Constitutionalism, supra note 177, at 1150 (citing “the emergence of a national 
army”), without producing any evidence that these factors actually have that effect or outweigh 
other factors, such as distinctive geography, economic conditions, religious beliefs, or migration 
patterns, that might push in the other direction. 
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glaringly obvious features of modern American society: the ease and frequency of 
mobility; [and] the dominance of mass media and mass marketing of national scope.”179 I 
address mobility in some depth in Part IV, but the basic point is that American mobility is 
not, in fact, more frequent than in prior eras; moreover, as mobility becomes easier, it is 
more likely to have a sorting effect that increases the coherence and distinctiveness of 
state communities.180  
As for media and marketing, it is true that the literature on nationalism and 
identity places considerable emphasis on common media discourse. But President Obama 
recently lamented that “the balkanization of the media means that we just don't have a 
common place where we get common facts and a common worldview the way we did 20, 
30 years ago.”181 Professor Gardner’s contrary assertion rests primary on concentrated 
ownership in the newspaper and television markets, but these sources hardly dominate 
news or discourse in the Internet Age. Likewise, Gardner’s cites the dominance of large 
suburban shopping malls as fostering a unitary consumer culture.182 That business model 
                                                      
179 GARDNER, supra note 15, at 69. Gardner also mentions “the increasing globalization of 
economic activity,” id., although he does not pursue the point. Any argument from globalization 
would prove too much, as globalization supposedly renders not only subnational but national 
borders irrelevant—and Gardner does not claim that our national political community has become 
obsolete. In any event, Gardner ignores literatures in both comparative federalism and 
international relations demonstrating how globalization and supranationalism, by weakening the 
nation state, may free subnational units to play a more important role. See, e.g., Christopher K. 
Connolly, Independence in Europe: Secession, Sovereignty, and the European Union, 24 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INT’L L. 51 (2013); Earl H. Fry, The U.S. States and Foreign Economic Policy: 
Federalism in the ‘New World Order,’ in FOREIGN RELATIONS AND FEDERAL STATES 122 (Brian 
Hocking ed. 1993). Certainly no one can plausibly argue that globalization—whatever one means 
by that term—has made the Scots or the Catalans less distinctive. 
180 See infra Section IV.C. 
181 Obama: The Vox Conversation, VOX, Jan. 2015, available at http://www.vox.com/a/barack-
obama-interview-vox-conversation/obama-domestic-policy-transcript. See also Terence P. Jeffrey, 
Obama Blames ‘the Balkanization of the Media,’, CNSNEWS.COM, Nov. 15, 2013, available at 
http://cnsnews.com/news/article/terence-p-jeffrey/obama-blames-balkanization-media.  What is 
“CNSNews.com,” you ask? It’s web-based “alternative news source” founded by political 
conservatives. See cnsnews.com/about-us. Vox, on the other hand, is an influential website run by 
the liberal blogger Ezra Klein. This is what the President was talking about. 
182 GARDNER, supra note 15, at 71-72 (citing BERNARD J. FRIEDEN & LYNNE B. SAGALYN, 
DOWNTON, INC.: HOW AMERICA REBUILDS CITIES 69 (1989)).  
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is in decline,183 and internet marketing makes extremely specific targeting of individual 
shoppers a preferable alternative to Gardner’s account of one national marketing 
conversation.184 All quibbling aside, however, the real problem with both arguments is 
Gardner’s failure to demonstrate that the development of a common national culture has 
crowded out distinctive state political cultures.  
Professor Gardner’s main argument does address state identity directly—after a 
fashion. In a companion article, he points out that “if any part of the nation in any period 
might be expected to have displayed a distinct character and set of values, it would be the 
antebellum and Confederate South”; nonetheless, “[a]s a matter of historical fact, 
according to historians who study the South, any differences between the South and 
North in culture, character, or values were . . . too slight by far to support contemporary 
impressions” of regional distinctiveness.185 It is, of course, a bit odd to try and disprove 
the existence of distinctive state identities today by reference to a society that existed a 
century-and-a-half ago. Moreover, Gardner’s assertion is highly implausible. He relies on 
sources demonstrating that the Confederate states may not have been as different from 
the North as they (and their subsequent apologists) liked to suppose, but these sources 
hardly conclude that the differences were not meaningful.186 Gardner’s position that the 
                                                      
183 Malls are so nineties. See, e.g., Once Temples of American Commerce, Indoor Malls Lose 
Shoppers to E-stores, PBS NEWSHOUR, Nov. 28, 2014, at 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/temples-american-commerce-indoor-malls-lose-shoppers-e-
stores/ (“Indoor malls have been in decline ever since consumers discovered online shopping, and 
many retail spaces are either closing or being repurposed as shopping habits evolve.”); Amy 
Merrick, Are Malls Over? THE NEW YORKER, Mar. 11, 2014, at 
http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/are-malls-over (suggesting that large malls are 
being replaced by smaller shopping areas integrated with residential and public space).  
184 See, e.g., James D. Ratliff & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Online Advertising: Defining Relevant 
Markets, 6 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 653 (2011).  
185 Gardner, Southern Character, supra note 43, at 1290-91; see also GARDNER, supra note 15, at 
72-74 (repeating this argument). 
186 For example, Gardner cites C. Vann Woodward’s conclusion that the South “remains more 
American by far than anything else, and has all along,” C. VANN WOODWARD, THE BURDEN OF 
SOUTHERN HISTORY 25 (1960) (cited in Gardner, Southern Character, supra note 43, at 1236).  
But Professor Woodward’s argument in that essay was that the South had a unique historical 
experience that had shaped its character in such a way as to allow it to make a special contribution 
to the nation. WOODWARD, supra, at 15-25. In fact, the same paragraph Gardner quotes concludes 
that “[t]he modern Southerner . . . should be secure enough also not to deny a regional heritage 
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South was not (and therefore is not) distinctive enough to matter legally or politically 
flies in the face of overwhelming scholarly consensus.187 
Critically, the Confederate South meets even the overly-restrictive identity critera 
set by Dean Rubin and Professor Feeley—that is, willingness to “fight and die” for a 
subnational community.188 Even if Professor Gardner were right that the Old South was 
not so distinctive, that would simply prove the Anna Karenina principle that 
distinctiveness is not a necessary condition for identity. Perhaps distinctiveness is the 
more critical factor for Gardner’s argument about state constitutionalism;189 his focus, 
after all, is on whether state legal traditions are sufficiently different to justify interpreting 
textually-similar state constitutional provisions in divergent ways. But for my purposes, it 
is identity that principally matters. The evidence Gardner cites is a useful corrective for 
                                                                                                                                                    
because it is at variance with national myth. It is a heritage that should prove of enduring worth to 
him as well as to his country.” Id. at 25; see also EUGENE D. GENOVESE, THE SOUTHERN 
TRADITION: THE ACHIEVEMENT AND LIMITATIONS OF AN AMERICAN CONSERVATISM (1994) 
(likewise arguing that the South has a distinctive political tradition with something to offer the 
nation). The leading contemporary historian of Southern identity reaches a nuanced conclusion 
that southern identity is both individual in focus and not the same thing as distinctiveness; he 
nonetheless observes that “I have yet to encounter anyone who has moved into or out of the South 
and did not have the sense that, for better or worse, living here was different from living in other 
parts of the country.” JAMES C. COBB, AWAY DOWN SOUTH: A HISTORY OF SOUTHERN IDENTITY 
336-37 (2005). This is all we need to reject the various formulations of the One Nation argument. 
See also Gardner, Southern Character, supra note 43, at 1233 (conceding that “historians and 
social scientists who study the South uniformly agree that the South is distinct in some way, to 
some degree”).   
187 See, e.g., KEY, supra note 269, at 1 (“[T]he South remains the region with the most distinctive 
character and tradition.”). 
188 See supra notes __-__ and accompanying text. 
189 One of Gardner’s key points is that Southern identity rests on an exaggerated notion of 
Southern distinctiveness, and that this notion has been constructed for political purposes. See 
Gardner, Southern Character, supra note 43, at 1252 (stating that this is cause for viewing 
“contemporary beliefs about Southern distinctiveness . . . with a certain skepticism”). But the 
literature on nationalism has long accepted that national identities are socially constructed and not 
simply reflections of reality. See, e.g., E.J. HOBSBAWM, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM SINCE 1789: 
PROGRAMME, MYTH, REALITY 10 (1990) (observing that nations are “constructed essentially from 
above”); ANDERSON, supra note 94, at 6 (noting that nations are “imagined” communities). That 
does not make those identities inconsequential.  
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Confederate apologists’ claims that the antebellum South was an entirely separate and 
unique society. But it cannot tell us anything useful about state identity today. 
That’s all there is.  No one in the legal literature—or, to my knowledge, 
anywhere else—has made any broad-gauged evidence-based effort to determine 
Important arguments and judgments are being made not only throughout the academic 
literature but also in constitutional litigation based on assumptions about distinctiveness 
and identity without any kind of actual knowledge of the facts. This, simply put, is an 
intolerable state of affairs. 
Parts III and IV of this essay develop contemporary evidence about the 
distinctiveness of the states’ and their citizens’ sense of state identity, respectively. Part 
III offers up a smorgasbord of facts, trivia, and Americana about the States—their 
physical characteristics, demographic makeup, economic conditions and performance, 
and political culture. It turns out that people who think the states are all the same may be 
spending too much time drinking coffee at Starbucks, eating at Cheesecake Factory, and 
watching network television.  They need to get out more, because the States are in fact 
quite different places from one another. 
Identity, loyalty, and attachment are much harder to get empirical purchase on.  
Part IV begins with the efforts states make to construct a common history and impart that 
history to the next generation. I then consider public opinion research not on state identity 
per se, but on public trust in the various levels of government, as well as preferences for 
national or state action on particular questions. I then consider the extent to which people 
move from one jurisdiction to another over the course of their lives, dispelling the myth 
that our society is “increasingly mobile” and demonstrating that the mobility we do have 
may actually strengthen rather than undermine state identity. 
III. State Distinctiveness 
Can we really tell one state from another anymore?  In his essay on New Jersey, 
Anthony Bourdain recounts an experience from a book tour, 
waking up in Austin or Minneapolis or St. Louis, at yet another 
anonymous chain hotel.  Not knowing where I was, I threw open the 
drapes and looked out the window, desperate for orientation.  Where was 
I? . . . Beneath me, an endless and grimly predictable sequence of 
Victoria’s Secret superstore, McDonald’s, the Gap, P. F. Chang’s, T. G. 
I. Friday’s, Chili’s, Home Depot.  Mall after mall separated only by a 
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strip mall or min-mall, stretching out to the horizon, where another glass-
covered cityscape clustered perhaps around a shopping district.  I could 
have been anywhere.  I could have been in New Jersey.190 
Many of us have had similar impressions.  We’ve all had the experience, for example, of 
finding a Starbucks on every corner whether one is in Boston or Austin.   
These perceptions are not always accurate, however.  It turns out that although 
both Massachusetts and Texas are Starbucks-rich, a significant “latte gap” exists between 
those jurisdictions and states like West Virginia, Mississippi, and Vermont, which must 
suffer along with only a tenth as many Starbucks outlets per person as in the franchise’s 
home state. 191   Similarly, many observers invoke “the spectre of a homogenized 
landscape, the endless suburbs, strip developments and Wal-Marts and box stores,”192 but 
Arkansas and Oklahoma actually enjoy seven times as many Wal-Marts per person as 
bargain-deprived jurisdictions like New York, New Jersey, and California.193  If even this 
widespread perception of the homogeneity of American consumer culture masks more 
regional variation than we might expect, then we might also question the more 
fundamental intuition that all the states are the same.194 
One recent empirical study of state politics concluded that “[s]tates have real, 
significant cultural and political differences.  And despite the homogenizing tendencies of 
national media, drastically lower transportation costs, and a franchised consumer 
economy, regional political differences have not gone away.”195 Academics in the field of 
                                                      
190 Bourdain, supra note __, at 307. 
191 GELMAN, supra note 49, at 29; see also id. at 30 (with a map!). 
192  David Goldblatt, The Independent, Dec. 12, 2008, available at 
http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/books/reviews/state-by-state-a-panoramic-
portrait-of-america-edited-by-matt-weiland-and-sean-wilsey-1062480.html (visited March 18, 
2011) (reviewing STATE BY STATE, supra note 3).  
193 GELMAN, supra note 49, at 29.  Anecdotally, a casual survey of auto license plates in the 
parking lot at the West Lebanon, New Hampshire Wal-Mart (on the Vermont border) suggests that 
the Wal-Mart gap is a significant spur to interstate travel. 
194  See also FlowingData, Grocery Store Geography, June 26, 2013, available at 
http://flowingdata.com/2013/06/26/grocery-store-geography/ (mapping the highly regional 
distribution of major grocery store chains).  
195 GELMAN, supra note 49, at 21-22. 
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comparative state politics tend to view these matters quite differently from “One Nation” 
proponents.  Virginia Gray, for example, ascribes the continued existence of American 
federalism to “the magnitude of state differences”:  “The states are so different it is hard 
to imagine they would get along within a single government.  Only federalism could 
accommodate the cultural distance between, say, clean-living Utah and gambling-mecca 
Nevada.  Federalism allows these differences to flourish.”196 
I collect several different types of evidence in this Part. Some of it is data in the 
social science sense: survey responses, or statistics on demographics, mobility, or 
political behavior. Some of it is cultural—that is, anecdotal reporting by literary authors 
and other cultural elites.197 To the extent that we are trying to measure culture, I have 
included this latter form of evidence despite its “soft” nature. If an artist like Bruce 
Springsteen thinks New Jersey is both distinctive and lovable,198 that has an effect on the 
culture notwithstanding that the Boss himself is hardly a typical datapoint. 
This Part begins with “policy inputs”—that is, the geographical, demographic, 
economic, and cultural facts creating the environment and imperatives that shape state 
policy.  I then turn to “policy outputs”—the actual decisions that state governments 
make, as reflected in state constitutions, other state laws, and general state policy choices.  
All of this information admittedly has a “glass half full/glass half empty” quality to it:  
The States are different, but perhaps they are not that different.  One might as well admit 
                                                      
196  Virginia Gray, The Socioeconomic and Political Context of States, in POLITICS IN THE 
AMERICAN STATES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 1, 6 (Virginia Gray & Russell L. Hanson, eds., 8th 
ed. 2004). Legal commentators have largely ignored a fairly robust social science literature on 
state political culture. See, e.g., DANIEL ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A VIEW FROM THE 
STATES (3d ed. 1994) [hereinafter ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM] (tracing influence of three 
distinct political cultures in the states); Elizabeth Adell Cook, Ted G. Jelen, & Clyde Wilcox, State 
Political Cultures and Public Opinion About Abortion, 46 POL. RES. Q. 771, 771 (1993) (“A well-
established literature points to important political differences between various American states.”). 
197 See, e.g., THESE UNITED STATES 2003, supra note 61; THESE UNITED STATES 1920S, supra note 
58; JOHN GUNTHER, INSIDE U.S.A. (50th Anniversary ed. 1997) (1947). 
198 See, e.g., Bruce Springsteen, Greetings from Asbury Park, NJ (Columbia Records, 1973); see 
also Lester Bangs, Bruce Springsteen: Greetings from Asbury Park, NJ, ROLLING STONE, July 5, 
1973 (album review), available at http://www.rollingstone.com/music/albumreviews/greetings-from-
asbury-park-nj-19730705 (“Old Bruce makes a point of letting us know that he's from one of the 
scuzziest, most useless and plain uninteresting sections of Jersey.”). 
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up front that no one has any idea how different the states need to be in order to sustain a 
healthy federal system—if we even had a general metric to measure “different” or 
“healthy” in the first place. But the federalism literature has focused on sameness for so 
long that it may help simply to review the other side of the ledger. At the end of the day, 
the States are different enough to lead this observer to suspect that Mr. Bourdain’s vision 
of a relentlessly generic mercantile landscape may have been, well, just a bad trip. 
A. How Different are the States?  Policy Inputs 
 The banner of the Texas state tourism website insists that Texas is “like a whole 
other country.”199 “[T]he fact is,” as Molly Ivins put it, “it’s a damned peculiar place.”200 
But how distinctive are the American states, really? The Texas tourism website is, after 
all, selling something, and James Gardner has observed that “[a]ll too often arguments 
about the unique character and values of the people of a given state resemble nothing so 
much as chamber-of-commerce-style boosterism.”201 To be sure, we do not have a state, 
like Quebec within Canada, that speaks a different official language. Scholars of 
nationalism have emphasized the importance of a distinctive language in shaping national 
identity,202 but the same scholars have also made clear that a distinct language is not 
                                                      
199 Office of the Governor, Economic Development and Tourism, www.TravelTex.com (visited 
Oct. 16, 2012),  
200 Molly Ivins, Texas: Texas on Everything, in THESE UNITED STATES 2003, supra note __, at 
421, 421. 
201 Gardner, Southern Character, supra note 43, at 1225.  But see infra notes __-__ and 
accompanying text (demonstrating the profound influence of boosterism on the social construction 
of Texas state history and identity). 
202 See ANDERSON, supra note 94, at 37-46; see also Sujit Choudhry, Managing Linguistic 
Nationalism Through Constitutional Design: Lessons from South Asia, 7 I CON 577 (2009) 
(discussing the complex relationship between language and federalism in India). 
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essential for the development of separate political identity.203 And if one looks past 
official languages, the states are more linguistically diverse than one might think.204 
State comparativists begin with a variety of socioeconomic factors “that may 
affect patterns of state policy,” such as “population size and composition, migration and 
urbanization, physical characteristics and natural resources, types of economic activities 
stemming from a state’s physical endowments, wealth, and regional economic forces.”205 
This section begins with the obvious—empirical differences in geography, population 
and demographic makeup, and economic conditions—then moves to differences in 
history, political culture, and positions on public issues. Some of the differences are 
unsurprising, although some readers may be struck by their magnitude; others may be 
unexpected. The point of the section is simple: The States of the Union are more different 
than many people seem to think. 
1. The Land 
 Long before Larry Bird and Gene Hackman stamped Indiana as the land of 
basketball underdogs, 206  Theodore Dreiser grounded the essential and distinctive 
                                                      
203 See ANDERSON, supra note 94, at 47 (“[W]hether we think of Brazil, the USA, or the former 
colonies of Spain, language was not an element that differentiated them from their respective 
imperial metropoles. . . . [L]anguage was never even an issue in these early struggles for national 
liberation.”). 
204 The percent of the population speaking languages other than English at home varies from under 
5 percent in Alabama, Mississippi, Kentucky, and West Virginia to over 40 percent in California 
and around 35 percent in New Mexico and Texas. See Language Spoken at Home by State: 2011, 
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 2014, at 50 (2014) [hereinafter STATISTICAL 
ABSTRACT].  Over a decade ago, the two leading Democratic candidates for Governor of Texas 
conducted a televised debate in Spanish. See Kelley Shannon, Texas Candidates Debate in 
Spanish, MIDLAND DAILY NEWS, March 1, 2002, available at 
http://www.ourmidland.com/import/texas-candidates-debate-in-spanish/article_e2b8f754-93fc-
52c0-8cc0-a364c455a68e.html.  And linguists have documented extensive differences in the 
“English” spoken in different parts of this country.  See, e.g., Walter Hickey, 22 Maps that Show 
Americans Speak English Totally Differently from One Another, BUS. INSIDER, June 5, 2013, 
available at http://www.businessinsider.com/22-maps-that-show-the-deepest-linguistic-conflicts-
in-america-2013-6?op=1. 
205 Gray, supra note 196, at 6. 
206 See INDIANAPOLIS STAR NEWS, ED., LARRY BIRD: AN INDIANA LEGEND (1998); Hoosiers 
(1986) (starring Gene Hackman), at IMDb, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0091217/; see also Dana 
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character of his native state in “her soil and light.”207 Hoosiers are not alone in stressing 
the distinctiveness of the physical environment. Lousie Erdrich described “[t]he North 
Dakota sky as “[s]hattering, spectacular, inescapable . . . . a former tallgrass prairie 
heaven tarp that stretches down on every side and quiets the mind.”208 On a winter’s visit 
to New Hampshire, Will Blythe discovered “that there are at least forty varieties of 
silence.”209  
Notwithstanding the tendency of American constitutional law to think of political 
communities exclusively in terms of people, 210  physical features—size, climate, 
                                                                                                                                                    
O’Neil, Basketball Means More in Indiana, ESPN.com, Jan. 31, 2013, available at 
http://espn.go.com/mens-college-basketball/story/_/id/8896650/basketball-touches-life-all-levels-
indiana-college-basketball (“In Indiana, it is the gyms defined by the hanging of a basketball 
goal—hung majestically at Assembly Hall, where IU plays, or simply on the side of a silo—that 
connect the state.”); Associated Press, Indiana’s Christian Watford hits 3-pointer at buzzer to stun 
No. 1 Kentucky, Dec. 10, 2011, available at http://espn.go.com/ncb/recap?gameId=313440084; 
Richard Lingeman, Indiana: The Home State, in THESE UNITED STATES 2003, supra note 61, at 
133, 136 (“In my day, every little village had a team and a school gymnasium, and every garage or 
barn had a basketball hoop affixed to it.  Now the village high schools have vanished, and the kids 
are bused to consolidated schools.  But you still see the hoops.”).  The 2014 Final Four lacked an 
Indiana team but was nonetheless a festival of American federalism, as the Universities of Florida, 
Wisconsin, Connecticut, and Kentucky squared off for the NCAA championship. See C.L. Brown, 
Like this season, Final Four won’t be boring, March 30, 2014, available at 
http://espn.go.com/ncb/notebook/_/page/homecourt140330/home-court. 
207 Theodore Dreiser, Indiana: Her Soil and Light, in THESE UNITED STATES 1920S, supra note 58, 
at 120 . Some eighty years later, Richard Lingeman wrote that “[m]y final Indiana memory is of 
driving through countryside on a summer evening—faded red barns and white farmhouses, green 
rolling fields thick with corn, lit by the slangting golden light of the setting sun.  There is such an 
aura of peace and fat contentment in that picture.  That’s my Indiana home, I guess.  Or was.”  
Lingeman, supra note 206, at 141. 
208 Louise Erdrich, North Dakota, in STATE BY STATE, supra note 3, at 349, 352. 
209 Will Blythe, New Hampshire, in STATE BY STATE, supra note 3, at 288, 297.  Mike Barnicle, on 
the other hand, infamously commented that “New Hampshire looks like Arkansas with snow.” 
Mike Barnicle, Vermont vs. New Hampshire, BOSTON GLOBE [date], reproduced at 
http://boulter.com/nh/barnicle.html.  
210 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, __ (1964) (“Legislators represent people, not trees or 
acres.”). 
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topography, natural resources—may have significant influence on the character and 
culture of a state. As Jim Gardner points out, “[t]he idea that geography and climate 
influence national character” goes back at least to Montesquieu and Aristotle.211 Several 
historians have suggested that the land and climate went a long way toward creating the 
South’s distinctive culture—and, in particular, its reliance on slavery.212 
 That the states differ in terms of these factors may be obvious; the magnitude of 
the differences, however, may retain some capacity to surprise. For instance, everyone 
knows that Alaska is really big, but it remains striking to learn that “the twenty-two 
smallest states could be combined before an area as large as Alaska is reached.”213 Alaska 
is something of an outlier, but wide disparities persist as we move down the size 
rankings: The fifth largest state (New Mexico) is over fifteen times as large as the forty-
fifth largest state (Massachusetts), and the tenth largest (Oregon) is over three times as 
large as the fortieth (South Carolina).214 As Professor Gray points out, geographic size 
does matter for politics and policy in a variety of salient ways: The size of rural districts 
and the distances legislators must travel to the capital affects how often a legislature can 
meet and who can afford to serve, for example, and per capital expenditures on highway 
infrastructure (a central responsibility of state governments) are wildly higher in Alaska 
and Wyoming than in Rhode Island.215 
More profoundly, the land shapes political culture over time. David Hackett 
Fischer has traced, for example, the influence of New England’s climate, highly variable 
weather, soil, and coastline on the development of Puritan culture, concluding that “[t]he 
vitality of this regional culture owed much to its physical setting.”216 T.R. Fehrenbach has 
likewise chronicled the influence of the Texas physical environment—in particular, the 
exposure of the frontier to hostile Indians and Mexicans, as well as the agricultural and 
                                                      
211 Gardner, Southern Character, supra note 43, at 1229. 
212 [cites] 
213 Gray, supra note 196, at 15. 
214 See CQ’S STATE FACT FINDER 2007, at 84 (2007) (listing the land areas of New Mexico 
(121,356 square miles), Oregon (95,997 square miles), South Carolina (30,110 square miles), and 
Massachusetts (7, 840 square miles)).  Just for fun, Alaska (571,951 square miles) is over 547 
times as big as Rhode Island (1,045 square miles).  Id.   
215 Gray, supra note 196, at 15. 
216 FISCHER, supra note 63, at 50-54. 
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mineral resources that spurred the development of a fundamentally extractive economy—
on Texas history and political culture.217 One could proliferate additional example, but 
the point is simple: American political culture cannot help but respond to the immense 
diversity of the American physical environment. 
2. Demographics and Social Capital 
If we turn from land to people, we find similarly striking differences.  The largest 
state, California (35,458,000 people in 2006) is seventy times as large as the smallest, 
Wyoming (515,000 people); the fifth largest, Illinois (12,832,000 people) is fifteen times 
the size of Delaware (853,000 people), the forty-fifth largest; and my own North Carolina 
(8,857,000 people), the tenth largest state, is almost seven times as large as the fortieth 
state, Maine (1,322,000 people).218   Interestingly, the population data shows a large gap 
between the top four very large states (California, Texas, New York, and Florida) and the 
next group (Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Ohio); the gap between Florida and Illinois is 
roughly the size of Wisconsin, itself the twentieth largest state.219   
We can expect population to affect state political culture in myriad ways, 
including national power (voting strength in the House of Representatives and the 
Electoral College), burdens on infrastructure and public services, and racial, ethnic, 
religious, and political diversity. These factors are driven not only by objective size, of 
course, but also by population growth, density, and demographic makeup. The states 
differ significantly along each of these lines. The fastest growing states in 2005—Nevada 
and Arizona—grew at approximately three times the rate of Virginia (ranked 16th) and 
seven times the rate of Iowa (ranked 36th); three states (Massachusetts, New York, and 
Rhode Island) found themselves actually losing population.220 The densest state, New 
Jersey, had 1,175 persons per square mile in 2005, while Alaska had only one, Wyoming 
                                                      
217 T. R. FEHRENBACH, LONE STAR: A HISTORY OF TEXAS AND THE TEXANS __ (2d ed. 2000); see 
also ROBERT A. CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON: THE PATH TO POWER 8-32 (1982) 
(describing how geography, and particularly the quality of the soil, shaped the culture of the Texas 
Hill Country). 
218 CQ’S STATE FACT FINDER, supra note 214, at 18. 
219 Florida had 18,090,000 people in 2006, while Illinois had 12,832,000 and Wisconsin had 
5,557,000. CQ’S STATE FACT FINDER, supra note 214, at 18. 
220 CQ’S STATE FACT FINDER, supra note 214, at 20. 
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had five, and Kansas (ranked fortieth) had 34.221 It is not hard to see how these sorts of 
differences could cash out into quite different ways of life. 
Demographically, the states differ along lines of age, race, education, economic, 
and religious indicators. On the input side, the 2004 birth rate in Utah was twice that of 
Maine and Vermont,222 while California welcomed nearly ten times as many legal 
immigrants in 2005 as tenth-place Washington (and 723 times as many as last place 
Wyoming).223 The median age of state populations range from 41.2 in Maine to 28.5 in 
Utah; the median states are Maryland and South Carolina at 37.1.224 In Florida, almost 17 
percent of the population is over age 65; in Texas, Georgia, Utah, and Alaska, less than 
10 percent is.225 In Utah, 30 percent of the population is 17 years old or younger, but only 
21 percent of the population is that young in North Dakota, Vermont, West Virginia, and 
Maine.226   
These disparities obviously have important cultural, economic, and political 
repercussions; for instance, Texas—which ranks in the top five for birth rates, legal and 
unauthorized immigration, and population under age 17, and eighth for percentage 
growth, is also in the top five states for the percentage of children living in poverty.227 
                                                      
221 CQ’S STATE FACT FINDER, supra note 214, at 38. 
222 CQ’S STATE FACT FINDER, supra note 214, at 36 (stating that, in 2004, Utah had a birth rate of 
21.2 per 1000 population, while Vermont and Maine each had a rate of 10.6).  Similarly, fourth-
ranked Texas admitted five times as many legal immigrants as fourteenth-ranked Arizona.  Id.  
Disparities in unauthorized immigrant populations are similarly marked.  California’s was 
estimated at 2.5 to 2.75 million in 2005, with 1.4 to 1.6 million in second-ranked Texas; the 
median states were Indiana and Iowa, with 55 to 85 thousand apiece; and eight states (Alaska, 
Wyoming, South Dakota, Maine, Vermont, North Dakota, Montana, and West Virginia) had less 
than ten thousand.  Id. at 40.  
223 CQ’s State Fact Finder, supra note __, at 39.  See also Laura B. Shrestha & Elayne J. Heisler, 
The Changing Demographic Profile of the United States, CRS Report for Congress No. 7-5700, 
Sept. 25, 2009, at 12 (“The primary destination states in 2008, as in every year since 1971, were 
California, New York, Texas, Florida, Illinois, and New Jersey.  Sixty-three percent of all (legal) 
persons immigrating to the United States in 2008 lived in these six states.”). 
224 CQ’S STATE FACT FINDER, supra note 214, at 26. 
225 CQ’S STATE FACT FINDER, supra note 214, at 24. 
226 CQ’S STATE FACT FINDER, supra note 214, at 25. 
227 CQ’S STATE FACT FINDER, supra note 214, at 34. 
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Youngish Utah has almost three times as many roller coasters per capita as oldish West 
Virginia, and the latter state leads the nation in toothlessness.228 The aging of populations 
figures prominently into assessments of the future economic and political prospects for 
countries around the world,229 and it is hard to imagine why the same factors would not 
be equally important to the several states. 
One area of marked and persistence divergence is religion.  “Since colonial times 
the adherents of the various religious traditions and groups in America have not been 
randomly distributed across the country.”230  These geographic patterns of religious belief 
“shape public cultures in different parts of the country and in turn are shaped by them.”231 
As Professor Gelman notes, “Americans as a whole are strikingly observant . . . but states 
vary widely in this respect, with much higher church attendance in Mississippi and 
elsewhere in the deep South compared to states such as New Hampshire, Vermont, and 
Nevada.”232  The religious profiles of various states are significantly different, although—
Utah aside—not massively so.  Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, and California are 
Catholic strongholds, with Catholics composing from 30 to 40 percent of the population 
in those states.233 Mainline Protestants have their largest concentrations (26 percent to 34 
percent) in Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Pennsylvania. 234   The Baptists enjoy 
disproportionate numbers (36 percent to 39 percent) in Tennessee, North Carolina, and 
Georgia, while the “Nones”—people registering no religious belief—have their highest 
                                                      
228 See STATE BY STATE, supra note 3, at 552 (table 18), 557 (table 23). 
229 See, e.g., Edmund Conway, UK’s Aging Population is a Bigger Threat than the Financial 
Crisis, THE TELEGRAPH, Feb. 12, 2010, available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis/7216546/UKs-aging-population-is-a-bigger-
economic-threat-than-the-financial-crisis.html. 
230 BARRY A. KOSMIN & ARIELA KEYSAR, RELIGION IN A FREE MARKET: RELIGIOUS AND NON-
RELIGIOUS AMERICANS, WHO WHAT WHY WHERE 105 (2006); see also GELMAN, supra note 49, 
at 79 (“Religion is inextricably tied to social and political geography.  Different religions and 
denominations are concentrated in different parts of the country, from Mormons in Utah and Jews 
in New York to larger groups such as evangelical Protestants in the South and Roman Catholics in 
the metropolitan areas of the Northeast and Midwest.”). 
231 KOSMIN & KEYSAR, supra note 230, at 107. 
232 GELMAN, supra note 49, at 130. 
233 KOSMIN & KEYSAR, supra note 230, at 114-15 & Figure 7.7. 
234 Id. 
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concentration (14 percent) in Washington State. 235   All in all, recent survey data 
“conclusively confirms the continuing existence of some geographically specific 
religious subcultures within the nation.”236 
Finally, Robert Putnam’s famous study of social capital in the United States 
included a comparative assessment of social capital in the fifty states. “Differences 
among the states on the underlying measures [that go into the Social Capital Index] are 
substantial,” he found, “with ratios of roughly three to one between high- and low-
ranking states. Social trust, for example, ranges from 17 percent in Mississippi to 67 
percent in North Dakota.”237 Professor Putnam’s “barometer” of social capital revealed a 
clear geographical pattern:  
The primary ‘high-pressure’ zone is centered over the headwaters of the 
Mississippi and Missouri rivers and extends east and west along the 
Canadian border. The primary ‘low pressure’ area is centered over the 
Mississippi Delta and extends outward in rising concentric circles 
through the former Confederacy. California and the mid-Atlantic states 
lie near the national average.238  
As Putnam points out, these patterns correspond strongly not only to historical migration 
patterns but also to the states dominated by slavery in the nineteenth century and Jim 
Crow politics in the twentieth.239 “Inequality and social solidarity,” he concluded, “are 
deeply incompatible.”240  
                                                      
235 Id. 
236 Id. at 123-24. 
237  ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN 
COMMUNITY 291 (2001). 
238 Id. at 292. 
239 Id. at 294. 
240 Id. It may be worth noting, however, that the states with highest measure of income 
inequality—New York, Connecticut, and Massachusetts—all do fairly well on Putnam’s social 
solidarity barometer. See List of U.S. States by Gini Coefficient, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_U.S._states_by_Gini_coefficient (visited Feb. 21, 2015). 
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3. State Economies 
In early 2013, Texas Governor Rick Perry went on a hunting trip—not in the 
Texas Hill Country, but in California.  He was poaching jobs, using radio ads criticizing 
the difficulty of starting a business in California and in-person gubernatorial visits to 
promising California companies.241  The Governor’s sales pitch emphasized Texas’s low-
tax, low-regulation economic model, which has placed Texas at or near the top of the 
fifty states in terms of GDP growth, job creation, as an alternative to California’s model 
of progressive regulation, high taxes, and robust government services.242  Whatever one 
thinks of interstate job-snatching, Perry’s trip dramatized the fact that the American states 
are large and competitive economic entities, confronting differing economic 
circumstances and employing diverse economic strategies. 
Like the states’ physical size and population, the economies of individual states 
also vary widely in size.  California’s GDP in 2012 was approximately $2 trillion, while 
Wyoming’s was only $ 38 billion. 243   The map below 244  puts those numbers in 
perspective by relabeling each state with the name of a foreign country with a similar 
GDP.  
                                                      
241 See Shan Li, Texas Gov. Rick Perry tries to woo California businesses, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 12, 
2013, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2013/feb/12/business/la-fi-perry-jobs-20130213.   
242 See generally Dan Balz, Texas, California embody red-blue divide, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 
2013, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/texas-california-embody-red-blue-
divide/2013/12/28/d6d4d7ee-6764-11e3-ae56-22de072140a2_story.html; California v. Texas: 
America’s future, THE ECONOMIST, July 9, 2009, available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/13990207. 
243 Gross Domestic Product by State in Current and Chained (2005) Dollars: 2000 to 2012, in 
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note __, at 461. 
244 Frank Jacobs, US States Renamed for Countries with Similar GDPs, big think, June 10, 2007, 
available at http://bigthink.com/strange-maps/131-us-states-renamed-for-countries-with-similar-
gdps. 
 Volk of New Jersey – 2/24/15 draft 
 
 
 
55 
 
While it may not surprise to learn that California is economically equivalent to France or 
Texas to Canada, even many of the smaller states turn out to be comparable to significant 
foreign nations:  Alabama has an economy the size of Iran’s, for example, and Idaho is 
comparable to Ukraine.  New Jersey’s economy, strikingly, is about the same size as 
Russia’s. 
The evidence on economic conditions among the states is mixed:  Differences in 
income and other leading indicators are significant, but hardly earth-shattering.  The 
national average personal income per capita in 2012 was $42,693, but that ranged from 
$33,073 in Mississippi to $58,908 in Connecticut.245 In 2011, the national unemployment 
rate was 8.9 percent, but in the states unemployment ranged from under 6 percent in 
Iowa, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North and South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming to 
                                                      
245 Personal Income Per Capita in Current and Chained (2009) Dollars by State: 1990 to 2012, in 
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note __, at 468.  Median family income varied from $46,304 in 
Mississippi to $83,823 in Maryland around a national average of $61,455. See Family Income—
Distribution by Income Level and State: 2011, in STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note __, at 472. 
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over 11 percent in California, Nevada, and Rhode Island. 246 According to the Minot 
mayor Curt Zimbelman, true unemployment in the North Dakota oil country “probably 
doesn’t exist.”247These disparities provoke migration of both persons and businesses; in 
2012, for example, it cost twice as much to rent a U-Haul truck one-way from California 
to Texas as it did to rent one going in the other direction.248 
 Poverty varied significantly as well. The national poverty rate in 2011 was 15.9 
percent, but that varied from 8.8 percent in New Hampshire to 22.6 percent in 
Mississippi.249 The cheapest urban area in which to live appears to be Harlingen, Texas 
(81.8% of the national composite index); New York City’s borough of Manhattan is the 
most expensive (225.4% of the national index), followed by Brooklyn, New York 
(178.6%) and Honolulu, Hawaii (167.0 %).250 
 The performance of the various state economies over time also varies 
considerably. In 2012, the U.S. GDP grew by 2.5 percent overall. State GDP growth, 
however, varied from 13.4 percent in North Dakota to -0.1 percent in Connecticut.251 
According to financial analyst Meredith Whitney, “[t]he strong growth of the central 
corridor [from Texas north to the Dakotas, and from Colorado east to Indiana] is being 
obscured by the weakness in the housing-bust states [California, Florida, Arizona, 
                                                      
246  Civilian Labor Force by Employment Status and Sex, by State: 2011, in STATISTICAL 
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 2014, at 404 (2014) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT]. 
247 Quoted in MEREDITH WHITNEY, FATE OF THE STATES: THE NEW GEOGRAPHY OF AMERICAN 
PROSPERITY 155 (2013). 
248 See id. at 157. 
249 Individuals and Families Below Poverty Level—Number and Rate by State: 2001 and 2011, in 
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note __, at 486. 
250  Cost of living Index—Selected Urban Areas, Annual Average: 2012, in STATISTICAL 
ABSTRACT, supra note __, at 502-05. 
251 See Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Widespread Economic Growth in 
2012, June 6, 2013, available at 
http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/regional/gdp_state/2013/pdf/gsp0613.pdf. North Dakota’s 
growth was a significant outlier, attributable to its shale oil boom. The second-highest growth was 
4.8 percent in Texas—still almost double the national average. See id. Connecticut was the only 
state with negative growth, but eight states recorded growth under 1 percent for 2012.  Ten states 
had growth over 3 percent. See id.   
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Nevada, Illinois, and New Jersey].”252 The upshot is that “the seventeen states [of] the 
central corridor  grew their economies by 8 percent from 2008 to 2011. The United States 
as a whole grew its economy by 6 percent. The housing-bust states grew theirs by 2 
percent.”253  
These short- and medium-term variations pale, however, beside the differential 
geographical impacts of long-run economic forces. Labor economist Enrico Moretti 
explains that “the effects of globalization, technological progress, and immigration on 
American workers are not uniform across the United States. They favor the residents of 
some cities and hurt the residents of others.”254  Professor Moretti argues that the U.S. is 
moving from a manufacturing economy to a knowledge economy, and that “[m]ore than 
traditional industries, the knowledge economy has an inherent tendency toward 
geographical agglomeration.”255 Cities and regions that successfully attract innovative 
firms feed on their own success, while “[c]ommunities that fail to attract skilled workers 
lose further ground.”256   
Other studies of changes in American class and culture have found similar 
geographical disparities. Richard Florida’s famous study of the “creative class”—that is, 
those working in knowledge-intensive industries—found marked interstate disparities in 
the proportion of creative class workers.257 Likewise, Charles Murray’s work on rising 
inequality within white America found that wealthy and well-educated elites are 
increasingly clustering into “SuperZips”—that is, zip codes in the 95th through 99th 
centiles for education and income.258  This sort of clustering has profound consequences. 
As Professor Moretti observes, “[t]he sorting of highly educated Americans into some 
                                                      
252 WHITNEY, supra note 247, at 156; see also id. at 6-7 (lising the “housing-bust” states). 
253 Id. at 156. 
254 ENRICO MORETTI, THE NEW GEOGRAPHY OF JOBS 6 (2012). 
255 Id. at 5. 
256 Id. 
257 See RICHARD FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE CLASS, REVISITED 209-11 (2012). 
258 See CHARLES MURRAY, COMING APART: THE STATE OF WHITE AMERICA, 1960-2010, at 75-94 
(2012). 
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communities and less educated Americans into others tends to magnify and exacerbate all 
other socioeconomic differences.”259   
To be sure, many of these analyses focus on localities, not states.  Murray’s 
SuperZips, for example, cluster around particular metropolitan areas,260 and Moretti’s 
knowledge economy is being built around sub-state areas like California’s Silicon Valley 
or North Carolina’s Research Triangle.261 That suggests, perhaps, that we should focus on 
the distinctiveness of particular localities—not whole states.262  I address that concern in 
Part V.  But the short answer for present purposes is that the presence of a high-tech 
mecca or a SuperZip cluster affects the economy of the entire state, and these sorts of 
communities exist in some states but not others.   
Finally, to return to Governor Perry’s “hunting trip,” states have pursued 
markedly different economic strategies over the years.  As one observer described the 
competition between California and Texas, “[t]wo of our biggest and richest states, polar 
opposites on the political spectrum, are taking radically different approaches to attracting 
new jobs.”263 Part of the difference is the scope of regulation; Chief Executive magazine, 
for example, has consistently ranked Texas as the “best state for business”—by which it 
means the least intrusive regulatory regime—while putting California at the bottom of 
that poll.264  But other aspects of state economic strategy may be important as well.  
                                                      
259 MORETTI, supra note 254, at 5. 
260 See MURRAY, supra note 258, at 88-94. 
261 See also FLORIDA, supra note 257, at __. 
262 See also Aaron M. Renn, Why State Economic Development Strategies Should Be Metro-
Centric, NEW GEOGRAPHY, Jan. 22, 2014, available at 
http://www.newgeography.com/content/004144-why-state-economic-development-strategies-
should-be-metro-centric (arguing that “[s]tates are not singular economic units”). 
263 California vs. Texas: Wild West Shootout, THE AMERICAN INTEREST, Feb. 6, 2013, available at 
http://www.the-american-interest.com/blog/2013/02/06/california-vs-texas-wild-west-shootout/.  
264  2013 Best & Worst States for Business, CHIEF EXECUTIVE, May 6, 2013, available at 
http://chiefexecutive.net/best-worst-states-for-business-2013; see also JP Donlon, Another 
Triumph for Texas: Best/Worst States for Business 2012, CHIEF EXECUTIVE, May 2, 2012, 
available at http://chiefexecutive.net/best-worst-states-for-business-2012 (“Texas easily clinched 
the No. 1 rank, the eighth successive time it has done so. California earns the dubious honor of 
being ranked dead last for the eighth consecutive year.”). 
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Texas took the proceeds of its oil and gas resources and invested them, first in its higher 
education system and later in sovereign wealth funds designed to lure business to the 
state.265  California has likewise facilitated investment by funding critical infrastructure, 
but has also relied on progressive social and environmental regulation to appeal to 
Americans who may find Texas too conservative, flat, or dry.   
My point is not to argue for one model over the other.266 And I do not deny that 
the country is more homogeneous in its economic makeup and more interconnected in its 
economic relationships than, say, in the nineteenth century.  Nonetheless, differences in 
economic conditions and prospects among the states are significant in absolute terms, and 
they arise at least in part from different approaches to governing.  Those approaches are, 
in turn, linked to different political cultures among the states—a phenomenon I address in 
the next section. 
4. State Political Culture  
In the late 1940s, John Gunther’s famous Inside USA—a very un-Fodors travel 
guide emphasizing history, politics, and culture—commented that “[n]othing is more 
remarkable in the United States than the difference between the Dakotas”: 
These are the two least-known states in the country, and many people 
think of them casually as a kind of “bloc,” which they most certainly are 
not. North Dakota is probably the most radical state in the union, and 
South Dakota is one of the most conservative. . . . South thinks that 
North is inhabited exclusively by raging Bolsheviks; North thinks that 
South is a preserve for all people to the right of Hoover.267  
Some of these differences have faded by the twenty-first century; North Dakota, like 
Russia, has largely renounced socialism (which now appears to be confined to 
                                                      
265 See Erica Greider, Big, Hot, Cheap and Right: What America Can Learn from the Strange 
Genius of Texas __ (2013). 
266 Recent evidence suggests that California may be coming out of its recent funk.  See, e.g., 
Jordan Weissmann, California is Suddenly Adding Jobs Faster than Texas—Why? THE ATLANTIC, 
Aug. 29, 2012, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/08/california-is-
suddenly-adding-jobs-faster-than-texas-why/261729/ (suggesting that the key difference is that 
California’s economy rests on housing, while Texas rests on oil and gas, so that the fortunes of 
each state depend simply on which industry is doing better at any given time). 
267 GUNTHER, supra note 197, at 237. 
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Vermont268 and certain inner suburbs of Boston). But looking around the map, one still 
finds fascinating pairs of states that share many key topographical and demographic 
characteristics, and yet could not be more different in terms of their politics and style of 
life.269  
Contrasts like that between the Dakotas in the last century vividly illustrate the 
proposition that states have distinctive political cultures. Skeptics of state identity in the 
legal academy seem to fit well with the broader turn to interdisciplinary studies. But if 
this body of scholarship were really interdisciplinary, it would take stock of an extensive 
and longstanding political science literature on state political culture. Gabriel Almond 
and Sidney Verba’s pioneering study defined political culture as a set of “attitudes toward 
the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the 
system.”270 Daniel Elazar’s seminal work defined “political culture” as “the summation of 
persistent patterns of underlying political attitudes and characteristic responses to 
political concerns that is manifest in a particular political order.”271  He explained that 
“different political cultures will define fairness in politics differently,” for example, and 
that “political culture will be significant” in “shaping public expectations regarding 
government services.”272  One can see both of these factors in play in contemporary 
                                                      
268 See, e.g., Jay Parini, The View from Vermont, in THESE UNITED STATES 2003, supra note 61, at 
440 (extolling Vermont’s uniquely progressive politics). 
269 Mr. Gunther commented that “Oregon and Washington are twins except as to character,” but 
“nowhere else in the country can the extraordinary tenacity of state characteristics be better 
observed, the deep-rooted instinct of a state to grow its own way without regard to its neighbor.” 
GUNTHER, supra note 197, at 89, 93; see also V.O. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS 36 (1950) (“The 
political distance from Virginia to Alabama must be measured in light years.”).  Having attended 
college on the border between New Hampshire and Vermont, the author would testify to similar 
sharp jurisdictional distinctions arising from fundamentally similar circumstances. 
270 ALMOND & VERBA, supra note 161, at 13. 
271 ELAZAR, MOSAIC, supra note 63, at 214. 
272 Id. at 214; see also JOHN J. HARRIGAN & DAVID C. NICE, POLITICS AND POLICY IN STATES AND 
COMMUNITIES 10 (10th ed. 2008) (observing that “numerous studies have found that political 
culture influences the kind of policies adopted by states”). 
 Volk of New Jersey – 2/24/15 draft 
 
 
 
61 
portrayals of Texas and California as the embodiment of distinctive political/economic 
models.273 
Studies emphasizing political culture have been somewhat controversial in 
political science. Part of the problem is the inherent fuzziness of concepts like “culture” 
or “national character.” As one leading analysis pointed out, “[p]olitical culture is one of 
the most popular and seductive concepts in political science; it is also one of the most 
controversial and confused.” 274  Hence, cultural analysis tended to lose ground to 
seemingly “sharper” approaches; as Ronald Inglehart lamented, “[s]ince the late 1960s, 
rational choice models based on economic variables have become the dominant mode of 
analysis; while cultural factors have been deemphasized to an unrealistic degree.”275 
More recent work on political culture has addressed this failing by taking a more 
empirical turn.276 Other critics have rejected the notion “that cultural factors have any 
systematic effects on political and economic outcomes.”277 Even critics acknowledge, 
however, that “political culture is likely to help explain certain characteristics of political 
institutions” and remains “a useful explanatory tool.”278  My purposes—which are simply 
                                                      
273 See California v. Texas: America’s future, THE ECONOMIST, July 9, 2009, available at 
www.economist.com/node/13990207 (comparing California’s model, featuring high taxes and 
extensive government regulations and services, with Texas’s “small government” model).  
274 David J. Elkins & Richard E.B. Simeon, A Cause in Search of Its Effect, or What Does 
Political Culture Explain? 11 COMPARATIVE POLITICS 127, 127 (1979); see also Jeffrey Olick & 
Tatiana Omeltchenko, Political Culture, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL 
SCIENCES 300-02 (2008) (concise summary of the development of the literature on political 
culture). 
275 Ronald Ingleheart, The Renaissance of Political Culture, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1203, 1203 
(1988). 
276 See id. at 1225-28; see also David Young Miller, The Impact of Political Culture on Patterns of 
State and Local Government Expenditures, 21 PUBLIUS 83 (1991) (finding empirical support for 
Elazar’s classificatios in expenditure patterns); Charles A. Johnson, Political Culture in American 
States: Elazar’s Formulation Examined, 20 AM. J. POL. SCI. 491 (1976) (finding empirical support 
for Elazar’s categories); Ira Sharkansky, The Utility of Elazar’s Political Culture: A Research 
Note, 2 POLITY 66 (1969) (same). 
277 Robert W. Jackman & Ross A. Miller, A Renaissance of Political Culture? 40 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 
632, 653 (1996); see also Elkins & Simeon, supra note 274, at __. 
278 See Elkins & Simeon, supra note 274, at 141, 143; see also id. at 142 (“Culture is unlikely to 
be of much help in explaining why alternative A was chosen over alternative B—but it may be of 
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to identify factors that may make particular states different from one another, rather than 
to explain particular policy choices—steer clear of the main points in controversy. 
Much of the political culture literature focuses on the national level.  Writing in 
1968, however, Samuel Patterson observed that “the states can be treated for analytical 
purposes as relatively independent political systems with political cultures at least 
somewhat distinctive to themselves.”279  Professor Elazar saw the political cultures of the 
state as functions of the sedimentary deposits left by migrations of three great political 
subcultures—“moralistic,” “individualistic,” and “traditionalistic”—over the course of 
many generations.280  He explained that “representatives of each [subculture] are found 
within every state to varying degrees.  In fact, unique aggregations of cultural patterns are 
clearly discernible in every state.  These cultural patterns give each state its particular 
character and help determine the tone of its fundamental relationship, as a state, to the 
nation.”281   
Professor Elazar was not an empiricist, and efforts to test his theory empirically 
have generated varying results.282  The main empirical difficulty seems to be identifying 
the “missing link” between political culture and public policy; even empirical critics 
concede, however, that Elazar’s “tripartite classification of political cultures has emerged 
as one of the leading predictors of the interstate variance in public policy outputs.”283 For 
example, a more recent empirical analysis of state budgets yielded results “consistent 
with the continued existence of distinct cultures among the states.  Despite the age of 
Elazar’s cultural system and ongoing demographic changes, the culture-expenditure link 
                                                                                                                                                    
great help in understanding why A and B were considered, while no thought was given to C, D, or 
E.”). 
279 Patterson, supra note 73, at 195. 
280 ELAZAR, MOSAIC, supra note 63, at 229-57.  
281 ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM, supra note 196, at 134.  See id. at 135, figure 5.4, for a map. 
282 Compare, e.g., Charles A. Johnson, Political Culture in American States: Elazar’s Formulation 
Examined, 20 AM. J. POL. SCI. 491, (1976) (finding empirical support for Elazar’s theory and 
concluding that “political culture is related to political characteristics and political decisions of 
American states”), with [critics]. 
283 David Lowery & Lee Sigelman, Political Culture and State Public Policy: The Missing Link, 
35 WESTERN POL. QUARTERLY 376, 376, 383 (1982). 
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remains intact.”284 And Robert Putnam’s study of interstate differences in social capital 
yielded a pattern “astonishingly similar” to Elazar’s analysis.285  
In any event, my concern is not with whether Professor Elazar correctly 
classified the cultures of the American states, but simply with whether political culture 
exists as a meaningful phenomenon and varies among the States.286   None of the 
empirical work testing Elazar’s theory denies that this is the case, and his conception of 
state political culture remains a mainstay of the literature on state governance.287  Another 
way to uncover the importance of state political culture would be to evaluate the 
importance of an individual’s state of residence in predicting political opinions.  An 
important study of “Statehouse Democracy” conducted by Robert Erikson, Gerald 
Wright, and John McIver aggregated CBS News/New York Times surveys from 1976 to 
1998 that asked questions on ideological and partisan identification and broke the data 
down by the respondents’ state of residence.  They found that “[t]o some degree, state 
differences in political preferences follow simply from the states’ group compositions.  
Each electorate is a unique composite of political groupings, and these help to determine 
the state’s political views.”288   
That evidence helps to show that states are meaningfully distinctive—that is, that 
differences in demographic characteristics do cash out into important political 
differences. But it would doesn’t tell us much about identity or the existence of a 
                                                      
284 Steven G. Koven & Christopher Mausoff, The Influence of Political Culture on State Budgets: 
Another Look at Elazar’s Formulation, 32 AM. REV. OF PUBLIC ADMIN. 66, 74 (2002); see also id. 
at 66 (citing several earlier studies of “[t]he culture-public expenditure relationship” that “found 
significant correlations using a range of methods, including multiple regression and discriminant 
analysis”); Lawrence M. Mead, State Political Culture and Welfare Reform, 32 POLICY STUD. J. 
271, 286 (2004) (concluding, based on an empirical analysis of state welfare reform efforts, that 
“[c]ulture clearly matters for the performance of American states”). 
285 PUTNAM, supra note 237, at 294. 
286 For arguments that different schema better capture the divergent political cultures of the states, 
see, e.g., Joel Lieske, American State Cultures: Testing a New Measure and Theory, 42 PUBLIUS 
108 (2011).  
287 See, e.g., HARRIGAN & NICE, supra note 272, at 9-11 (state and local government textbook 
using Elazar to introduce basic determinants of governance). 
288 ROBERT S. ERIKSON, GERALD C. WRIGHT, & JOHN P. MCIVER, STATEHOUSE DEMOCRACY: 
PUBLIC OPINION AND POLICY IN THE AMERICAN STATES 47 (1993).. 
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cohesive state political culture. The Statehouse Democracy study further found, however, 
that “collective sentiment can be more than the sum of views of the represented groups.  
A second potential source of state attitudes is state residence itself.”289  Even controlling 
for demographic characteristics, Professors Erikson, Wright, and McIver found that 
“indigenous ‘state’ effects, which we attribute to state-to-state differences in political 
culture, account for far more of the interstate variance of partisanship and ideology than 
does interstate variation in the demographic compositions of state populations.  A state’s 
partisan or ideological bent seems more a function of its political history and 
development than of the characteristics of its population.”290 The authors concluded that 
“[s]tates are active and meaningful political communities whose electorates have 
distinctive preferences; the states are not just collections of atomistic individuals whose 
opinions automatically flow from their personal socio-economic characteristic.”291 
Political science is not the only discipline to identify different cultural 
dispositions among the states. Historian C. Vann Woodward, for example, attributed the 
distinctive political culture of the Southern states to the experience of rebellion and defeat 
in the Civil War; he argued, during the Vietnam period, that as the only portion of the 
country that had ever lost a war, the South had unique wisdom to offer a nation that 
arguably had an over-optimistic view of its own invincibility.292   Likewise, Texas 
historian Gregg Cantrell tells how Texas’s political culture shifted during the Progressive 
era from the Southern regional narrative of the “Lost Cause” to a more Texas-specific 
(and less depressing) story emphasizing the Texas War of Independence and the 
                                                      
289 Id.  
290 Id. at 71. 
291 Id. at 10.  The same authors updated their research in 2006 but found no reason to question 
their earlier conclusions concerning the importance of state residence as an explanatory factor with 
respect to political attitudes.  See Robert S. Erikson, Gerald C. Wright, & John P. McIver, Public 
Opinion in the States: A Quarter Century of Change and Stability, in JEFFREY E. COHEN, ED., 
PUBLIC OPINION IN STATE POLITICS 229 (2006); see also Barbara Norrander & Clyde Wilcox, 
State Residency, State Laws, and Public Opinion, in COHEN, supra, at 38, 49 (finding that “[s]tate 
residency adds 10 to 25 percent to the explained variation in individual-level opinion, while 
demographic factors contribute approximately half of the explained variation”). 
292 WOODWARD, supra note 186, at 25. 
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Alamo.293  Historians focused on other parts of the country could doubtless tell similar 
stories.   
More broadly, David Hackett Fischer, like Professor Elazar in political science, 
has traced much of the development of American political culture to four distinct 
migrations from different regions of Britain to particular locations in North America. He 
concludes that “[e]ven as the ethnic composition of these various regions of the United 
States has changed profoundly, regional cultures themselves have persisted, and are still 
very powerful even in our own time. All of them derive from folkways that were planted 
in the American colonies more than two centuries ago.”294 
Other disciplines likewise find systematic differences among states and regions 
relevant to political culture. A recent study by social psychologists found “strong 
evidence that there are robust psychological differences between regions of the United 
States that are associated with important geographical factors.”295 A different study 
ranked the states in terms of “tightness (many strongly enforced rules and little tolerance 
for deviance) versus looseness (few strongly enforced rules and greater tolerance fo 
deviance),” finding that these characteristics were “systematically associated with state-
level outcomes,” including substance abuse, homelessness, gender equality, innovation, 
and happiness.296  
                                                      
293 See Gregg Cantrell, The Bones of Stephen F. Austin: History and Memory in Progressive-Era 
Texas, in GREGG CANTRELL & ELIZABETH HAYES TURNER, EDS., LONE STAR PASTS: MEMORY 
AND HISTORY IN TEXAS 39, 41 (2007).   
294 See FISCHER, supra note 63, at 10-11; see also COLIN WOODARD, AMERICAN NATIONS: A 
HISTORY OF THE ELEVEN RIVAL REGIONAL CULTURES OF NORTH AMERICA (2011) (making a 
similar argument). 
295 Peter J. Rentfrow, Samuel D. Gosling, Markus Jokela, David J. Stillwell, & Michal Kosinski, 
Divided We Stand: Three Psychological Regions of the United States and Their Political, 
Economic, Social, and Health Correlates, 105 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 996, 1006 (2013). 
296 Jesse R. Harrington & Michele J. Gelfand, Tightness-Looseness Across the 50 United States, 
111 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 7990, 7995 (2014); see also Jesse Harrington & Michele Gelfand, 
Tightness and Looseness: A New Way to Understand Differences across the 50 United States, 
SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, July 2, 2014, available at 
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/tightness-and-looseness-a-new-way-to-understand-
differences-across-the-50-united-states/. 
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* * * 
People who take the trouble to look will find that “the fifty states . . . somehow 
stubbornly resist blending into a single undifferentiated whole.”297  Political scientists, 
historians, geographers, economists, and sociologists are all well-attuned to these 
differences. In this respect, the One Nation argument is testament to the continuing 
insularity of legal scholarship. The legal literature’s insularity on this point becomes all 
the more puzzling, moreover, when one surveys the extent to which state-by-state 
diversity is reflected in the law itself. 
B. How Different are the States?  Policy Outputs 
In 2010, Arizona enacted what both proponents and critics considered to be “the 
broadest and strictest immigration measure in generations,” criminalizing the failure to 
carry immigration documents and conferring broad power on state and local police to 
detain persons suspected of being in the country illegally.298 Arizona’s law bore a strong 
kinship to California’s Proposition 187, enacted sixteen years earlier, which denied 
public services, including healthcare and education, to undocumented immigrants.299 In 
sharp contrast, “Arizona-style legislative initiatives unfriendly to immigrants have often 
hit brick walls in Texas.”300 While governor of the Lone Star State, George W. Bush 
vocally opposed Proposition 187, and his successor Rick Perry not only thwarted 
                                                      
297 Matt Weiland, Preface, in STATE BY STATE, supra note 3, at xiv. 
298 Randal C. Archibold, Arizona Enacts Stringent Law on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, April 23, 
2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/24/us/politics/24immig.html. Three years 
earlier, Arizona had also ramped up state enforcement of laws prohibiting employers within the 
state from hiring undocumented immigrants. Unlike the 2010 law, the employer provisions were 
largely upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court. Compare Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 
(2012) (holding most provisions of the 2010 act preempted by the federal immigration laws), with 
Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011) (upholding the “Legal Arizona 
Workers Act” against preemption challenge).  
299 See Mark Z. Barabak, The Politics of California’s Proposition 187 in One Chart, L.A. TIMES, 
June 18, 2014, available at http://www.latimes.com/nation/politics/politicsnow/la-pn-politics-of-
proposition-187-in-one-chart-20140617-story.html. The politics of immigration in California have 
since changed considerably, in part due to the election of Hispanic legislators in significant 
numbers. See id. 
300 Katie Glueck, Texas GOP Touts Its Hispanic Model, POLITICO, Nov. 30, 2012, available at 
http://www.politico.com/story/2012/11/texas-gop-touts-its-hispanic-model-84465.html.  
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proposals to emulate Arizona but oversaw enactment of a state DREAM Act permitting 
foreign-born children of undocumented immigrants to pay in-state tuition at the state’s 
public universities.301  Texas’s divergent approach is grounded in its historical ties, 
cultural affinity, and strong economic links to Mexico, as well as the political realities of 
a state with a forty-percent Hispanic population.302  
The divide between Arizona and California, on the one hand, and Texas, on the 
other, over immigration policy is just one among many examples of states with common 
problems making divergent policy choices about how to address them. One might well 
assume, for example, that the two inland states of northern New England, sharing such 
similar topography and demography, would produce fundamentally similar legal regimes.  
And yet New Hampshire is rated one of the most business-friendly regulatory climates in 
the nation,303 and it lacks both sales and income taxes. Vermont, on the other hand, has 
                                                      
301  See JOHN D. GRAHAM, BUSH ON THE HOME FRONT: DOMESTIC POLICY TRIUMPHS AND 
SETBACKS 227-28 (2010); Mallie Jane Kim, Rick Perry Stands by Texas DREAM Act, U.S. NEWS 
& WORLD REPT., July 25, 2011, available at 
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2011/07/25/rick-perry-stands-by-texas-dream-act; Texas 
Gov: Arizona Immigration Law ‘Not Right’ for Texas, FOX NEWS, Apr. 29, 2010, available at 
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/04/29/texas-governor-arizona-immigration-law-right-
texas/. 
302 See WAYNE THORBURN, RED STATE: AN INSIDER’S STORY OF HOW THE GOP CAME TO 
DOMINATE TEXAS POLITICS 218-29 (2014); Jessie Katz, Prop. 187 Gives Texas a Selling Point in 
Mexico, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1995, available at http://articles.latimes.com/1995-02-06/news/mn-
28768_1_mexico-city. Texas policy has not, of course, been unremittingly pro-immigration; 
Governor Perry, for example, has famously promoted a border fence as well as unilateral measures 
to restrict the entry of illegal immigrants. See, e.g., Sarah Mervosh, Perry blasts Obama over 
border, terrorism threat, DALLASNEWS, Aug. 29, 2014, available at 
http://www.dallasnews.com/news/politics/state-politics/20140829-perry-blasts-obama-over-
border-terrorism-threat.ece. Concerns about border security (and frustrations with the federal 
government’s failure to provide it) have been a virtually constant aspect of Texas history. See  
FEHRENBACH, supra note 414, at 275-76. 
303 See Dean Stansel, José Torra, & Fred McMahon, Economic Freedom of North America 2014, 
at 7, available at http://www.freetheworld.com/2014/efna/economic-freedom-of-north-america-
2014-us-edition.pdf (rating New Hampshire fifth in “economic freedom”). 
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high taxes, strict regulations, and recently tried to erect a single-payer public healthcare 
system.304  
This section focuses on the different legal choices states have made. I have not 
tried to survey all the differences in state laws around the country. Even if that were 
practicable, the end result would surely have the same glass-half-empty/glass-half-full 
quality we saw in the last section. The existence of distinctive state political cultures has 
not prevented the rise of a national political culture as well, and all the states share a 
common legal heritage.305 A modern economy and a sense that states face many similar 
problems both create incentives for harmonization, and organizations like the American 
Law Institute and the Commission on Uniform State Law have made important progress 
in making states’ laws more uniform on particular questions. All I seek to show is that 
this shared national legal tradition has not caused our fifty state legal regimes to collapse 
into one homogeneous mass. Major differences remain, and these differences occur on 
questions that matter a great deal to Americans. 
I begin with state constitutions. The debate over state constitutionalism—and, in 
particular, over whether courts should interpret state constitutions in light of the 
particular culture and traditions of the state—is the one place in the legal literature where 
scholars have debated the existence and significance of state identity in some depth. I 
then turn to a brief survey of state policy divergence on a range of issues, including crime 
and punishment, taxing and spending, family law, and environmental policy. 
Significantly, I find that significant policy diversity persists even in areas, like 
environmental law, where the state role is ostensibly limited to implementing federal 
regulatory schemes. Finally, I also consider the significance of recent debates about the 
“red state/blue state” divide in American politics. 
These divergent state policy outputs matter to my argument in three ways. First, 
they contribute to making each state feel more distinctive. Through a distinct mix of 
fiscal and regulatory choices, for example, Texas and California have created starkly 
different economic models whose effects pervade everyday life. Second, these distinctive 
                                                      
304 See id. (ranking Vermont forty-eighth in “economic freedom”); Sarah Wheaton, Why Single 
Payer Died in Vermont, POLITICO, Dec. 20, 2014, available at 
http://www.politico.com/story/2014/12/single-payer-vermont-113711.html. 
305 See, e.g., Ford W. Hall, The Common Law: An Account of Its Reception in the United States, 4 
VAND. L. REV. 791 (1951). 
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choices are directly relevant to several of the values—experimentation, accommodation 
to regionally diverse preferences, providing opportunities to participate in politics—that 
federalism is supposed to serve. Third—most important to my argument—the making of 
these choices through a state’s deliberative processes is itself a constitutive act that builds 
a sense of community and loyalty among a state’s citizens. As the political theorist Anna 
Stilz has observed, “over time political cooperation can constitute a group of citizens into 
a collective with important ties binding them together.306 
1. State Constitutions 
In 1977, Justice William Brennan published an essay in the Harvard Law Review 
urging state courts to interpret their own state constitutions broadly to protect individual 
rights.307 Noting the Burger Court’s tendency to cut back on the Warren Court’s broad 
interpretations of those rights, Brennan issued “a clear call to state courts to step into the 
breach. . . . With federal scrutiny diminished, state courts must respond by increasing 
their own.”308  Brennan’s essay helped spark a “new judicial federalism” that featured 
both increased interest in state constitutional options by jurists and a vigorous academic 
debate about the legitimacy and efficacy of state constitutionalism as a substitute for 
broad interpretations of federal rights.309   
The importance of state constitutions transcends Justice Brennan’s “new judicial 
federalism,” however. State constitutions play a role in constituting each state as an 
independent political community, and we may expect a state’s constitution to reflect that 
community’s most fundamental values and commitments.310 The extent of variation 
                                                      
306 Anna Stilz, Why Does the State Matter Morally? Political Obligation and Particularity, in 
VARIETIES OF SOVEREIGNTY AND CITIZENSHIP 244, 260 (Sigel R. Ben-Porath & Rogers Smith, 
eds. 2012). 
307 William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. 
L. REV. 489 (1977). 
308 Id. at 503. 
309 See, e.g., Symposium: The Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 959 (1985); 
Earl M. Maltz, False Prophet—Justice Brennan and the Theory of State Constitutional Law, 15 
HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 429 (1988); Hans Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States’ 
Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 379 (1980). 
310 See, e.g., JAMES T. MCHUGH, EX UNO PLURA: STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND THEIR POLITICAL 
CULTURES 2 (2003); G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 3 (1998). 
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among state constitutions may thus tell us something important about the distinctiveness 
of states in our federal system. Conversely, many critics of the new judicial federalism 
have found the results of Justice Brennan’s call underwhelming.311 That conclusion, as I 
noted earlier,312  has been interpreted to demonstrate that the states lack distinctive 
identities. 
The most vigorous critic, James Gardner, reviewed a sampling of 1208 opinions 
issued in 1990 by the high courts in seven states.313 He found that the state courts in 
question decided state constitutional cases in only about 21 percent of their cases; that 
they resorted to state constitutional grounds only grudgingly and often failed to specify 
the basis of their rulings; that they frequently construed their state constitutions in 
“lockstep” with analogous federal provisions; and that they almost never analyzed the 
particular history of state constitutional provisions.314 Not one to mince words, Professor 
Gardner concluded that “state constitutional law today is a vast wasteland of confusing, 
conflicting, and essentially unintelligible pronouncements.”315  
 316 Justice Brennan’s call focused on state rights provisions—the area in which 
state constitutions most resemble the federal Constitution, and hence that in which the 
gravitational force of the federal provisions and U.S. Supreme Court decisions 
                                                      
311 See, e.g., GARDNER, supra note 15, at 45-47. 
312 See supra notes __-__ and accompanying text. 
313 See Gardner, Failed Discourse, supra note 43, at 778-80. 
314 See id. at 780-94. 
315 Id. at 763. Professor Gardner did not argue that state constitutions should be interpreted in line 
with parallel federal provisions; rather, he argued for using state constitutions as a way to 
vindicate the broader view of federal rights articulated by dissenting justices like Justice Brennan. 
See GARDNER, supra note 15, at 121-23. Gardner’s view thus ends up being a state constitutional 
law version of Jessica Bulman-Pozen’s Partisan Federalism or Heather Gerken’s Dissenting by 
Deciding. See supra notes __ and accompanying text. 
316 Professor Gardner’s work has spawned a mini-literature of essays by lawyers in particular 
states insisting that, whatever may be going on in other states, their state has a unique 
constitutional tradition. See, e.g., Ronald L. Nelson, Welcome to the “Last Frontier,” Professor 
Gardner: Alaska’s Independent Approach to State Constitutional Interpretation, 12 ALASKA L. 
REV. 1 (1995); David Schuman, A Failed Critique of State Constitutionalism, 91 MICH. L. REV. 
274 (1992) (Oregon). 
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interpreting them has the strongest pull limiting state-by-state diversity. Justice Brennan’s 
goal, moreover, was overtly political: He hoped to push the interpretation of individual 
rights in a more liberal direction that seemed blocked, at the time, in the federal courts.317 
It was probably unrealistic to expect largely elected state judiciaries to go further in 
protecting criminal defendants than life-tenured federal judges were willing to go. In any 
event, my survey here focuses on the respects in which state constitutions diverge from 
the national model, because in the absence of a federal focal point, different state 
constitutions may be more likely to branch out in different directions.  
 Many of the most striking state constitutional divergences from the model occur 
on the structural side.318 The most obvious differences involve the structure of the state 
constitutions themselves. As Alan Tarr notes, “probably their most striking feature is 
their length.”319 The longest (Alabama’s) is approximately 376,000 words, while the 
shortest (Vermont’s) is still roughly 8500 words; the mean is over 31,000 words.320 By 
comparison, the U.S. Constitution clocks in at around 4,400 words. Much of the extra 
length is taken up with “‘constitutional legislation,’ provisions that in their length and 
detail are indistinguishable from statutes.”321 State constitutions are also amended—and 
even replaced—far more frequently than the federal one.322 Louisiana has gone through 
eleven constitutions in just over two centuries, New York has had four, and the mean for 
                                                      
317 See, e.g., Paul W. Kahn, Two Communities: Professional and Political, 24 RUTGERS L. J. 957, 
968 (1993); Maltz, supra note 309, at 432. As Professor Maltz has pointed out, Justice Brennan 
was not generally a champion of federalism in the rest of his jurisprudence. See id. at 430-32. 
318 Jim Gardner’s most recent salvo focuses on government structure and asserts that, although our 
system affords state wide opportunities to experiment with structural opportunities, “states have 
not availed themselves of these opportunities.” James A. Gardner, Autonomy and Isomorphism: 
The Unfulfilled Promise of Structural Autonomy in American State Constitutions, 59 WAYNE L. 
REV. 31, 34 (20140) [hereinafter Gardner, Isomorphism]. Professor Gardner’s article focuses 
rather narrowly on voter apportionment following the Supreme Court’s one man-one vote 
decisions.  Even if the states are similar on that point, it is a leap—to say the least—to say that the 
states are simply unwilling or unable to innovate on structural matters. See id. at 66. 
319 TARR, supra note 310, at 9. 
320 See State Constitutions, in THE BOOK OF THE STATES __ (Audrey Wall ed. 2014). 
321 TARR, supra note 310, at 9. 
322 See id. at 23-27. 
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all states is just under three.323 The states have adopted over 5900 amendments to their 
current set of constitutions (almost 120 per state.324 Unlike the national government, 
states have been unafraid to hold state constitutional conventions and have done so over 
230 times.325  
The frequency of state constitutional amendment and replacement, as well as the 
highly-specific and frequently mundane character of many state constitutional provisions, 
has prompted critics to argue that state constitutional discourse simply lacks the gravitas 
to define a meaningful political community. 326  A favorite target is New York’s 
constitutional provision regulating the width of ski trails.327 But as Emily Zackin points 
out, that provision has a far more interesting history. It actually amends a more 
foundational provision mandating that the state’s forest preserve be “forever kept as wild 
forest land.”328 Construction of ski trails would require timber removal; hence, the ski 
trail amendment carved out a limited exception to the “Forever Wild” principle. Professor 
Zackin concludes that “[m]any, if not all, of the details in state constitutions 
                                                      
323 See State Constitutions, in THE BOOK OF THE STATES __ (Audrey Wall ed. 2014). 
324  TARR, supra note 310, at 24. Alabama is the amendment champion, with over 580 
amendments, but that number is arguably distorted by the inclusion of numerous local 
amendments that only apply to particular counties. See State Constitutions, in THE BOOK OF THE 
STATES __ n. (a) (Audrey Wall ed. 2014). 
325 TARR, supra note 310, at 25. 
326 See Gardner, Failed Discourse, supra note 43, at 818-820 (concluding that state constitutions 
reflect communities that are “frivolous, or fickle, or unreflective” and therefore “not worthy of 
respect”). As Emily Zackin points out, however, “state constitutions are so detailed in large part 
because these documents provide so many points of entry for the direct participation of citizens 
and citizen groups.” EMILY ZACKIN, LOOKING FOR RIGHTS IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES: WHY 
STATE CONSTITUTIONS CONTAIN AMERICA’S POSITIVE RIGHTS 23 (2013). These sorts of 
opportunities to participate in government are one of the quintessential virtues of federalism, see, 
e.g., Merritt, supra note 149, at 7-8, as well as one of the ways that a political community 
constitutes itself over time, see Stilz, supra note 306, at 260.  
327 See N.Y. CONST. art. 14, § 1; Gardner, Failed Discourse, supra note 43, at 819-20 (mocking 
this provision). 
328 N.Y. CONST. art. 14, § 1 
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simultaneously describe highly specific policies and reflect the important principles of 
governance that these policies were created to advance.”329 
The specific provisions of state constitutions deviate from the federal model with 
respect to each branch of government. State legislatures, for example, possess plenary—
not enumerated—powers.330 This means that they have residual powers vis-à-vis the other 
branches of state governments, and that limitations on state legislative powers are “the 
fundamental interpretive issue under state constitutions.”331  Because they address a 
fundamentally different structural problem from the federal notion of enumeration, these 
limits tend not to have counterparts; there is no federal model for states to coalesce 
around. Not surprisingly, the results vary considerably. State constitutions adopted in the 
nineteenth century tend to include a wide variety of procedural checks on legislative 
action, such as supermajority or multiple bill-reading requirements and limits on the 
length and frequency of legislative sessions, as well as substantive prohibitions, such as 
bars to loaning the credit of the state to private entities or granting divorces.332 State 
constitutions enacted after the Depression, by contrast, were more concerned with 
“structuring state government to act vigorously” to confront public problems; they thus 
contained significantly fewer procedural or substantive limits on legislative power.333  
State constitutions have almost uniformly rejected any notion of a “unitary” 
executive—a principle often thought to lie at the heart of the national separation of 
powers. 334  Only New Jersey follows the federal model. 335  This means that state 
constitutions must define the respective purviews of separately elected governors, 
                                                      
329 ZACKIN, supra note 326, at 28. 
330 See TARR, supra note 310, at 16. The North Carolina Constitution, for example, provides 
simply that “[t]he legislative power of the State shall be vested in the General Assembly,” without 
any further enumeration. N.C. CONST. Art. II, § 1. 
331 See TARR, supra note 310, at 16. 
332 See id. at 118-21. 
333 Id. at 155-57. 
334 Compare TARR, supra note 310, at 17 (“[M]ost state executive articles establish a nonunified 
executive.”), with Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 705 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (insisting 
that Article II’s provision vesting “[t]he executive Power” in the President “does not mean some of 
the executive power, but all of the executive power”).  
335 See TARR, supra note 310, at 17. 
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attorneys general, secretaries of state, and the like—a problem that simply does not exist 
in federal law. As one might expect, state executive officers vary significantly in their 
mandate and power. The Texas Railroad Commissioner, a separately-elected office that 
doesn’t exist in most states, runs “one of the most important regulatory bodies in the 
nation” because it “strongly influence[s] the supply and price of oil and natural gas 
throughout the United States.” 336  In Tennessee, the Attorney General is not only 
unelected, but appointed by the state supreme court.337 Some state constitutions avoid one 
of the most difficult and contentious questions of federal separation of powers law by 
explicitly authorizing and empowering particular administrative agencies, such as 
Florida’s Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission.338 
 State courts likewise differ profoundly from their federal counterparts—and from 
one another. Start with judicial selection, which ranges from partisan elections (7 states) 
to nonpartisan elections (15 states) to pure gubernatorial appointments (5 states) to 
appointments from a list produced by a nominating commission (21 states) to legislative 
appointment (2 states).339 More fundamentally, states differ in their conception of the 
“judicial power.” Some have a broader conception of standing or a narrower conception 
of mootness than the federal courts.340 Others authorize advisory opinions by express 
constitutional provision (8 states) or by statute (3 states), while ten others have rejected or 
                                                      
336 David F. Prindle, Railroad Commission, HANDBOOK OF TEXAS ONLINE, June 15, 2010, 
available at http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/mdr01.  
337 See Eric Schelzig, 8 Apply to Become Tennessee Attorney General, THE TENNESSEAN, Aug. 29, 
2014, available at http://www.tennessean.com/story/news/politics/2014/08/29/apply-become-
tennessee-attorney-general/14821347/. 
338 See TARR, supra note 310, at 17-18. 
339  See the cool interactive map at Judicial Selection in the States, JUDGEPEDIA, 
http://judgepedia.org/Judicial_selection_in_the_states (visited Feb. 17, 2015). 
340 See, e.g., Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943) (per curiam) (dismissing a doctor’s challenge 
to a Connecticut restriction on contraceptives on the ground that the doctor could not assert the 
constitutional rights of his patients; the Connecticut Supreme Court had decided the case on the 
merits pursuant to a broader conception of standing under the state constitution); DeFunis v. 
Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (dismissing an appeal on mootness grounds that the Washington 
Supreme Court had been willing to hear based on an exception for matters of continuing public 
concern). 
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abandoned this practice.341 And all states diverge sharply from the federal judiciary by 
recognizing a common lawmaking power long denied to the federal courts (at least 
outside the maritime jurisdiction).342 Although all states enjoy this power, they differ in 
the extent to which legislatures intrude through codification, in their willingness to go 
along with unification efforts like the Uniform Commercial Code, and even (in the case 
of Louisiana) to the extent they consider themselves common law jurisdictions at all. 
 Finally, there are the various individual rights afforded by state constitutions 
against government action. As I have noted, the state constitutionalism debate has 
focused on the extent to which  state courts do (or should) interpret those rights more 
broadly than their counterparts in the federal Bill of Rights. That debate tends to ignore, 
however, state constitutional rights without federal cognates—in particular, state 
constitutional provisions for positive rights to government protection from social or 
economic harms. Although the national Constitution generally lacks such rights,343 Emily 
Zackin has demonstrated that social movements throughout our history have managed to 
enshrine positive rights to public education, workers’ rights, and rights to a healthy 
environment in state constitutions.344 “To American reformers seeking rights to a more 
protective government,” Professor Zackin writes, “state constitutions have often appeared 
to be the most accessible and relevant constitutions.” 345  This historical experience 
                                                      
341 See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER, & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, 
HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 57-58 (6th ed. 2009) 
[hereinafter HART & WECHSLER]. 
342 See Burt Neuborne, State Constitutions and the Evolution of Positive Rights, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 
881, 896–97 (1989) (“Unlike their federal counterparts, state courts continue to play an avowedly 
generative role in the growth of American law. As the energy of state courts in forging new 
common law rules in areas as diverse as products liability and corporate take-overs attests, state 
courts are im-bued with the power and creative ethos of the common law tradition.”); Ernest A. 
Young, A General Defense of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 10 J. L. ECON. & POL’Y 17, 101-04 
(2013) (exploring the sources of state courts’ lawmaking powers). 
343 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Why Does the American Constitution Lack Social and Economic 
Guarantees? 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 4 (2005). 
344 See ZACKIN, supra note 326, at 2-3. One reason that the current debate neglects these rights is 
that it focuses on courts, while many of the positive rights were directed primarily toward forcing 
legislative action and not toward judicial enforcement. See id. at 109 (discussing workers’ rights). 
345 ZACKIN, supra note 326, at 212. 
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strongly suggests not only that state constitutions importantly differ from both the federal 
charter and one another, but that citizens have found state constitutional activism to be an 
important form of civic participation. 
2. State Policy Divergence: A Sampler 
If states really are distinctive political communities, then we would expect them 
to make different choices on any number of significant policy issues. A comprehensive 
test of that hypothesis, of course, would require a survey of nearly all the law. I have 
instead picked a few significant and fairly representative areas of state policy and noted 
some important state-by-state variations within each. One could proliferate other 
examples, but these should be sufficient to get a sense of the significant diversity from 
state to state. 
Fiscal Policy: Fiscal policy is worth looking at both because it is one of the most 
contentious areas of contemporary politics and because it determines the “scope and 
scale” of state government.346 A recent survey reveals “a great deal of variation across the 
states in fiscal scale . . . . Even after excluding Alaska, own-source general revenue and 
general spending per capita are more than twice as high for the state ranked second 
(Wyoming in both cases) as for the states ranked fiftieth (Georgia and Florida, 
respectively).”347 The factors that seem to drive fiscal scale are about what one would 
expect: “differences in the abilities of state residents to pay for public services, 
preferences for government programs, transfers of revenues from the federal government, 
and institutions that govern how decisions are made.”348 
States vary significantly in the ways they have chosen to generate revenue, and 
these variations are particularly salient to citizens. One need only check the license plates 
in the parking lots at New Hampshire shopping centers near the state’s borders to see the 
effect of the Granite State’s decision to eschew a sales tax. And Governor Rick Perry’s 
sales pitch to California businesses surely emphasized that their employees could avoid 
paying state income tax by relocating to Texas. Top individual income tax rates vary 
from 12.3 and 11 percent in California and Hawaii, respectively, to 4.54 and 3.22 percent 
                                                      
346 Robert G. Lowry, Fiscal Policy in the American States, in POLITICS IN THE AMERICAN STATES: 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 309, 310 (Virginia Gray, Russell L. Hanson, & Thad Kousser eds. 
10th ed. 2013) 
347 Id. at 311. 
348 Id. at 313. 
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in Arizona and North Dakota.349 Eight states (Alaska, Florida, Nevada, New Hampshire, 
South Dakota, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming) have no personal income tax.350 State 
corporate income tax rates range from zero (Nevada, South Dakota, Washington, and 
Wyoming) to 12 percent in Iowa.351 States eschewing income taxes generally rely on 
some combination of sales taxes, property taxes, or levies on extractive industries. 
Because different sorts of taxation have important distributive effects, these revenue 
choices have significant policy implications across a range of issues. 
States also vary significantly in their fiscal health. A prominent feature of 
American fiscal federalism is the national government’s commitment not to bail out state 
governments when they get into trouble; this allows individual states to pursue their own 
distinctive fiscal policies without directly endangering the national finances.352 Although 
every state but Vermont has some sort of balanced budget amendment, these vary in form 
and (perhaps more importantly) the degree of accounting shenanigans that the state’s 
political culture will tolerate.353 Moreover, states also vary in the extent to which they 
have incurred long-term debt obligations—such as unfunded public employee pension 
plans—that threaten the state’s financial stability.354 Because state debt trades in well-
developed financial markets, one can assess the variation in state fiscal soundness by 
looking at state credit ratings and the yields on state bonds. These measures reflect 
significant variation: In 2014, Standard & Poors gave fifteen states had the prized AAA 
                                                      
349 See Tax Policy Center, State Individual Income Taxes, 2015, Feb. 6, 2015, available at 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/displayafact.cfm?Docid=406. California millionaires pay 
an additional one percent, for a tip-top rate of 13.3 percent. See id.  
350 See id. New Hampshire does tax income from dividends and interest at five percent. See id. 
351 See Federation of Tax Administrators, Range of Corporate Income Tax Rates, Feb. 2014, 
available at http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/corp_inc.pdf (for tax year 2014). In general, state 
taxation of businesses varies greatly in form, making crude rate comparisons less informative. 
352 See generally JONATHAN A. RODDEN, HAMILTON’S PARADOX: THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF 
FISCAL FEDERALISM (2006); Paul E. Peterson & Daniel Nadler, Freedom to Fail: The Keystone of 
American Federalism, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 253 (2012) . 
353 See generally National Council of State Legislatures, NCSL Fiscal Brief: State Balanced 
Budget Provisions, Oct. 2010, available at 
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/fiscal/StateBalancedBudgetProvisions2010.pdf. 
354 See, e.g., WHITNEY, supra note 247, at  Ernest A. Young & Emily D. Johnson, The 
Constitutional Law of State Debt, 7 DUKE J. CON. L. & PUB. POL’Y 117 (2012). 
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rating, while thirty-three were AA+, AA, or AA-. New Jersey, California, and Illinois 
were A+, A, and A-, respectively.355  
Practically speaking, these ratings affect the borrowing costs that each state 
faces; more broadly, they reflect a fairly thoroughgoing assessment of the state’s 
financial prospects. State debts have been one of the great drivers of American 
constitutional history, from Chisholm v. Georgia356 and the ratification of the Eleventh 
Amendment, to the late-nineteenth century state bond crisis that shaped both the general 
federal common law and our law of sovereign immunity,357 to the partial revival of 
Contracts Clause litigation in our own time.358 Moreover, unmanageable state debts 
compound differences in tax and investment policy that, in turn, encourage migration 
from one state to another. As Ms. Whitney points out, “central-corridor states have more 
resources to attract newcomers because they are not choking on debt and crazy pension 
obligations and forced into a dependency on higher and higher tax rates. Not 
coincidentally, these same states are also investing in the right things: jobs, infrastructure, 
and education.”359 
Crime and Punishment:  With respect to criminal law, “[t]he USA is not a 
coherent or singular state but rather made up of mixed democratic practices, a rich 
political imagination and varying sub-national polities—polities responsible for the 
                                                      
355 See State Credit Ratings from Standard & Poor’s, 2001-2014, STATELINE, 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2014/06/09/sp-ratings-2014 
(visited Feb. 21, 2015). 
356 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
357 See Ernest A. Young, Its Hour Come Round at Last? State Sovereign Immunity and the Great 
State Debt Crisis of the Early Twenty-First Century, 35 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 593, 593-94 
(2012); Lucas A. Powe, Jr., Rehearsal for Substantive Due Process: The Municipal Bond Cases, 
53 TEX. L. REV. 738 (1975). 
358 See Young & Johnson, supra note 354, at 130-34. One need only look across the pond to see 
the significant of debt crises to a federal system.  See, e.g., Paul P. Craig, Economic Governance 
and the Euro Crisis: Constitutional Architecture and Constitutional Implications, in THE 
CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF EUROPEAN BUDGETARY CONSTRAINTS (M. Adams, F. Fabbrini and 
P. Larouche eds 2014). 
359 WHITNEY, supra note 247, at 156. 
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creation, enactment and implementation of nearly all criminal justice policy.”360 Efforts 
to unify the substantive criminal law have seen mixed success at best. As William Stuntz 
has noted, “[n]o state adopted the Model Penal Code wholesale. Many of the states that 
copied it did so very partially, modifying some of its central elements. And, crucially, 
adoption of the MPC in no way restricted legislators' ability to add crimes later. They 
have continued to do so.”361 
We see similar divergences in state punitive regimes.  Persistent focus on 
national incarceration rates tends to mask substantial variation at the state level: 
“Minnesota, for example, imprisons 150 inmates per 100,000 population, New York 
imprisons 343 inmates per 100,000 population, both  below the national rate of 429 
inmates per 100,000 population and well below Texas’ 692 inmates per 100,000 
population or Louisiana’s 803 inmates per 100,000 population.”362 These rates have not 
remained static; a variety of states have significantly altered their imprisonment rates in 
recent years, with varying results.363 Texas, for example, has launched an ambitious effort 
to develop alternatives to incarceration, saving billions of dollars and also seeing 
significantly reduced crime rates.364 Scholars have traced these variations in incarceration 
to differences in the structure of state government and practices of civic engagement.365 
                                                      
360 Vanessa Barker, The Politics of Punishing: Building a State Governance Theory of American 
Imprisonment Variation, 8 PUNISHMENT & SOCIETY 5, 6 (2006). 
361 William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 583 
(2001); see also Paul H. Robinson & Markus D. Dubber, The American Model Penal Code: A 
Brief Overview, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 319, 320 (2007) (commenting that, notwithstanding the 
influence of the Model Penal Code, “[t]here is much diversity among the fifty-two American 
criminal codes and, therefore, it is often difficult to state ‘the’ American rule on any point of 
criminal law”). 
362 Barker, supra note 360, at 5. 
363 See Oliver Roeder, The Imprisoner’s Dilemma, Five Thirty Eight, Feb. 12, 2015, available at 
http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-imprisoners-dilemma/. 
364 See Roeder, supra note 363 (chart noting a 20 percent drop in Texas prison population and a 
roughly 27 percent drop in crime); see generally Olivia Nuzzi, Prison Reform is Bigger in Texas, 
THE DAILY BEAST, April 12, 2014, available at 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/04/12/prison-reform-is-bigger-in-texas.html.  
365 Barker, supra note 360, at 6. 
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One of the most studied areas of divergence is capital punishment. As one study 
noted, “[s]tate policy toward the death penalty varies widely in both theory and practice . 
. . [M]any U.S. states have no death penalty in their criminal codes; others have 
legislation on the books but do not conduct any executions; and a small number of states 
conduct the majority of executions.”366 Among states that conduct executions, we see 
enormous variation in the rates. Texas and Virginia, for example, execute more than 
eleven persons per million population, while seven states (Ohio, Tennessee, Colorado, 
California, Pennsylvania, Kentucky, and Washington) execute less than one in a 
million.367 To the extent that the law of capital punishment has become more uniform in 
recent years, that uniformity has been largely imposed by the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment.368  
Environmental Policy: Although federal law dominates environmental policy, it 
typically works through cooperative federalism arrangements wherein federal agencies 
set overall standards and states have primary authority over enforcement. Hence, “states 
play a central role in environmental enforcement, and have enormous discretion to 
determine their own enforcement strategies.” 369  And states still retain significant 
independent authority to regulate issues not covered by federal mandates or, in some 
                                                      
366 FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CONTRADICTIONS OF AMERICAN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 72 (2003). 
As of this writing, thirty-two states have the death penalty on the books, while eighteen have 
abolished it. States With and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty (visited Feb. 20, 2015).  
367 See ZIMRING, supra note 366, at 73, Figure 4.2 (figures are for 1977-2000, and I have excluded 
states from Zimring’s chart that have since abolished the death penalty). Although Professor 
Zimring notes “a pronounced regional pattern associated with variations in death penalty policy 
among U.S. states,” id. at 73, region does not seem to be a good indicator of the rate among states 
that actually do execute people; for example, Virginia executes far more people than North 
Carolina or Georgia; Arizona and Missouri execute far more than California or Indiana. See id., 
Figure 4.2. 
368 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (eliminating significant state-by-state 
variation on availability of the juvenile death penalty). 
369 David M. Konisky & Neal D. Woods, Environmental Policy, in POLITICS IN THE AMERICAN 
STATES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 469, 480 (Virginia Gray, Russell L. Hanson, & Thad Kousser 
eds. 10th ed. 2013); see also John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 
54 MD. L. REV. 1183 (1995). 
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important areas, to exceed federal requirements. 370  One recent overview found 
“tremendous variation in state policy” on environmental issues.371 This variation includes 
wide divergence in per capita spending on environmental policies,372 inspection rates for 
pollution sources,373 and willingness to innovate or to exceed federal requirements.374 
A number of factors drive these variations, including variations in environmental 
conditions, fiscal resources, administrative capacity, political attitudes of the electorate, 
partisan control of the state government, and federal activity in the state.375 Divergent 
environmental policies in turn affect not only  the quality of the environment, but also 
economic growth and development. California’s economic future, for example, may well 
turn importantly on state-level environmental choices about hydraulic fracturing and 
development of the Monterey Shale.376 
                                                      
370 See, e.g., Konisky & Woods, supra note 369, at 484-85 (discussing California’s statutory 
waiver authorizing it to exceed federal motor vehicle emissions standards under the Clean Air 
Act); id. at 485 (noting that “[i]n the absence of strong federal policy activity [on global warming], 
many states have adopted measures to either directly or indirectly reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions”).  On the other hand, twenty-four states have legislative prohibited their environmental 
agencies from adopting standards more stringent than federal requirements. See id. at 491. 
371 Konisky & Woods, supra note 369, at 480. 
372 See Konisky & Woods, supra note 369, at 482 (ranking expenditures and observing that “the 
states at the top of the list [Hawaii, West Virginia, Delaware, New Hampshire, and Wyoming] . . . 
are spending well over $100 per citizen compared with the states at the bottom of the rankings—
Ohio, Colorado, Alabama, Georgia, and Oklahoma—each of which is spending less than $20 per 
citizen”). 
373 Konisky & Woods, supra note 369, at 482. 
374 Konisky & Woods, supra note 369, at 484-92. 
375 Konisky & Woods, supra note 369, at 492-93; Scott P. Hays, Michael Esler, & Carol E. Hays, 
Environmental Commitment among the States: Integrating Alternative Approaches to State 
Environmental Policy, 26 PUBLIUS 41 (1996). 
376 See Jason Hoppen, State to Examine Monterey Shale Potential, SANTA CRUZ SENTINEL, Jan. 
14, 2015, available at http://www.santacruzsentinel.com/general-news/20150114/state-to-
examine-monterey-shale-potential; Norimitsu Onishi, Vast Oil Reserve May Now Be Within 
Reach, And Battle Heats Up, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2013, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/04/us/vast-oil-reserve-may-now-be-within-reach-and-battle-
heats-up.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
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Beyond policy divergence within states, particular states have often taken the 
lead in developing environmental policies that influence the nation as a whole. California, 
for example, historically preceded the federal government in combating air pollution, and 
that leadership role resulted in a special provision in the federal Clean Air Act permitting 
California to establish stricter limits on motor vehicle emissions than national law would 
otherwise permit.377 Building on this exemption, California has undertaken to lead in 
addressing climate change by regulating greenhouse gas emissions more stringently than 
does federal law. 378  Other states have also embarked on important environmental 
initatives. Ten northeastern and mid-Atlantic states have formed the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative,379 an agreement by to establish a regional cap and trade 
program for electric generating plants.  
Perhaps nothing shows the diversity of state positions on environmental matters 
better, however, than recent litigation over federal greenhouse gas standards. Twelve 
states successfully sued the EPA seeking to force it to regulate greenhouse gases as 
pollutants under the Clean Air Act. After they prevailed in the Supreme Court,380 the 
EPA designated six gases as pollutants—only to be challenged by the states of Alabama, 
Texas, and Virginia. Eighteen states intervened in support of the EPA, while fourteen 
other states intervened in support of the challengers.381 
* * * 
                                                      
377 See 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b), (e). EPA must approve the higher standards, and other states are 
permitted to adopt the California standards once approved. See also Dwyer, supra note 369, at 
1196 n.65 (explaining that this exception responded to California’s history of leadership on air 
pollution regulation).  
378 See Chris Megerian, California Leaders Vow to Continue Climate Change Action, L.A. TIMES, 
Dec. 15, 2014, available at http://www.latimes.com/local/politics/la-me-pol-brown-climate-
20141216-story.html. 
379 Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, http://www.rggi.org/home (visited October 29, 2010). 
380 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
381 See Robin Bravender, States Take Sides in Greenhouse Gas ‘Endangerment’ Brawl, N.Y. 
TIMES, March 19, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/03/19/19greenwire-
states-take-sides-in-greenhouse-gas-endangerme-29019.html. In the end, the District of Columbia 
Circuit rejected the challenge. See Coalition for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 
102 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
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One could proliferate examples. Numerous studies of other policy fields have 
found persistent state-by-state variation in policy outcomes.382 The diversity in policy 
inputs, in other words, is likewise reflected in policy outputs.  
3. The Red and the Blue 
 Many Americans may not remember that the red states used to be blue, and vice 
versa. When NBC unveiled the first illuminated electoral map on election night in 
November 1976, the states voting for Republican Gerald Ford were blue—the color of 
the Union in the Civil War—and the states voting for Democrat Jimmy Carter were 
red.383 For several election cycles afterwards, different networks used different color 
schemes. But by 2000 political commentators had settled into the now-standard labels of 
Republican states as “red” and Democratic states as “blue.”384 These labels have become 
central to a large debate, among both academics and popular commentators, as to whether 
the nation is becoming polarized along state lines. One writer, for example, asserted that 
red and blue states embody “two different forms of government, based on two different 
visions of the social contract.”385 
 There is little doubt that American politics are becoming more polarized in some 
respects. A recent Pew Center survey found that “Republicans and Democrats are more 
divided along ideological lines—and partisan antipathy is deeper and more extensive—
                                                      
382 See, e.g., Martha Derthick, American Federalism: Madison’s Middle Ground in the 1980s, 47 
PUB. ADMIN. REV. 66, __ (1987) (concluding, based on a study of state administration of welfare 
programs, that “federalism lives . . . in the persistence of interstate differences in program 
characteristics and in the ineffectiveness of much federal oversight of state administration”); see 
generally PHILLIP W. ROEDER, PUBLIC OPINION AND POLICY LEADERSHIP IN THE AMERICAN 
STATES 27 (1994) (“Overall, previous research finds little evidence that state policymaking has 
become nationalized.”). 
383 See Ron Elving, The Color of Politics: How Did Red and Blue States Come to Be? NPR, Nov. 
13, 2014, available at http://www.npr.org/2014/11/13/363762677/the-color-of-politics-how-did-
red-and-blue-states-come-to-be. 
384 See id. 
385 Jonathan Cohn, Blue States are from Scandinavia, Red States are from Guatemala, THE NEW 
REPUBLIC, Oct. 5, 2012, available at 
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/magazine/108185/blue-states-are-scandinavia-red-
states-are-guatemala. 
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than at any point in the last two decades.”386 But debate continues about whether citizens 
are polarized in the sense of having more extreme views or simply in the sense of having 
more ideologically consistent views,387 and about whether polarization is largely confined 
to elites or pervasive throughout the public.388 The important question for my purposes is 
whether political polarization is a geographic phenomenon, tending to differentiate states 
from one another.389  
Debate persists on this point, too. 390  At least two issues seem potentially 
important. First, do the differences dividing the electorate track state lines, so that the 
stereotypes of red states and blue states actually do signify meaningful differences? Some 
evidence suggests that they do. Alan Abramowitz and Kyle Saunders have noted, for 
example, that “states have become much more sharply divided among party lines since 
the 1960s: red states have been getting redder while blue states have been getting bluer. 
                                                      
386 Michael Dimock, Joceleyn Kiley, Scott Keeter, & Carroll Doherty, Political Polarization in the 
American Public: How Increasing Ideological Uniformtiy and Partisan Antipathy Affect Politics, 
Comprmise and Everyday Life, at 6 (June 12, 2014), available at http://www.people-
press.org/files/2014/06/6-12-2014-Political-Polarization-Release.pdf.  
387 See, e.g., Morris Fiorina, Americans Have Not Become More Politically Polarized, WASH. 
POST, June 23, 2014, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-
cage/wp/2014/06/23/americans-have-not-become-more-politically-polarized/ (arguing that only 
the latter is true); see also Alan I. Abramowitz & Morris P. Fiorina, Polarized or Sorted? Just 
What’s Wrong With Our Politics, Anyway? THE AMERICAN INTEREST, March 11, 2013, available 
at http://www.the-american-interest.com/2013/03/11/polarized-or-sorted-just-whats-wrong-with-
our-politics-anyway/#_ftnref10 (exchange between Professors Abramowitz and Fiorina).  
388 Compare, e.g., MORRIS P. FIORINA WITH SAMUEL J. ABRAMS & JEREMY C. POPE, CULTURE 
WAR? THE MYTH OF A POLARIZED AMERICA 167-70 (2d ed. 2006) (arguing that polarization is 
largely an elite phenomenon), with Alan I. Abramowitz & Kyle L. Saunders, Is Polarization a 
Myth?, 70 J. POL 542, 543 (2008) (arguing it is more pervasive). 
389 See, e.g., SCHAPIRO, supra note 13, at 29 (arguing that because the better empirical evidence 
suggests that red and blue states are not as polarized as the election night maps make them seem, 
this demonstrates that states no longer represent distinctive communities of value). 
390 Compare, e.g., FIORINA, supra note 388, at 33-56 (finding no fundamental differences between 
red and blue states), with Abramowitz & Saunders, supra note 388, at 549 (finding “large 
differences between the social characteristics and political attitudes of red state voters and blue 
state voters”). 
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While the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections were highly competitive at the national 
level, the large majority of states were not competitive.”391  
Others have suggested that a focus on political outcomes may exaggerate the 
extent of polarization, however.392 Matthew Levendusky and Jeremy Pope have argued 
that “scholars need to look at the entire distribution of opinion in red and blue states,” 
rather than simply the average opinion in those states or the outcomes of elections in 
each jurisdiction.393 Based on data showing the distribution of opinions, they found that 
“[e]ven with relatively extreme states such as New York and Utah, the level of overlap is 
striking.”394 Moreover, one cannot reliably predict the ideology of a particular person 
based on their state: “although blue-state citizens are on average more liberal, they are 
not uniformly more so—indeed, it is basically a coin flip to determine which respondent 
(the red- or the blue-state resident) is more liberal.”395 The upshot is that multiple 
approaches to measurement “show a great deal of commonality between red and blue 
states, with much more common ground than division between the two groups.”396 
Significant evidence suggests that, to the extent that polarization does occur, it 
may be occurring primarily within states rather than between them. Bill Bishops’s 
prominent work on “The Big Sort” argues that red and blue states are less significant than 
“landslide counties” with disproportionate majorities for one party or the other that 
remain stable over time.397 Others have argued that the key divides are between urban and 
                                                      
391 Abramowitz & Saunders, supra note 388, at 548. 
392 See, e.g., GELMAN, supra note 49, at 31 (pointing out that “most of the states are not far from 
evenly divided”). 
393 Matthew S. Levendusky & Jeremy C. Pope, Red States vs. Blue States: Going Beyond the 
Mean, 75 PUB. OPINION Q. 227 (2011). 
394 Id. at 238. 
395 Id. at 237. See also Elving, supra note 383 (observing that liberals exist in Idaho while 
conservatives soldier on in Minnesota, and that “being on the minor-fraction side of the party 
balance does not make these citizens less Idahoan or less Minnesotan. On the contrary, they may 
be among the fiercest loyalists of either state”). 
396 Levendusky & Pope, supra note 393, at 237. 
397 See BISHOP, supra note __, at __; see also Martin W. Lewis, Does the Red-State/Blue-State 
Model of U.S. Electoral Politics Still Work? GEOCURRENTS, Nov. 13, 2014, available at 
http://www.geocurrents.info/geopolitics/elections/red-stateblue-state-model-u-s-electoral-politics-
 Volk of New Jersey – 2/24/15 draft 
 
 
 
86 
rural areas.398 From the perspective of this data, states may be important not so much 
because they are distinctive in themselves, but rather because they provide an 
institutional space where citizens with divergent views and local identities must mix and 
govern together. 
 A second potentially important question concerns the extent to which in-state 
politics reflects national politics. Professor Fiorina notes that “in 2004 seven of the top 
eight Kerry states had Republican governors, while nine states that Bush carried by 
double-digit margins had Democratic governors.”399 Moreover, Fiorina points out that in 
2004, “Bush carried [Montana] by 20 points and Montanans passed a gay marriage 
prohibition by a 67:33 margin”; nonetheless, the same state in the same year also elected 
a Democratic governor, flipped the state Senate from Republican to Democratic control, 
and passed a medical marijuana initiative by a broad margin.400 These sorts of outcomes 
suggest that, in at least some states, different forces are driving political outcomes at the 
state and national levels401—which in turn suggests that state politics has a certain degree 
of autonomy and distinctiveness. 
                                                                                                                                                    
still-work (noting that county-level data show “many ‘red’ areas in most ‘blue’ states, just as there 
are quite a few ‘blue’ zones in most ‘red’ states”). 
398 See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 397 (“Outside of New England [and] the Pacific Coast, few non-
metropolitan [congressional] districts without Hispanic or African-American majorities supported 
Democratic candidates.”); Philip Bump, There Really Are Two Americas. An Urban One and a 
Rural One., WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 2014, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-
fix/wp/2014/10/21/there-really-are-two-americas-a-urban-one-and-a-rural-one/; Richard Morrill, 
How Polarization Plays Out in Washington State: Voting for President and the Same-Sex 
Marriage, NEWGEOGRAPHY, Jan. 15, 2013, available at 
http://www.newgeography.com/content/003400-how-polarization-plays-out-washington-state-
voting-president-and-same-sex-marriage (showing urban-rural divide as the “dominant” 
dimension). 
399 FIORINA, supra note 388, at 31. 
400 Id. 
401 See Lewis, supra note 397 (noting that in “non-national elections, Republicans can be more 
competitive in ‘blue’ states just as Democrats can be more competitive in ‘red’ states, as they can 
run on platforms to the left and right, respectively, of their national parties”); Levendusky & Pope, 
supra note 393, at 243 (concluding that “enterprising politicians can construct different types of 
governing coalitions in the same state. New York and California can elect Republican governors, 
while Montana and Wyoming can elect Democratic governors”). 
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A broader point about the independence of state politics may help us assess the 
evidence on partisan polarization in the states. Even assuming a good deal of overlap in 
political opinions between red states and blue states, the fact that variation in the average 
opinions is sufficient to swing elections one way or the other may play an important role 
in bolstering distinctive state identities. That is because identity is not necessarily pre-
existing or even static, but rather may be built through the operation of politics. The fact 
that Republicans tend to win most statewide elections in red states, and Democrats win in 
blue states, does affect how those states are governed. And the experience of participation 
in governance, as well as the content of the laws, may shape citizens’ identity with the 
state. 
In the wake of the 2012 election, for example, thirty-seven states had unified 
party control of the state legislature and governor’s office—more than in any year since 
1952.402  That number declined slightly in 2014,403 but the fact remains that many states 
are not gridlocked like our national government. This difference may be important for a 
number of reasons. States may be able to experiment and innovate more freely than the 
national government, and participation at the state level may be less frustrating. 
Moreover, Anna Stilz has emphasized the role of democratic participation in legislation 
in shaping a regime that “reflects [citizens’] common life together” and “constitut[ing] a 
group of citizens into a collective with important ties binding them together.”404 If that is 
true, then the crucial question is not so much whether the citizens of particular states 
bring different characteristics into the voting booth, but rather whether the outcomes of 
elections—and of the legislative process they shape—contribute to the distinctive 
identities of these political communities over time. 
                                                      
402 Josh Goodman, One-Party Control Comes with Power and Peril, Stateline, Dec. 6, 2012, 
available at http://www.pewstates.org/projects/stateline/headlines/one-party-control-comes-with-
power-and-peril-85899434570. 
403 See Mark Trumbull, The Color Purple: Republican Gains Mean Divided Government in Many 
States, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Nov. 7, 2014, available at 
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Elections/2014/1107/The-color-purple-Republican-gains-mean-
divided-government-in-many-states (concluding that “as many as 19 states will have power split 
between political parties”). 
404 Stilz, supra note 306, at 260. 
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IV. State Identity 
Since the 1990s, North and South Carolina have been working to re-establish the 
original boundary between two states, which had become slightly misplaced over the 
centuries as the original trees and stones used to mark the border shifted and eroded.405  
Using a combination of historical research and GPS technology, surveyors have now 
discovered that about thirty households (and a gas station) are in a different state than 
their inhabitants originally thought.  This revelation has caused considerable 
consternation, much of it for readily-apparent economic reasons; the gas station, for 
example, will have to stop selling fireworks and increase its gas prices by roughly thirty 
cents per gallon on account of higher taxes in North Carolina.406  But for some, the 
objection sounds in less tangible notions of identity. Said one newly-designated North 
Carolinian, “I was born a sandlapper and I want to remain a sandlapper. And there is no 
way in hell I am rooting for the Tar Heels.”407   
Unfortunately, we cannot move large samples of the populace from one state to 
another and see if they complain. The existence and strength of state identity generally 
will have to be measured—if it even can be measured—in some other way. Direct 
surveys on the matter may well be practicable; in Europe, where the future of political 
and economic integration may depend on the extent to which Frenchmen and Germans 
                                                      
405 See Kim Severson, Untangling a Border Could Leave a Mess for Some, N.Y. TIMES, April 4, 
2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/05/us/the-carolinas-work-to-clarify-their-
borders.html. 
406 Id. 
407 Jeffry Collins, NC, SC state line isn’t where folks thought it was, MSN.COM, March 23, 2012, 
available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/46832892/ns/us_news-life/#.T4XV2Kvy9fF. What on 
earth is a “sandlapper?” you ask. It is a nickname for South Carolinians, referring primarily to 
those from the sandy-soiled regions of central and eastern South Carolina. South Carolina—Origin 
of the Term Sandlapper, SCIWAY, available at http://www.sciway.net/hist/sandlapper.html 
(visited April 11, 2012). The term’s origins are disputed, but may stem not only from the sandy 
soil but also from the clay-eating practices of certain economically-disadvantaged residents. See 
id. The North Carolinian nickname “tar heel” is better known but similarly obscure in its origins.  
See Tar Heel, WIKIPEDIA, available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tar_Heel (visited April 11, 
2012). Of course, those North Carolinians who prefer their basketball in a darker shade of blue 
tend to share the sandlapper’s sentiments quoted in the text.  See Urban Dictionary, GTHC, 
http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=GTHC, visited Sept. 17, 2014 (explaining the 
significance of the acronym “GTHC”). 
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can be persuaded to identify as “Europeans,” frequent polls seek to measure the relative 
strength of various political identities.408 Alas, I am unaware of any such survey data for 
the United States.   
The previous part examined state distinctiveness as a proxy for identity. But as 
the Anna Karenina principle suggests, distinctiveness and identity are not the same thing. 
And even if we were willing to presume that citizens would identify with their states in a 
world where the states are sharply distinctive, it is not at all clear that the more modest 
differences discussed in the preceding section would warrant a similar presumption. 
Conversely, the Carolina border example suggests that one might identify with one’s 
state just because it happens to be one’s home, even if the state next door is pretty 
similar. Certainly the relative similarity of high schools in a given school district does not 
keep the fans from screaming at a Friday night football game.409 This section thus tries to 
identify some additional proxies for state identity. I consider three: the extent to which 
states make an effort to shape and communicate a common history, particularly through 
public education; public opinion data on trust in government; and the extent and impact 
of individual mobility among states. 
A. State History and Public Education 
One way to assess the continuing force of state identity is to examine the extent 
to which citizens of a state share a common past—as well as to the efforts of the state 
itself to construct and transmit that past. Consider this famous passage from William 
Faulkner’s Intruder in the Dust: 
For every Southern boy fourteen years old, not once but whenever he 
wants it, there is the instant when it’s still not yet two o’clock on that 
July afternoon in 1863, the brigades are in position behind the rail fence, 
the guns are laid and ready in the woods and the furled flags are already 
loosened to break out and Pickett himself with his long oiled ringlets and 
his hat in one hand probably and his sword in the other looking up the 
hill waiting for Longstreet to give the word and it’s all in the balance, it 
hasn’t happened yet . . . and that moment doesn’t need even a fourteen-
year-old boy to think This time.  Maybe this time with all this much to 
                                                      
408 See, e.g., European Commission, Eurobarometer 71: Future of Europe, Jan. 2010, at 34-50; 
RISSE, supra note 109, at __ (collecting polling data). 
409 See, e.g., H.G. BISSINGER, FRIDAY NIGHT LIGHTS: A TOWN, A TEAM, AND A DREAM (1990). 
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lose and all this much to gain: Pennsylvania, Maryland, the world, the 
golden dome of Washington itself to crown with desperate and 
unbelievable victory the desperate gamble, the cast made two years ago. . 
. .410 
This summation of the “Lost Cause” myth that “shaped the mentalité of generations of 
white southerners”411 illustrates both the power of collective memory to shape political 
identity and the peril associated with such memory.412  “Collective memory, constructed 
through such activities as the writing and teaching of history, the celebration of holidays, 
the creation of art, the building of monuments and museums, and the preservation of 
historical sites, gives a society its identity and helps to define its values.”413   
It is easy to think of states that share importantly distinctive historical 
experiences. Texas, of course, has its own revolutionary experience and decade of 
national independence, as well as roles in the Civil War and the Western frontier.414 As 
Debbie Nathan puts it, “You know the tale: noble Jim Bowie against the evil Santa Anna, 
greedy Yankee Carpetbaggers versus vanquished and suffering Confederates, valiant 
                                                      
410 WILLIAM FAULKNER, INTRUDER IN THE DUST 148-49 (Signet, New American Library ed., 
1948). 
411 MCPHERSON, supra note 116, at 71. 
412 I discuss the dangers associated with strong subnational identities in Part VI, infra.  The “Lost 
Cause” myth, of course, is a regional myth—not one associated with a particular state.  I argue in 
Part V, however, that regional identities tend to be experienced and acted upon primarily through 
states.  See infra text accompanying notes __-__.  
413 Gregg Cantrell, The Bones of Stephen F. Austin: History and Memory in Progressive-Era 
Texas, in GREGG CANTRELL & ELIZABETH HAYES TURNER, EDS., LONE STAR PASTS: MEMORY 
AND HISTORY IN TEXAS 39, 41 (2007).  It may not be entirely irrelevant to note that I found this 
book at the Alamo gift shop in San Antonio. 
414 See, e.g., GUNTHER, supra note 197, at 6 (“The fact that Texas was  an independent state, albeit 
briefly, is an inescapable reality to most Texans; it is the cause of what we will later describe as 
‘Texan nationalism’; a visitor to Texas is reminded of it ceaselessly.”); but see T. R. FEHRENBACH, 
LONE STAR: A HISTORY OF TEXAS AND THE TEXANS 255-57 (2d ed. 2000) (emphasizing the 
frontier experience as more critical than the Revolution or period of independence to the formation 
of Texas culture). 
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Rangers fighting perfidious Injuns and Mexicans.”415 “Because of this history,” T. R. 
Fehrenbach observes, “the dominant Texan viewpoint was not that Texans settled Texas, 
but they conquered it. . . .  The struggle, the violence, the tribal instincts, and the feeling 
for place that these engendered may have separated Texans in some ways from other 
North Americans.”416 Hence, “[t]he Texans came closest to creating, in America, not a 
society but a people, like the peoples who had come before them.”417 As Cristina 
Henriquez puts is, “saying you’re a Texan isn’t just telling someone where you’re from; 
it’s telling someone who you are.”418  
Texas may have a particularly distinctive history, but it is hardly alone.  Consider 
also the Puritan experience in Massachusetts, the California Gold Rush, the Oregon Trail, 
New Mexico’s Spanish and Native American heritage, and Hawaii’s native monarchical 
past. And if one looks more closely, one often finds that even states that seem to outsiders 
to lack such distinctive pasts nonetheless find in their particular history a collective 
memory worth preserving. While it is hard to measure directly citizens’ sense of and 
attitude toward a distinctive collective past, we can identify positive state actions directed 
toward preserving and shaping that past. And it seems safe to assume that elected state 
officials would not pursue such efforts if their constituents were indifferent to them. 
                                                      
415 Quoted in Laura Lyons McLemore, Early Historians and the Shaping of Texas Memory, in 
CANTRELL & TURNER, supra note 413, at 15, 16; see also Ivins, supra note 200, at 425 (describing 
the Alamo as Texas’s “founding myth”).  It is worth noting, however, that these collective 
memories are not unitary, even within a single state.  Tejanos and African-Americans would tell a 
different tale.  See Gregg Cantrell & Elizabeth Hayes Turner, Introduction: A Study of History, 
Memory, and Collective Memory in Texas, in CANTRELL & TURNER, supra note 413, at 1, 5 
(observing that “various groups of Texans . . . do not share one experience; rather, they share 
multiple ‘collective memories’ of Texas’ past”).  The important point for present purposes, 
however, is that each of these multiple collective memories is distinctively Texan.  See, e.g., 
Andres Tijerina, Constructing Tejano Memory, in CANTRELL & TURNER, supra note 413, at 176, 
178-80 (distinguishing the very term “Tejano”—“any Spanish-surnamed Texans whose historical 
or cultural roots are in Texas”—from “Mexican Americans” and “Latinos” and concluding that 
“[b]y using the term ‘Tejano,’ Hispanics of various national origins can relate to a common 
heritage as Texans”). 
416 FEHRENBACH, supra note 414, at 447-48. 
417 Id. at 256.  
418 Cristina Henriquez, Texas, in STATE BY STATE, supra note 3, at 436, 442. 
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States undertake to promote collective memory by erecting monuments, 
preserving historical sites, and a host of similar activities.  These acts may be aimed not 
only a preserving the state’s heritage generally, but more specifically at constructing a 
particular version of that past in order deliberately to shape current identity in a way that 
furthers contemporary policy goals. For example, Gregg Cantrell has recounted how a 
Progressive-era governor of Texas, Oscar Branch Colquitt, deliberately set out to revive 
collective memories of the Texas Revolution at the same time as he de-emphasized 
Texas’s identity as part of the old Confederacy. “If Texas were to become the modern 
state that boosters like Oscar Branch Colquitt envisioned,” Professor Cantrell writes, “it 
needed to shed the burden of southern history and pick up the sword of Texas history—
not just any old Texas history, but a version of the revolutionary past that would reflect 
the progressive values and aspirations of modernizing society.”419  Governor Colquitt 
pursued this end by building monuments, appropriating money to preserve the Alamo 
historical site, and even exhuming the body of Stephen F. Austin and reburying him, with 
great fanfare, on the “Hill of Heroes” in the State Cemetery in the capitol city bearing his 
name.420 These efforts to turn the state’s identity away from the depressing legacy of the 
Confederacy’s “Lost Cause” were largely successful. “Even today . . . the dominant 
symbols—and hence the dominant public memories—of Texas history continue to be 
western symbols: the pioneer (symbolizing self-sufficiency), the Alamo (valor), the 
cowboy (rugged individualism), and the wildcatter (entrepreneurial spirit).”421 
Almost every state provides for the teaching of state history, either by law or by 
inclusion in the state Board of Education’s prescribed standards and curriculum.  Over 
half of the states provide for state history as a separate course.  Thirty states currently 
require schools to offer such courses by statute,422 a number that has nearly doubled over 
the past eighty years.423 North Carolina, for example, provides by statute that 
                                                      
419 Cantrell, supra note 413, at 66.  See also Cantrell & Turner, supra note 415, at 6 (“By the 
beginning of the twentieth century . . . Texans were turning to a more useful past, one that brought 
bravado and glory to their field of memories.  Hence ‘Remember the Alamo’ replaced the rebel 
yell, at least superficially.”). 
420 See Cantrell, supra note 413, at 37-64. 
421 Id. at 67. 
422 [cites]  Moreover, forty-six states require state history as part of their state curriculum. [cites] 
423 See C.P. Smith & J.L. Hupp, The Teaching of State History in the United States, 5 EDUC. RES. 
BULL 66, 68, table II (1926). 
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Both the standard course of study and the Basic Education Program shall 
include the requirement that the public schools provide to all students 
one yearlong course of instruction on North Carolina history and 
geography in elementary school and one yearlong course of instruction in 
middle school on North Carolina history with United States history 
integrated into this instruction. The course of instruction shall include 
contributions to the history and geography of the State and the nation by 
the racial and ethnic groups that have contributed to the development and 
diversity of the State and nation. Each course of instruction may include 
up to two weeks of instruction relating to the local area in which the 
students reside.424 
Any parent can attest, of course, that simply telling middle-schoolers they’re supposed to 
care about something will hardly make it so. But the presence of these statutes on the 
books, and their increasing prevalence over the course of the last century, must reflect a 
significant degree of political consensus that state history is important. Moreover, leading 
writers on nationalism have stressed the importance of education in shaping and 
preserving national identities.425 Efforts by states to promote the teaching of state history 
seem likely to play an analogous role in promoting some level of individual identification 
with the states. 
 Public education also serves a more foreward-looking role in creating and 
maintaining a sense of state identity. This is particularly true in higher education, where a 
public university of the first rank can serve as a focal point for the state community. 
Writing in the Federal Writer’s Project guide to North Carolina, for example, Jonathan 
Daniels observed that the University of North Carolina  functioned to “create a unity” out 
of the diverse elements and regions of the state.426  It did this in part by creating “an 
aristocracy of intelligence” and “a group of men in every section of the State who have 
                                                      
424  N.C. G.S.A. § 115C-81(b1).  My then-eighth-grader reported that this requirement is 
sometimes honored in the breach by teachers wishing to emphasize national history, but even such 
teachers seem committed to including a significant element of distinctive state history in the 
curriculum.   
425 See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 94, at 16. 
426 Jonathan Daniels, Tar Heels All, in FEDERAL WRITERS’ PROJECT, NORTH CAROLINA: THE WPA 
GUIDE TO THE OLD NORTH STATE 3, 6 (rev. ed. 1988) (1939) 
 Volk of New Jersey – 2/24/15 draft 
 
 
 
94 
something more than a provincial’s sense of the meaning of his native land.”427 Even 
more important, because the state had been “so long in ignorance, so long in poverty,” 
“[t]he university at Chapel Hill serves as a symbol for unity in aspiration as do few other 
institutions in the country.”428  
One could tell similar stories about public universities in other states.429 President 
Mark Yudof of the University of California, for example, introduced the university’s 
budget by noting that “[t]he University of California grew up with the state and for a 
century-and-a-half has served as a beacon of hope, an agent of transformation, and a true 
source of pride for all Californians.”430 State universities’ public role may be especially 
salient in the modern era when these universities (and especially their athletic programs) 
have become massive institutions with equally massive marketing and branding 
operations. 431  How many Americans who have never attended a public university 
nonetheless feel a part of the state community when rooting for the Longhorns or the 
Buckeyes or the Wildcats? Congratulating the Ohio State football team on winning the 
                                                      
427 Id. 
428 Id. 
429 See, e.g., Bruce Rastetter & Larry McKibben, Strengthening Iowa’s Higher Education Legacy, 
http://efficiency.uiowa.edu/ (visited Feb. 20, 2015) (“Over the years, Iowa’s public universities 
have instilled knowledge in our young people and pride throughout our state. Education became 
an Iowa identity — a distinction forged over time by strong Midwestern sensibilities and our 
unwavering commitment to academic excellence.”) (statement by members of the state’s Board of 
Regents initiating an institutional review of the state’s three public universities). 
430 Mark Yudof, Message from the President, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA BUDGET FOR CURRENT 
OPERATIONS, 2013-14, at S-1 (Oct. 2012), available at 
http://regents.universityofcalifornia.edu/regmeet/nov12/f1attach3.pdf.  
431 The Ohio State University’s branding website, for example, includes a dizzying array of 
detailed guidelines for presenting the University to the public. See http://brand.osu.edu/ (visited 
Feb. 20, 2015). And its account of “our brand” stresses the University’s relation to the Ohio 
community and its “Midwest sensibility.” See http://brand.osu.edu/our-brand/ (visited Feb. 20, 
2015). 
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national college football championship in 2015, Governor John Kasich commented that 
“[y]ou really lifted almost the entire state.”432 
B. Trust in Government 
Researchers have been asking survey questions about trust in government for 
many decades, and these questions have generally included a comparative component 
that inquires whether citizens repose more trust in state or national institutions.  This 
research concludes that “[c]itizens on average evaluate the performance of the federal 
government as significantly lower than that of the state and local governments, report less 
faith in the federal government to ‘do the right thing,’ have significantly lower 
confidence in the ability of the federal government to solve problems effectively, see the 
federal government as significantly less responsive than lower levels of government, and 
nearly 60 percent see the federal government as the most corrupt level of government.”433 
As Megan Mullin has pointed out, “[t]he public’s affection for an institution is 
not necessarily consistent with its assessment of that institution’s performance, and it is 
not clear what relationship either of these opinions has with attitudes about the abstract 
principle related to the division of power.”434 On the other hand, a number of recent 
studies have emphasized the importance of trust to government policy and social 
cohesion.  Marc Hetherington has demonstrated the importance of public trust in 
government to mobilizing public support for any policy involving sacrifice on behalf of 
                                                      
432  Randy Ludlos, Kasich Welcomes Ohio State Championship Team to Statehouse, THE 
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Feb. 11, 2015, available at 
http://buckeyextra.dispatch.com/content/stories/2015/02/11/buckeyes-kasich.html. 
433 Cindy D. Kam & Robert A. Mikos, Do Citizens Care about Federalism? An Experimental Test, 
4 J. EMP. LEG. STUD. 589, 598 (2007) (reporting results from the 2000 Attitudes Toward 
Government Study, but concluding that “[t]hese findings are consistent with those reported by 
other scholars, using other nationally representative surveys”); see also PewResearch, Center for 
the People & the Press, State Governments Viewed Favorably as Federal Rating Hits New Low, 
April 15, 2013, available at http://www.people-press.org/2013/04/15/state-govermnents-viewed-
favorably-as-federal-rating-hits-new-low/.  Interestingly, levels of trust in the federal government 
themselves vary significantly from state to state.  See Paul Brace & Martin Johnson, Does 
Familiarity Breed Contempt?  Examining the Correlates of State-Level Confidence in the Federal 
Government, in COHEN, supra note 291, at 19. 
434 Megan Mullin, Federalism, in NATHANIEL PERSILY, JACK CITRIN, & PATRICK J. EGAN, EDS., 
PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 216 (2008). 
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others, such as government welfare programs.435  And Francis Fukuyama has argued that 
social trust is central to individuals’ willingness to act communally in large institutions.436  
It would seem to follow that, if present trends continue, we should expect people to be 
more willing to build institutions and support shared sacrifice at the state level than at the 
national one.  
Whether or not we can infer self-identification with a state from the public’s 
greater trust in state institutions, these aspects of public opinion may be important to 
debates about federalism in a variety of more direct ways.  As Professors Kam and Mikos 
note, “[t]rust in government is politically consequential: it affects public opinion and 
voting decisions.”437  Most obviously, support for state institutions may translate into 
political opposition to measures that would increase federal power vis-à-vis the states.  In 
Federalist 17, Alexander Hamilton suggested that state governments “will generally 
possess the confidence and good will of the people; and with so important a support will 
be able effectually to oppose all incroachments of the national government.”438 Robert 
Mikos has dubbed this phenomenon the “populist safeguards of federalism.”439  While it 
is difficult to establish the influence of such safeguards directly, some scholars have 
suggested that they were powerful enough to impel movements in the 1980s and 1990s to 
devolve governmental authority to the states. 440   Relatedly, experience with state 
legalization of marijuana suggests that declining trust may lessen the normative force of 
federal law, especially where state law takes an opposite position.441 
                                                      
435 See MARC J. HETHERINGTON, WHY TRUST MATTERS: DECLINING POLITICAL TRUST AND THE 
DEMISE OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM 139 (2005). 
436 See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY 
(1995). 
437 Kam & Mikos, supra note 433, at 599. 
438 The Federalist No. 17 (Alexander Hamilton), at 109 (J.E. Cooke ed. 1961). 
439 Robert Mikos, The Populist Safeguards of Federalism, 68 OHIO ST. L. J. 1669 (2007). 
440 See Marc J. Hetherington & John D. Nugent, Explaining Public Support for Devolution: The 
Role of Political Trust, in WHAT IS IT ABOUT GOVERNMENT THAT AMERICANS DISLIKE? 134, 134-
35 (John R. Hibbing & Elizabeth Theiss-Morse eds., 2001). 
441 See Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the States’ 
Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421 (2009). 
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The relative trust advantage enjoyed by state and local governments may cut 
against national action even when the proposed national action would further popular 
policies.  Cindy Kam and Robert Mikos have demonstrated, based on their own surveys, 
that “even if Congress promises citizens the policy outcome the majority prefers—a ban 
on physician-assisted suicide—citizens may still doubt that the federal government will 
execute or interpret that policy competently, faithfully, or in accordance with their 
wishes.”442   These sorts of doubt may become politically consequential. 
Support for state autonomy may also give the Supreme Court more latitude to 
limit national power—should it be so inclined. Despite the firestorm of academic 
criticism engendered by the Rehnquist Court’s “federalist revival,” the Court’s efforts in 
the 1990s and early 2000s to limit national power encountered little opposition from the 
national political branches and was largely consistent with public opinion on federalism. 
It seems unlikely that the Rehnquist revival was a response to public opinion favoring 
state institutions over national ones; after all, those opinions appear to be relatively 
weakly held, and the Court does not seem to have aroused public opposition on account 
of its stance favoring national power between 1937 and 1995.443 But public attitudes 
would seem to alleviate concerns voiced by some commentators as to whether the Court 
has the “political capital” to limit national power.444 As Megan Mullin concludes, if the 
Court “attempts to continue the legacy of the federalism revolution, its actions would 
probably receive the quiet consent of a public that supports the states.”445 
Although these public attitudes do not directly prove the existence of strong state 
identities, they do undermine the One Nation hypothesis. After all, that theory holds that 
                                                      
442 Kam & Mikos, supra note 433, at 597-98. 
443  See, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS 
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION ___ (2009). 
444 See, e.g., JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A 
FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 139 (1980) (suggesting 
that the Court should decline to enforce constitutional limits on national power in order to 
conserve its political capital for individual rights cases); Jenna Bednar & William N. Eskridge, Jr., 
Steadying the Court’s “Unsteady Path”: A Theory of Judicial Enforcement of Federalism, 68 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1447, 1481 (1995) (arguing that “the Court assumes institutional risks when it 
invalidates congressional enactments” and that “the Court is not likely to challenge national 
political equilibria very often”). 
445 Mullin, supra note 434, at 229.  
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absent strong state identities, individual citizens have no reason to—and do not—care 
about their states.  If they nonetheless favor state institutions over national ones in 
important respects, something is wrong with the theory.  Either its empirical assumptions 
are incorrect, or people may have some reason to care about states even absent strong 
identities. 
C. Personal Mobility 
 Ha Jin, who won the National Book Award in 1999 for Waiting, says that “I 
don’t have a hometown. I grew up a People’s Liberation Army brat, moving around with 
my father. I can say I’m a northerner, since my first twenty-six years were spent in the 
northeast of China, but that is the most I can associate myself with a place.”446 The 
editors of State by State nonetheless chose Professor Jin to write the entry for Georgia, 
where he taught at Emory University for a decade and lived outside of Atlanta. It was, he 
reports, “the first real home I had ever had.”447 Jin’s story highlights the complex 
relationship between mobility and identity. We live in a mobile society; Americans are 
constantly arriving from somewhere else and then, as Stephen Vincent Benét said, 
“always moving on.”448 (Jin left Atlanta for Boston in 2002.)449 
Historically, Americans have been known for a high degree of personal 
mobility.450 Gordon Wood observes that Americans developed a reputation for mobility 
“as early as 1800,” and that “no other culture has ever had so much movement as 
ours.” 451  In the early Republic, this striking mobility did not simply undermine 
individuals’ sense of communal attachment; it tended to undermine the development of 
civic community and institutions at all in the new communities springing up across the 
frontier.452 Likewise, contemporary observers tend to assume that incessant movement 
erodes strong state identities. Based on Americans’ “consistently high level of 
geographical mobility,” for example, Samuel Huntington concluded that “[i]ndividual 
                                                      
446 Ha Jin, Georgia, in STATE BY STATE, supra note 3, at 104, 104. 
447 Id. at 105. 
448 STEPHEN VINCENT BENÉT, WESTERN STAR 3 (1943). 
449 See Jin, supra note 446, at 110. 
450 See HUNTINGTON, supra note 64, at 50;   
451 [find cite—quoted in Huntington, at 50, no cite in the FN] 
452 See GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 309-11 (1992). 
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Americans have from the first generally not developed intense attachments to particular 
localities.”453  
Americans from Robert E. Lee to Wendell Berry might attest that Professor 
Huntington’s conclusion is a little too quick.454 One of the best indicators of a particularly 
strong sense of state identity would be whether a state’s one-time citizens continue to 
identify with the state even after work, schooling, or relationships have taken them 
elsewhere.455 Or all this moving about may enhance individuals’ need to put down roots. 
Wilfred Maclay writes that “[i]n a frenetically mobile and ever more porous and 
inexorably globalizing world, we stand powerfully in need of . . . stable and coherent 
places in our lives—to ground us and orient us, and mark off a finite arena, rich with 
memory, for our activity as parents and children, as friends and neighbors, and as free 
and productive citizens.”456 Ha Jin found a sense of home during a decade in Georgia that 
had eluded him for twenty-six years in China. One cannot simply infer, as Huntington 
does, a lack of attachments from the numbers of people moving each year. 
Those numbers, in any event, actually undermine widespread assumptions about 
geographic mobility. It is widely believed that “the United States is an increasingly 
mobile society,”457 but this belief is a myth. One survey concluded that, in the second half 
                                                      
453 HUNTINGTON, supra note 64, at 50; but see ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER 1877-
1920, at xiii (1967) (observing that “America during the nineteenth century was a society of island 
communities,” with relatively little communication and a focus on local life). As is common, 
Professor Huntington infers the lack of attachment from the mobility numbers themselves, without 
survey data or other empirical evidence going directly to the question of local identification. See, 
also Kahn, State Constitutionalism, supra note 177, at 1150 (“[I]ndividuals in the United States 
are extremely mobile. As individuals lose a geographical focus in their lives, they inevitably turn 
to the national government as the primary focus of public life.”) (citing as authority a statement 
from the Federalist Papers that does not mention mobility). 
454 See, e.g., WENDELL BERRY, A PLACE ON EARTH (rev. ed. 1983) (1967). 
455 To pick a totally random example, say, an expat Texan law professor living in North Carolina.  
456 Wilfred M. McClay, Introduction, in WHY PLACE MATTERS: GEOGRAPHY, IDENTITY, AND 
CIVIC LIFE IN MODERN AMERICA 1, 3 (Wilfred M. McClay & Ted V. McAllister eds. 2014). 
457 Douglas A. Wolf & Charles F. Longino, Jr., Our “Increasingly Mobile Society”? The Curious 
Persistence of a False Belief, 45 THE GERONTOLOGIST No. 1, at 5 (2005) (noting that “a search of 
the World Wide Web for instances of the phrase ‘our [or an] increasingly mobile society’ 
produces well over 1,000 ‘hits’”). 
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of the twentieth century, “short-distance mobility rates have declined substantially, 
whereas long-distance moves have declined less sharply or have even remained relatively 
unchanged.”458 Similarly, Alison Stein Wellner has pointed out that “a person born today 
is more likely to remain near his birthplace than a person born in the 19th century.”459 
Current mobility rates are among the lowest levels recorded in the last sixty years.460 
None of this is to deny that actual numbers of moves are still quite high.461 But the idea 
that mobility is increasing—or that it is at historically high levels today—is simply 
false.462 
Most Americans live in the state in which they were born. The 2010 Census 
found that 58.8 percent of all people in the United States were residing in their state (or 
district) of birth, with 27 percent born in another state and the remaining 14 percent born 
                                                      
458 Id. at 9.  More recent data suggests that interstate moves are in fact heading down.  See David 
K. Ihrke, Carol S. Faber, & William K. Koerber, U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Reports, 
Geographic Mobility: 2008 to 2009, at 3 Table 1a (2011), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/p20-565.pdf [hereinafter Geographic Mobility]; see also 
infra note 464.  Many interstate moves, moreover, may well be returns to an area of prior 
residence.  See Julie S. DaVanzo & Peter A. Morrison, Return and Other Sequences of Migration 
in the United States, 18 DEMOGRAPHY 85, 88 (1981). 
459  Alison Stein Wellner, The Mobility Myth, REASON (April 2006) (available at 
http://reason.com/archives/2006/04/01/the-mobility-myth/1) (visited June 21, 2011). 
460   See Geographic Mobility, supra note 458, at 2-3. For a discussion of how the Census Bureau 
assesses mobility, see Alison Fields & Robert Kominski, America: A Nation on the Move, 
RANDOM SAMPLINGS, Dec. 10, 2012, http://blogs.census.gov/2012/12/10/america-a-nation-on-the-
move/. 
461 See Fields & Kominski, supra note 460. 
462  See Harry Enten & Nate Silver, Migration Isn’t Turning Red States Blue, 
FIVETHIRTYEIGHTPOLITICS, Aug. 29, 2014, available at 
http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/migration-isnt-turning-red-states-blue/ (“Interstate migration is 
not increasing. Instead, it has been on a downward trend since the 1980s; fewer Americans (as a 
share of the population) are relocating across state lines than a couple of decades ago.”). The 
persistence of the myth may reflect the atypical life experiences of academics. See Wolf & 
Longino, supra note 457, at 10 (noting that “[f]alse claims about trends in mobility made by 
academics or other professionals might reflect excessive reliance on personal experience or 
observation,” and that “[l]ong-distance career-related moves are commonplace among academic 
scholars, who tend to operate in a national job market”). 
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abroad or in a U.S. territory. 463  A 2013 study by the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Minneapolis found that interstate moves had fallen by fifty percent since the early 
1990s—from 3 percent of persons to 1.5 percent.464 The authors offered two theories to 
account for this decline: First, “labor markets around the country have become more 
similar in the returns they offer to particular skills, so workers need not move to a 
particular place to maximize the return on their idiosyncratic abilities.”465 And second, 
“better information—due to both information technology and falling travel costs—has 
made locations less of an experience good, reducing the need for young people to 
experiment with living in different places.”466 Anyone who’s watched House Hunters on 
HGTV—and who hasn’t?—ought to have some idea what they’d be getting into if they 
moved to most metropolitan areas of the U.S. or Canada.467 
All interstate moves are not the same. Two variables may help us begin to assess 
the impact of mobility on geographically-specific identities. The first is the scale of the 
movement. If people move as isolated individuals, they may well lose touch with old 
                                                      
463 Ping Ren, U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey Briefs, Lifetime Mobility in the 
United States: 2010, at 1 (2011), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/acsbr10-
07.pdf. Interestingly, the states vary rather widely on this point:  78.8 percent of persons living in 
Louisiana in 2010 were born there, for example, while only 24.3 percent of Nevada residents were 
born in that state. Id. Likewise a recent Gallup poll found only 23 percent of people in Montana, 
Hawaii, and Maine expressing a desire to leave, while roughly half the populations of Illinois and 
Connecticut “want to get the hell out.” Danielle Kurtzleben, Half of People Living in Illinois and 
Connecticut Want to Get the Hell Out, VOX, April 30, 2014, available at 
http://www.vox.com/2014/4/30/5668588/illinois-connecticut-maryland-gallup-interstate-
migration-rates. Gallup noted a correlation between the states most at risk of losing population and 
those states in which residents express low levels of satisfaction with state taxes and state 
government. See Lydia Saad, Half in Illinois and Connecticut Want to Move Elsewhere, GALLUP, 
April 30, 2014, available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/168770/half-illinois-connecticut-move-
elsewhere.aspx. 
464 Greg Kaplan & Sam Schulhofer-Wohl, Understanding the Long-Run Decline in Interstate 
Migration, Working Paper 697 (Dec. 2013), available at 
https://www.minneapolisfed.org/research/wp/wp697.pdf.  
465 Id. at 2.  
466 Id. 
467 See House Hunters, HGTV, http://www.hgtv.com/shows/house-hunters (visited Feb. 22, 2015). 
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attachments and struggle to build new ones.468 But when people migrate in groups over a 
sustained period to particular destinations, they may profoundly shape the character of 
the destination community and render it more distinctive. A significant literature 
documents the profound effect of migration patterns—both from abroad and internal to 
the United States—in determining the political culture of particular American regions.469 
And much of what makes Texas distinctive—from the food and the elegant place names 
to the unique three-cornered racial politics—arises from its Hispanic heritage and 
migration.470 Migrations, in other words, may help foster the sense that a given state, 
unlike Gertrude Stein’s Oakland, has a “there” there.471 
A second variable is the reason for movement. We might distinguish between 
“uprooting,” that is, moving to follow a job or a spouse, without any general sense of 
affinity for the new locale, and “sorting,” or moving to a place where one expects to feel 
more at home. Much uprooting in this country has occured in response to broad historical 
forces—the Civil War, the African-American diaspora after the abolition of slavery, the 
Great Depression, World War II—that either coerce people to move or simply make 
conditions intolerable in their original homes.472 One would expect this sort of mobility to 
undermine state identity and, in some cases, to encourage people to develop a national 
outlook. As Aaron Wildavsky pointed out, “[a] person living in the same town or 
neighborhood most of his life . . . might be motivated to climb the party ladder to a 
                                                      
468  Forces of technology and globalization—which are usually thought to undermine local 
attachments—may actually make those attachments easier to maintain at a distance.  See, e.g., The 
County Line, http://www.airribs.com/ (visited Feb. 8, 2015) (mail order site for the County Line 
Bar-B-Q in Austin, Texas); Perini Ranch, Online Store, http://store.periniranch.com/products/ 
(visited Feb.8, 2015) (mail order site for the Perini Ranch Steakhouse in Buffalo Gap, Texas). 
469 See, e.g., BARONE, supra note 48; FISCHER, supra note 63; WOODARD, supra note 294; 
ELAZAR, MOSAIC, supra note 63. 
470 See THORBURN, supra note 302, at 14 (“Much of the culture of Texas developed from the 
state’s association with Mexico, whether in fine arts or in popular culture and folkways, an 
association that provides a continuing contribution to what Texas is today.”). 
471 Stein’s statement is generally misinterpreted.  As Professor McClay explains, she was actually 
lamenting the disappearance of the strong sense of place that she had felt as a child growing up in 
Oakland—not trying to put down the city. McClay, supra note 456, at 1-2. 
472 See, e.g., JOHN STEINBECK, THE GRAPES OF WRATH (1939) (chronicling the Joad family’s 
migration from Oklahoma to California in the wake of the Dust Bowl). 
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position of prominence. The same person who keeps changing residence . . . might be 
better off attaching herself to a national interest group, available whenever she wants and 
willing to recognize prior participation no matter where it occurred.”473 More generally, 
Albert Hirschman argued that “loyalty” was the critical factor that encourages individuals 
to exercise voice rather than exit when they become dissatisfied with some aspect of a 
current organization or community.474 If there is lots of exit, we might infer low levels of 
loyalty.475  
By the second half of the twentieth century, large-scale moves in response to 
social forces were giving way to what Michael Barone calls “migrations of choice.”476 
These moves involve sorting rather than uprooting. If people move freely to the state 
most congenial to them, they might well form stronger attachments to that state than to 
the one they were randomly born into. People appear to sort both because of the lifestyle 
that a “red” or “blue” community signifies, but also as a deliberate choice to live among 
politically-likeminded people.477 “Americans have tended to move to neighborhoods and 
to states and metropolitan areas where their own political views are dominant,” Mr. 
Barone observes.478 “Young professionals who can choose where they will live gravitate 
toward the San Francisco Bay Area and like-minded places if their values and views are 
                                                      
473 WILDAVSKY, supra note 1, at 4. To the extent that traditional decentralized political parties 
have been a critical component of American federalism, see, e.g., Kramer, supra note __, at ___, 
this dynamic would threaten a key element of the federal order. 
474 HIRSCHMAN, supra note 21, at __.  On the other hand, a person who felt alienated in her home 
state may be more inclined to exercise voice in a new state of residence where her views are more 
in tune with the community’s norms. 
475 Professor Hirschman spoke of exit as an alternative to voice. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 21, at __. 
Exit ends the possibility of voice in the home jurisdiction, but Hirschman’s focus on that 
jurisdiction submerged another possibility, which is that relocation may enhance one’s 
opportunity for voice in the new place. 
476 BARONE, supra note 48, at 227. 
477 Elving, supra note 383 (“We thought at first that this was all lifestyle, but the more I talked to 
people, the more I talked to people who said it was a conscious decision to go to a Democratic 
area or a Republican area.”) (quoting Bill Bishop); see also BARONE, supra note 48, at 232 
(“[V]olitional migration . . . consists primarily of movement from high-tax states to low-tax states 
but also of movements to culturally congenial communities.”).  
478 BARONE, supra note 48, at 266. 
 Volk of New Jersey – 2/24/15 draft 
 
 
 
104 
liberal, and toward the Dallas-Fort Worth Metroplex and other like-minded places if their 
values and views are conservative.”479    
We thus have reason to believe that the general decline in mobility might 
decrease the sorts of movement that undermine personal identification with one’s state 
(uprooting), while at the same time those moves that do happen may be more likely to 
enhance the movers’ sense of personal fit with their communities (sorting). Some 
empirical evidence seems to support this hypothesis. Although some observers have 
suggested that the “Blue State Diaspora”—the widespread tendency of people to move 
from blue to red states—will turn the latter states “purple,”480 more fine-grained analysis 
suggests that this is a mirage. Analyzing General Social Survey data, which tracks both 
political beliefs and duration of residence in particular states, Harry Enten and Nate 
Silver found that “[i]f anything, movers generally have more extreme political views than 
natives: Those people moving to the West Coast or New England, for example, are more 
liberal than people who grew up there.”481 They concluded that “the people moving away 
from a region are ideologically distinct from those who continue to live there,” with the 
result that “migrants’ political beliefs mirror those of voters in their new destination.”482  
If this is right, then sorting likely prevails over uprooting in the contemporary 
era. Rather than undermining one’s comfort level in one’s state of residence, mobility 
may well enhance it. As Ha Jin’s story illustrates, sometimes moving is more like coming 
home. 
* * * 
At the end of the day, the empirical question that this essay set out to address 
may remain at least somewhat intractable. Notwithstanding extensive empirical work 
supporting the existence of distinctive state political cultures, one cannot conclusively 
demonstrate that state political culture or identity exist or pin down the degree to which 
they may have declined since the origins of our nation.  That difficulty also attaches, of 
                                                      
479 Id. 
480 See Robert Gebeloff & David Leonhardt, The Growing Blue-State Diaspora, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
23, 2014, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/24/upshot/the-growing-blue-state-
diaspora.html. 
481 Enten & Silver, supra note 462. 
482 Id. 
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course, to any assertion that state identity does not exist, and part of my point is simply to 
insist that such assertions cannot be established as fact simply by the impressions of law 
professors whose experiences may be far from typical. For every colleague I have 
encountered who is surprised that anyone would care about their state, I have also 
encountered someone (often a student) equally surprised anyone would doubt that such 
attachments exist. I do think that the evidence canvassed here tends to confirm Matt 
Weiland’s more impressionistic assessment:  
The fifty states themselves have individual places in our collective 
imagination, and they offer their natives a mind-set, even a world-view.  
For all the talk of identity in American life, the personal fact that defines 
American lives as much as gender, ethnicity, or class is where you’re 
from, which more than anything means your home state.483 
V. Other Levels of Attachment:  Of Cities and Regions  
Even if one accepts that Americans often have strong identities that are more 
particularistic than their allegiance to the nation, one might sensibly ask whether those 
identities are most likely to be grounded in states, as opposed to some other geographical 
unit. When Frank Sinatra recorded “New York, New York,” he was not singing about 
New York state.484 A number of scholars have argued that, in contemporary society, the 
states are simply too large to be meaningful sites of democratic activity, and that the 
values of popular participation and democratic accountability traditionally associated 
with states are more likely to be realized at the local level.485 And recent demographic 
research has suggested that the most important political and cultural diversity exists 
within states rather than among them.486 
                                                      
483 Matt Weiland, Preface, in STATE BY STATE, supra note 3, at xiv. 
484 Interestingly, when the editors of The Nation commissioned their essay series on each 
American state in the 1920s, they included separate entries for New York City and New York 
state.  See THESE UNITED STATES 1920S, supra note 58, at 2 n.1 (noting that “the editors thought 
the metropolis had little intrinsic relationship with New York State and hence deserved an article 
of its own.”). 
485 [cites] 
486 See, e.g., BILL BISHOP, THE BIG SORT: WHY THE CLUSTERING OF LIKE-MINDED AMERICA IS 
TEARING US APART (2008).  Indeed, Bishop’s work suggests that cities may be too large as units 
and that much identity-based sorting is occurring at the neighborhood level. See id. at ___. 
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Conversely, we might argue that identity more likely reposes at the regional 
level. Many residents of the states of the old Confederacy may well identify more 
strongly as “southerners” than as citizens of Missisippi, Georgia, or North Carolina. Most 
of the existing literature on distinctive political subcultures within the United States 
focuses on the regional level.487 Regional affiliation might be expected to trump state 
identity particularly in areas like New England, made up of small states that collectively 
remain smaller than behemoth jurisdictions like California or Texas. And to the extent 
that state identities are forged through historical instances of action against the tide of 
national politics, those instances tend to involve states acting collectively in regional 
groups. The Confederacy is obviously the most salient example, but others include the 
Midwestern progressives in the late nineteenth century or the New England states that 
nearly seceded over the trade policies of the Madison administration.488 
These are all plausible arguments, and I do not undertake to prove here that states 
are always or necessarily more important to people than their cities or regions. Instead, I 
offer three more modest points. First, a considerable measure of distinctiveness and 
identity exists at the state level, independent of local or regional affiliations. Second, 
there is little reason to think that, in most cases, these other affiliations undermine or 
trade off with state identity. And third, the states provide the most important institutional 
locus of policymaking and identity in our federal system, and for that reason state 
distinctiveness and identity is of primary concern. 
A. American City-States and the “Big Sort” 
 Many of the same decentralizing arguments for federalism can be made for 
devolving political authority even further to cities and counties. 489  And for many 
contemporary Americans, cities seem to form a more central aspect of identity than 
states. Professional sports franchises, for example, tend to be identified with particular 
                                                      
487  See, e.g., NICOLE MELLOW, THE STATE OF DISUNION: REGIONAL SOURCES OF MODERN 
AMERICAN PARTISANSHIP (2008); W.J. CASH, THE MIND OF THE SOUTH (1941). 
488 See, e.g., JAMES M. BANNER, TO THE HARTFORD CONVENTION:  THE FEDERALISTS AND THE 
ORIGINS OF PARTY POLITICS IN MASSACHUSETTS, 1789-1815 (1970). 
489 See, e.g., Gerken, All the Way Down, supra note 7, at __; see also Levy, supra note 23, at 461 
(observing that “the states and provinces that make up really existing federalism are, in general, 
too large” for “competitive federalism or . . . Tiebout sorting”).  
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cities, rather than states.490 In politics, Bill Bishop has prominently argued for a “Big 
Sort” in which Americans are self-segregating politically into ideologically homogenous 
local units.491 Mr. Bishop suggests that the commonly debated phenomenon of “red” and 
“blue” states is not nearly so important as the category of “landslide counties—counties 
where one party won [a competitive presidential election] by 20 percentage points or 
more.”492 “Beginning in 1992,” Bishop observes, “the percentage of people living in 
landslide counties began an upward, stairstep progression. And by 2004 in one of the 
closest presidential contests in history, 48.3 percent of voters lived in communities where 
the election wasn’t close at all.”493 Bishop concludes that “people don’t live in states. 
They live in communities. And those communities are not close to being in equipoise, 
even within solidly blue or red states. . . . As Americans have moved over the past three 
decades, they have clustered in communities of sameness, among people with similar 
ways of life, beliefs, and, in the end, politics.”494 
The tension between local and state governments is a fixture of contemporary 
federalism debates.495 It is not my topic to assess that tension here.  The question, rather, 
is whether local identities have replaced, or can replace, state political identity as the 
relevant units of American federalism. Well-developed institutions do exist at the local 
level, but they suffer certain disadvantages as a locus for identity and political 
                                                      
490 Only five out of thirty-two National Football League franchises, for example, are named after 
their home states. (One of them, the Charlotte-based Carolina Panthers, tries to have it both ways 
as between North and South Carolina, and the Houston Texans invoke both city and state.) The 
New England Patriots are named after a region. Originally named the Boston Patriots, the 
franchise strongly considered “the Bay State Patriots” after a nickname for the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts.  This was apparently dropped for fear of being branded “the B.S. Patriots.” See 
Martin Rogers, Why Are They Called the New England Patriots?, THEPOSTGAME, Yahoo! Sports, 
Feb. 1, 2012, available at http://www.thepostgame.com/blog/throwback/201202/true-patriots-love-
how-new-englands-nfl-team-got-its-name.   
491 BILL BISHOP, THE BIG SORT: WHY THE CLUSTERING OF LIKE-MINDED AMERICA IS TEARING US 
APART (2008). 
492 Id. at 9. See also id. at 44 (“California is the stereotypical ‘blue’ state.  But within California, 
17 counties grew more Democratic after 1976, and 30 became more reliably Republican.”). 
493 Id. at 11. 
494 Id. at 5. 
495 See, e.g., David Barron, A Localist Critique of the New Federalism, 51 DUKE L. J. 377 (2001). 
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community. One problem is that local governing jurisdictions often fail to track the 
boundaries of imagined communities at the local level.496 To the extent that “Boston” is a 
political community, it surely contains close-in cities like Chelsea, Everett, and Revere, 
and arguably Brookline, Cambridge, and other jurisdictions as well.497 But there is no 
single self-governing set of institutions corresponding to this broader local community, 
and in fact many might well disagree not only as to its actual boundaries but also as to 
who counts as a member of the community.498 The result, as Anthony Smith notes, is that 
                                                      
496 Likewise, federal OMB guidelines for defining metropolitan areas take account of local 
opinion—that is, what community residents think they are a part of—only in marginal cases.  See 
OMB’s Standards for Defining Metropolitan Statistical Areas (summarizing Dec. 27, 2000 notice 
in Federal Register), available at http://cber.cba.ua.edu/rbriefs/news010501.html. 
497  See U.S. Census Bureau, Geographic Areas Reference Manual, at 13-3 (“[I]t must be 
considered that the neighboring towns of Quincy, Dorchester, Milton, Roxbury, Brookline, 
Brighton, Watertown, Cambridge, Charlestown, Medford, Malden, and Chelsea, although not 
included in the [Boston] city charter, are component parts of the city, and are . . . associated with it 
in all its commercial, manufacturing, literary, and social relations and feelings . . . .”) (quoting 
Boston’s 1846 entry in The New England Gazetteer); see also Wendell Cox, Large Urban Cores: 
Products of History, NEWGEOGRAPHY, July 17, 2014, available at 
http://www.newgeography.com/content/004428-large-urban-cores-products-history (identifying 
Boston and New York as “metropolitan areas where the urban core stretches well beyond the core 
municipality’s city limits”). For a sense of the complexities, see Greater Boston, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greater_Boston (visited Dec. 7, 2012) (“Due to ambiguity in usage, 
the size of the area referred to can be anywhere between that of the metropolitan statistical 
area (MSA) of Boston and that of the city's combined statistical area (CSA), which includes the 
metro areas of Providence, Rhode Island and Worcester, Massachusetts.”); see also Metropolitan 
Area Planning Council, The MAPC Region and Its Subregions, available at 
http://metrobostondatacommon.org/site_media/calendar/Calendar2010_00_region.pdf (visited 
Dec. 7, 2012) (providing a map of what Wikipedia describes as “[t]he most restrictive definition of 
the Greater Boston area”). 
498 Cf. Daniel K. Wallingford, Bostonian’s Idea of the United States of America, map c. 1930s-40s, 
available at http://www.georgeglazer.com/archives/maps/archive-newengland/bostonian.html 
(visited Dec. 7, 2012) (commenting that “[a] person born in the city of BOSTON and residing in 
BOSTON may not be a BOSTONIAN; yet a person born in Hingham, residing in Newton [and 
making] frequent crossings to England and the Continent . . . is likely to be a BOSTONIAN,” and 
complaining that “[t]he lack of a definite text-boook definition for A BOSTONIAN has added to 
the many difficulties encountered by the Publishers of this map”).  
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“localities may easily disintegrate into separate settlements.”499 That, in fact, is precisely 
the phenomenon Bill Bishop documents: “The Big Sort” is not primarily into like-minded 
cities, but rather into even small enclaves of homogeneity within cities. As Bishop 
explains, “[w]hen my wife and I moved to Austin, we didn’t go hunting for the most 
Democratic neighborhood in town. But the result was the same: moving to Travis 
Heights, we took a side and fell into a stark geographic pattern of political belief, one that 
has grown more distinct in presidential elections since 1976.”500 
The second problem with localities as a locus for political identity is that local 
governments generally lack federal constitutional recognition or protection. Vigorous 
debate exists as to whether federalism is good for local autonomy.501 However, if we are 
ultimately concerned about federalism for other reasons—such as its role in checking the 
power of national institutions502—then it seems unlikely that local institutions are likely 
to be of much help. The institutional autonomy of local governments may well have 
peaked in the nineteenth century. Both trends in the development of cities and pressures 
deriving from federal programs have undermined the institutional autonomy and capacity 
of local government.503 
Finally, the overwhelming majority of Americans live in a state, 504  but a 
relatively small percentage live in a city like New York. How many localities can truly 
claim a local identity trumping their states? Urban geographers have recognized that “the 
‘urbaneness’ of central cities var[ies] greatly.”505 Cities vary widely in the density of the 
                                                      
499 SMITH, supra note 94, at 4. 
500 BISHOP, supra note 486, at 5. 
501 [cites] 
502 See infra Part III. 
503 See Martha Derthick, How Many Communities? The Evolution of American Federalism, in 
DILEMMAS OF SCALE IN AMERICA’S FEDERAL DEMOCRACY 125, 127-42 (Martha Derthick, ed., 
1999) [hereinafter DILEMMAS OF SCALE]. 
504 And some of those that don’t, such as Puerto Ricans, live in communities that effectively 
function as states for most purposes in our system. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht 
Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 672 (1974) (“‘Puerto Rico has . . . not become a State in the federal 
Union like the 48 States, but it would seem to have become a State within a common and accepted 
meaning of the word.’”) (quoting Mora v. Mejias, 206 F.2d 377, 387 (1st Cir. 1953)). 
505 Cox, Urban Cores, supra note 497. 
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population within the core city’s jurisdiction and the proportion of the metropolitan area 
that the core city comprises.506 Besides the Big Apple, one might make a case for Los 
Angeles, Chicago, Boston, and perhaps San Francisco; alternatively, one might 
emphasize metropolitan areas that are not cities but perhaps claim a distinctive identity, 
such as Orange County or Silicon Valley. But while the Census Bureau defines “urban” 
as any area with 50,000 or more people, it seems highly doubtful that denizens of smaller 
cities like Wichita, Kansas (population 386,000) 507  or Abilene, Texas (population 
120,000)508 think of themselves as distinct from other Kansans or Texans, respectively. A 
world in which cities were the primary locus of identity would thus leave out not only the 
16 percent of Americans who live in rural areas,509 but also the overwhelming majority of 
urbanites as well. It seems more sensible to think of certain cases like New York City—
whose population in 2010 would have ranked between Virginia (12th) and Washington 
(13th) if it were a state510—as comparable to states for many purposes.  
B. Regionalism in the American Federal System  
For much of our history, American politics have been dominated not by 
individual localities or states but rather by sectionalism—that is, the politics and rivalries 
of larger regions.511 Part of the significance of regions is economic. As Nicole Mellow 
notes, “despite nationwide industrial and post-industrial development in the last half-
century, American regional economies still differ and translate into divergent policy 
preferences.”512 More broadly, however, she argues that “regional culture” embodies a 
“web of meanings, symbols, foundational principles, and interpretive frameworks that 
have broad political effects independent of any given [demographic] group or 
population.”513 In this vein, C. Vann Woodward famously argued that the South as a 
                                                      
506 See id.. 
507 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wichita,_Kansas (visited Feb. 24, 2015). 
508 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abilene,_Texas (visited Feb. 24, 2015). 
509 [2010 census figures] 
510 [2010 census figures] 
511  See, e.g., FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SECTIONS IN AMERICAN 
HISTORY (1932). 
512 MELLOW, supra note 487, at 17. 
513 Id. at 18. 
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region had important contributions to offer American culture and politics,514 and Daniel 
Elazar’s political cultures were at least partially regional phenomena, not limited to 
particular states.515   
I do not mean to deny the significance of regional distinctiveness or identity here. 
I doubt, however, that regions can play the same role as states in the maintenance of 
American federalism. One problem is that “regions are geographically difficult to define; 
their centres are often multiple and their boundaries ragged.”516 To the extent that 
American law divides the country regionally, it tends to draw different groupings for 
different purposes. The General Services Administration’s “Region 1,” for instance, 
includes Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and 
Connecticut. 517  But the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has 
jurisdiction only over Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island—and 
Puerto Rico, of course.518  Although these demarcations have considerable bureaucratic 
and legal significance, one suspects that their cultural salience is approximately zero.  
Hence, Nicole Mellow argues that “[f]or understanding politics, . . . [w]hat distends or 
contracts a region’s boundaries is the number of shared experiences among its 
inhabitants, given the political issues and events of the moment.”519  From the standpoint 
of shared experience, the more important boundary of New England, culturally speaking, 
                                                      
514 See WOODWARD, supra note 186, at 25. 
515  See ELAZAR, MOSAIC, supra note 63, at __. For other regional theories, see, e.g., FISCHER, 
supra note 63; COLIN WOODARD, AMERICAN NATIONS: A HISTORY OF THE ELEVEN RIVAL 
REGIONAL CULTURES OF NORTH AMERICA (2011); JOEL GARREAU, THE NINE NATIONS OF NORTH 
AMERICA (1981). 
516 SMITH, supra note 94, at 4; see also MELLOW, supra note 487, at 23 (“[R]egions should be 
thought of as to some extent mutable or as having ‘variable edges.’”). 
517  See General Services Administration, New England: About Region 1, available at 
http://www.gsa.gov/portal/category/21432 (visited Dec. 20, 2012). 
518  See United States Courts, Court Locator, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/court_locator.aspx (visited Dec. 20, 2012). 
519 MELLOW, supra note 487, at 23. 
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may be that tipping point somewhere in the middle of Connecticut where baseball fans of 
the New York Yankees start to outnumber Boston Red Sox fans.520   
A further complication arises from the tendency of many geographers to define 
regions as a central large city and its surrounding hinterland.521 More recently, some 
geographers and planners have advanced a similar regional geography based on 
“megapolitans,” defined as “regions that encompass cities and counties linked through 
man-made and natural connections such as shared transportation networks, labor markets 
or water supplies.”522 But however compelling the case—particularly economic—may be 
for planning around these sorts of regions, they are considerably smaller than the regions 
that dominate popular consciousness.  Faulkner’s account of a Southern boy dreaming of 
refighting the “Lost Cause,” 523  for example, cannot be confined to the Atlanta 
megapolitan area; it defines a much broader region consisting of all the states of the Old 
Confederacy.  When Americans think of “the South,” or “the Midwest,” or “the West 
Coast,” they are generally envisioning a different and broader set of regions than 
professional planners often do.524 
                                                      
520 For a relatively sophisticated attempt to trace this boundary, see John Branch, Where Do Rivals 
Draw the Line?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2006, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/18/sports/baseball/18fans.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.  
Interestingly, once one leaves the battleground state of Connecticut, “the swerves of the baseball 
boundary harden into straight lines” determined largely by state boundaries.  Id.; see also id. 
(suggesting that “the state line [between Massachusetts and New York] seems built on baseball as 
much as colonial politics”). 
521 See Green, supra note __, at 283 (“The concept of the metropolitan community . . . holds that a 
large city tends to organize the region surrounding it. . . .  The city is the focal point of regional 
activity, with the hinterland carrying on functions that are necessary to the metropolitan 
community as a whole.”).  
522 Haya El Nasser, Megapolitan Areas Compete Globally, USATODAY, Nov. 28, 2011, available 
at http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2011-11-
17/megapolitan/51451598/1?csp=34news. See generally ARTHUR C. NELSON & ROBERT E. LANG, 
MEGAPOLITAN AMERICA: A NEW VISION FOR UNDERSTANDING AMERICAN’S METROPOLITAN 
GEOGRAPHY (2011).  
523 See supra text accompanying note 410. 
524 For example, consider these two efforts by young geography academics to capture the 
American regions in this broader sense:  Andrew Shears, Regions of the Continental United States 
(According to . . . Me), andrewshears.com, Sept. 21, 2010, available at 
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At the same time, the regions that loom large in popular consciousness may be, 
well, too large.  Even the old South was quite diverse internally; Clement Eaton called 
that region “a federalism of cultures.”525  How much more diverse is the South today, 
without slavery to unite it?  Likewise, even the smallest region—New England—is 
divided between a pastoral north (New Hampshire, Vermont, and Maine) and the bustling 
south (Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island).  One generally does not see 
common institutions uniting regions on this scale, and the Constitution confers no 
recognition on regions at all.  Indeed, the opposite is true:  Article V’s prohibition of 
depriving any state of its equal suffrage in the Senate is, in effect, a bar to folding the 
states into larger regional units. 
 Nor does evidence of the continuing political significance of regions or sections 
necessarily undermine the argument that I have made about state identity.  First, we do 
have important empirical confirmation that regional identity does not capture all relevant 
variation in political attitudes. Even within regions, the Statehouse Democracy study 
found that “[k]nowing a person’s state . . . does add to our ability to forecast a person’s 
partisanship or ideology beyond what we know . . . from the person’s demographics and 
region together.”526  If regions are politically distinctive in their own right, then, state 
political cultures are still more distinctive.  Second, it is not necessarily the case that local 
or regional identity would trade-off with state identity in a negative way.  As I argue in 
Part VI, identity may often be cumulative, so that identifying with one’s family or town 
makes it more likely that one will also develop attachments to one’s state, region, and 
nation.527  Certainly, the Southern region is generally taken to be the place where 
individuals identify most strongly with their states. 
                                                                                                                                                    
http://andrewshears.com/2010/09/21/regions-of-the-continental-united-states-according-to-me/; 
Emily Fekete, Regions of the United States According to Me, Entertaining Half-thoughts, Sept. 17, 
2010, available at http://emilyfekete.wordpress.com/2010/09/17/71/.  
525 CLEMENT EATON, THE MIND OF THE OLD SOUTH 24 (1964); see also EMORY THOMAS, THE 
CONFEDERATE NATION: 1861-1865, at 34 (1979) (“Topographically the section varied from the 
swamps of Louisiana to the mountains of western Virginia; culturally Southerners included such 
diverse peoples as Creoes, European immigrants, mountaineers, the first families of Virginia, and 
Texas frontiersman.”). 
526 ERIKSON, WRIGHT, & MCIVER, supra note 288, at 50-52. 
527 See infra text accompanying notes __-__. 
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Finally, states remain the most important institutional players, particularly as a 
matter of constitutional law. America largely lacks strong regional institutions,528 apart 
from a few interstate compacts and coalitions devoted to particular policy issues like air 
pollution. To the extent that regional identities matter, then, political action based on 
those identities will generally have to go through the states. Scholars have recognized that 
the capacity for political action is itself important for identity; as David Miller points out, 
“[t]he fact that the community in question is either actually or potentially self-
determining strengthens its claims on us both as a source of identity and as a source of 
obligation.”529 Because regions—as opposed to states or provinces—typically lack an 
institutional framework for self-governance, they have not typically served as an effective 
basis for popular mobilization. According to Anthony Smith, “[o]nly rarely do we meet a 
powerful and cohesive regional movement, as in the Vendée during the French 
Revolution. . . . In most other cases ‘regionalism’ is unable to sustain the mobilization of 
its populations with their separate grievances and unique problems.”530 
VI. Loyalty, Treason and the Paradox of Identity in a Multi-Level Polity 
 Many will resist celebrating state allegiances in a time of concern about national 
solidarity.  On the one hand, we worry about nationalism itself as a divisive force in the 
world.531 On the other, we also worry that our own nation is paralyzed by division and 
perhaps even, in Charles Murray’s phrase, “coming apart” on partisan, class, or regional 
lines.532 My choice of Robert E. Lee to illustrate the notion of loyalty to a State, for 
example will inevitably summon up a host of unfavorable associations. 533  Most 
academics I know see Lee as a traitor and a racist—not the folk hero cherished by 
                                                      
528 See, e.g., MELLOW, supra note 487, at 21 (acknowledging that “regions don’t have strong 
institutional and constitutional forms to bind them” but must “cohere through a history of shared 
values and symbols as well as material realities”). 
529 MILLER, supra note 94, at 12; see also SHARANSKY, supra note 81, at 108 (“[P]articipation in 
collective democratic life is itself a powerful source of identity.”). 
530 SMITH, supra note 94, at 4. 
531 See, e.g., NUSSBAUM, LOVE OF COUNTRY, supra note 5. 
532 See MURRAY, supra note 258; see also BISHOP, supra note 486; [others]. 
533 See Cohen, supra note 25; see also Rubin, supra note 12, at 46 (suggesting attachment to 
federalism is motivated by the “sinister yearning of some Americans for the moonlight, magnolia, 
and mint-julep era of the antebellum South”). 
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Confederate wannabes or the brilliant general lauded by military historians. More 
generally, many legal scholars generally view appeals to federalism as inevitably 
grounded in racism or some other “sinister” motive.534 
One would have hoped we would be past that by now. Lynn Baker and I argued 
at length a decade ago that there is no necessary connection between a commitment to the 
constitutional autonomy of the states and the unworthy causes of slavery and racism in 
which that autonomy was enlisted for much of our history.535 Most important for present 
purposes, issues of race in this country have been largely nationalized by constitutional 
amendment,536 with the result that contemporary debates about federalism generally are 
about same-sex marriage, clean air policy, or tort reform—not race.   
This change in the issue agenda, as well as the recent period of Republican 
control over all three branches of the national government, has led many liberals to 
rethink their previously automatic equation of federalism with oppression.537  Likewise, 
liberals are slowly rediscovering a long history of state-based activism for progressive 
causes.538  It remains possible, of course, that state governments will be less progressive 
                                                      
534 See, e.g., Seth Kreimer, Federalism and Freedom, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 
66, 67 (2001) (“In my formative years as a lawyer and legal scholar, during the late 1960s and 
1970s, [federalism] was regularly invoked as a bulwark against federal efforts to prevent racial 
oppression, political persecution, and police misconduct.”); Peter J. Smith, Federalism, Lochner, 
and the Individual Mandate, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1723, 1746-47 (2011) (comparing federalism-based 
arguments against the Affordable Care Act to arguments for racial segregation). 
535 Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial Review, 
51 DUKE L. J. 75, 133-62 (2001). 
536 To say these problems have been nationalized is not, of course, to say they have been solved. 
537 See, e.g., David J. Barron, Reclaiming Federalism, DISSENT (Spring 2005).  As Professor 
Schapiro’s work demonstrates, contemporary federalism has been enlisted to support a wide 
variety of causes, many of them associated with political liberalism.  See Robert A. Schapiro, Not 
Old or Borrowed: The Truly New Blue Federalism, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 33, 33 (2009)  
(hailing a “trend of state-level reform [that] represents a kind of return to the early Progressive 
movement . . . when state-sponsored programs constituted the core of the Progressive agenda”); 
see also Gerken, New Progressive Federalism, supra note 27; Kathleen M. Sullivan, From States’ 
Rights Blues to Blue States’ Rights: Federalism After the Rehnquist Court, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 
799 (2006). 
538 See, e.g., ZACKIN, supra note 326. 
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than national authorities on any given issue, but there is no longer reason to think that this 
will be true more often than not.539  In Scotland, for example, devolution and even 
secession are associated with progressive politics,540 and the German Constitutional Court 
has long resisted full integration into the EU out of concerns for protecting human rights 
and the institutions of social democracy.541  
 Colonel Lee’s decision had two distinct dimensions: his choice of his state 
government over his national one, and his choice of the pro-slavery side over the anti-
slavery side.542 They are separable in principle—which is not to say that either was 
appropriate. As an Air Force brat, raised in the Strategic Air Command during the Cold 
War, I have to agree that Lee was guilty of treason. My interest here is in what Daniel 
Elazar called a “federal political culture,”543 in which individuals owe loyalty to both the 
nation and the state. Supporting secession out of loyalty to a state is no better than 
working to obliterate the states out of loyalty to the nation.  
                                                      
539 Indeed, if feelings of social solidarity and trust are necessary to foster support for redistributive 
policies, see HETHERINGTON, supra note 435, then there may be good reasons for progressives to 
prefer state governments. 
540 See, e.g., James Maxwell, Too close to call: Scottish independence vote hinges on working 
class, ALJAZEERA AMERICA, Sept. 14, 2014, available at 
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/9/14/scotland-referendumanalysis.html (observing that 
the Scottish National Party gained traction because Scots were “frustrated with Labour’s rightward 
drift under Tony Blair”).  On this point, note also the left-wing “Second Vermont Republic,” 
which advocates secession from the United States. See The Montpelier Manifesto, SECOND 
VERMONT REPUBLIC, Aug. 29, 2012, available at http://vermontrepublic.org/the-montpelier-
manifesto/. 
541 See Brunner v. European Union Treaty, [1994] 1 C.M.L.R. 57 (1993); see generally Ernest A. 
Young, The European Union: A Comparative Perspective, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION (forthcoming 2015). 
542 One can quibble, of course, about the extent to which the Union was anti-slavery, especially at 
the outset of the War. See, e.g., JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL 
WAR ERA 312 (1988) (noting that “in July 1861 even radicals who hoped that the war would 
destroy slavery voted for the Crittenden-Johnson resolutions” which “affirme[ed] that the United 
States fought with no intention ‘of overthrowing or interfering with the rights or established 
institutions of [the seceded] States’ but only . . . ‘to preserve the Union’”).(quoting Cong. Globe, 
37 Cong., 1 Sess., 222-23, 258-62). But I have no interest in pursuing that argument here. 
543 DANIEL J. ELAZAR, EXPLORING FEDERALISM 192 (1987). 
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A federal political culture may, however, require one to emphasize one loyalty 
over the other in particular situations. The Federalist theory of competing loyalties 
facilitates “disloyalty” against one or the other level of government by giving citizens a 
second option when one government adopts policies they find repugnant. As Dean Rubin 
and Professor Feeley recognize, “[f]ederalism . . . serves as a means of modulating, or 
varying, political identity”; it provides individuals “with opportunities to divide loyalty 
and rechannel action.”544 Alexander Hamilton made this clear in Federalist 28: 
Power being almost always the rival of power, the general government 
will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations of the state 
governments, and these will have the same disposition towards the 
general government.  The people, by throwing themselves into either 
scale, will infallibly make it preponderate.  If their rights are invaded by 
either, they can make use of the other as the instrument of redress.545 
The balance of popular loyalty in a federal political culture is not fixed, but fluid, shifting 
to one level of government or the other in response to the behavior of each. American 
federalism should thus not seek to duplicate Colonel Lee’s notion of “my state, right or 
wrong,” but rather simply to maintain the States as sufficiently plausible objects of 
loyalty that, in the event of misbehavior at the center, they can attract the allegiance of a 
dissatisfied populace. 
I want to use Lee’s example to illustrate the phenomenon of putting one’s state 
first, not to advocate taking that decision to the lengths that Lee did. One need not 
recognize a right to secede from the national polity in order to be serious about 
constitutional limits on central authority within that polity.546  One might argue for 
constitutional power to defy the disfavored sovereign’s pronouncements, as an earlier 
generation of Virginians did in response to the Alien and Sedition Acts and as some 
states and localities opposed to the USA PATRIOT Act have asserted a right to do in the 
                                                      
544 FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 14, at 15.  As Rubin and Feeley point out, federalism is not the 
only way to modulate identity in this way: “[t]he individual could become attached to a religion, a 
clan, a cultural movement, or a vocation.”  Id. 
545 Federalist No. 28, at 181 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (italics added). 
546 For a thoughtful discussion of the constitutional legitimacy of secession, see Sanford Levinson, 
Perpetual Union, Free Love, and Secession: On the Limits to the Consent of the Governed, 39 
TULSA L. REV. 457 (2003). 
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present day.  And there are plenty of instances in which one may put a state first within 
the limits imposed by binding national law, as Colorado and Washington officials did by 
legislating a permissive state policy on marijuana without purporting to interfere with the 
enforcement of federal law. One might simply choose to direct one’s political energies to 
reform at the state level, as early abolitionists and Progressives did, in hopes that such 
reforms will eventually be able to “go national.”  
 What impact would a revived emphasis on state identity have on national 
allegiances? Many have assumed that such identities must inevitably trade off with one 
another, as Colonel Lee’s example suggests. Observers of contemporary Europe, for 
example, worry that strong national identities have undermined efforts to strengthen EU 
institutions.547 This is not the only possibility, however.  Edmund Burke suggested much 
earlier that “[t]o be attached to the subdivision, to love the little platoon we belong to in 
society, is the first principle (the germ as it were) of public affections. It is the first link in 
the series by which we proceed toward a love to our country and to mankind.”548 For 
Burke, loyalty is cumulative.  We first learn loyalty in our families, which prepare us to 
develop attachments to a school, a church congregation, or a town. These attachments 
then extend outward to state and nation—and ultimately, if Burke is right, to humanity 
generally.549 
Similarly, David Brooks—a modern-day Burkean—has emphasized “the 
tremendous power of particularity. If your identity is formed by hard boundaries, if you 
come from a specific place . . . you are going to have more depth and definition than you 
are if you grew up in the far-flung networks of pluralism and eclecticism, surfing from 
                                                      
547 See, e.g., Amitai Etzioni, EU: Closing the Community Deficit, 43 INTERECONOMICS 324, 325 
(2008) (observing that “‘Euroskepticism’ . . . seems to be on the rise and is reported to be tied to 
national identities that have become both stronger and more exclusive”). 
548 EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE, 41 (J. G. A. Pocock ed., 
Hackett Pub. Co. 1987) (1790). 
549  See also Jacob T. Levy, States of the Same Nature: Bounded Variation in Subfederal 
Constitutionalism, in NEW FRONTIERS OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: DUAL ENFORCEMENT OF 
NORMS 25, 29 (James A. Gardner & Jim Rossi, eds. 2010) (suggesting that the founders thought 
that “republicanism at the sate level could provide an appropriate civic education for 
republicanism at the federal level”); Philip Selznick, Afterword: Federalism and Community, in 
DILEMMAS OF SCALE, supra note 503, 355, 366 (observing that “particular attachments are not 
only compatible with, but can preserve and strengthen, more comprehensive unities”). 
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one spot to the next, sampling one style then the next, your identity formed by soft 
boundaries, or none at all.”550 Not altogether surprisingly, Mr. Brooks was writing about 
Bruce Springsteen’s New Jersey, seeking to explain “why younger rock bands can’t fill 
stadiums year after year, while the more geographically defined older bands like U2, 
Springsteen and the Beach Boys can.”551  
This view suggests that state identity may provide training for national 
citizenship, and it dovetails with anecdotal evidence that sentiments of national patriotism 
may be strongest in parts of the country where state and local identities are also stronger.  
As James McPherson as observed, “[t]he South is today one of the most patriotic regions 
of America; many who profess a love for the Confederate flag would be among the first 
to leap to the defence of the American flag and the civic nationalism it represents.”552 
Likewise, some theorists of European integration have viewed a commitment to pan-
European ideals as complementary to, not inconsistent with, strong attachments to the 
Member States.553  Looking around the world, we see examples of countries where 
national and subnational identities coexist, with each level of identity serving important 
functions for their citizens. David Miller observes, for example, that “Belgium, Canada, 
                                                      
550  David Brooks, The Power of Particularity, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2012, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/26/opinion/brooks-the-power-of-the-particular.html?_r=0.  
Analogously, advocates of teaching state history argue that its greater particularity, vis-à-vis 
national history, helps students build the skills needed to analyze a broader range of historical 
questions. [cite] 
551 Id. 
552 MCPHERSON, supra note 116, at 73; see also COBB, supra note __, at 325 (noting “the long-
standing determination of so many southerners to show their “Americanness” through ostentatious 
professions of patriotism” and “historically high levels of military participation and enthusiasm for 
military action”). 
553 See Thomas Darnstädt, Jan Puhl, Hans-Jürgen Schlamp, Christoph Schult, & Helene Zuber, 
How the EU Can Emerge from the Ashes, SPIEGEL ONLINE, Nov. 18, 2011, available at 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,druck-797626,00.html (“For [Erhard] 
Denninger, one of the leading experts on the German constitution, the notion that European 
nations only stand a chance of preserving their national identities within a union is old hat. He 
cites Hermann Heller, an important constitutional law professor in the Weimar Republic, who, 
shortly after the catastrophe of World War I, raised the question of ‘whether the only hope of 
saving the cultural individualism of the European nations is through a sovereign European federal 
nation.’”). 
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and Switzerland work as they do partly because they are not simply multinational, but 
have cultivated common national identities alongside communal ones, and partly because 
they have developed institutions (federalism, decentralization) to ensure that each 
community has its interests protected against incursions by the rest.”554 
  Or the dynamics may be more complicated still. In Europe, for instance, the rise 
of European identity has arguably strengthened subnational identity while weakening the 
national identities caught in between. As Samuel Huntington explains, “[t]he emergence 
of a broader supranational identity [in Europe] reinforces the simultaneous narrowing of 
identities.  Scots increasingly think of themselves as Scottish rather than British because 
they can also think of themselves as European.”555 Notwithstanding Scotland’s ultimate 
vote not to secede (for now), this development is already having profound consequences 
for the structure of Great Britain. 
 Even if subnational loyalties may sometimes undermine support for the center, 
that may not always be a bad thing. The literature on patriotism and national loyalty is 
replete with warnings that “[p]atriotism turns out to be a permanent source of moral 
danger.”556 As George Fletcher puts it, “[b]lind adherence to any object of loyalty—
whether friend, lover, or nation—converts loyalty into idolatry. There is a moral danger 
in thinking that any concrete person or entity could become the ultimate source of right 
and wrong.”557 
Far from condemning the notion that one might prefer one’s state to the nation, 
our Founders envisioned a world in which our two levels of government would 
perpetually compete for the loyalty and sympathy of the sovereign People.558 As Justice 
Kennedy observed in Term Limits, “[i]t was the genius of their idea that our citizens 
would have two political capacities, one state and one federal, each protected from 
                                                      
554 MILLER, supra note 94, at 96. 
555 HUNTINGTON, supra note __, at 14; see also id. (noting that “[t]his is equally true for 
Lombards, Catalonians, and others”). 
556 Alasdair MacIntyre, Is Patriotism a Virtue? The Lindley Lecture, University of Kansas, reprinted 
in Political Thought ___ (eds Rosen and Wolff) (OUP, Oxford, 1999). 
557 Fletcher, supra note 161, at 6. 
558 See generally Todd E. Pettys, Competing for the People’s Affection: Federalism’s Forgotten 
Marketplace, 56 VAND. L. REV. 329 (2003). 
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incursion by the other. The resulting Constitution . . . establish[ed] two orders of 
government, each with its own direct relationship, its own privity, its own set of mutual 
rights and obligations to the people who sustain it and are governed by it.”559 Each 
citizen, then, is at least potentially torn—as Colonel Lee was—between his loyalty to the 
Nation and to the State.  “[T]he core thought,” as Jacob Levy explains, “is that authority 
can be safely vested in the central government in part because, and perhaps just to the 
degree that, the people are inclined to be loyal and attached to their states rather than to 
the center.”560 
 State identities are not, of course, the only alternative available to individuals 
dissatisfied with national policy.  As Anthony Smith points out, “the self is composed of 
multiple identities and roles—familial, territorial, class, religious, ethnic and gender.”561  
Certainly one can point to instances of popular mobilization around each of these 
different identities, from union activism for workers’ rights to religious opposition to 
abortion or unjust wars to Mothers Against Drunk Driving. But my point is not that states 
offer the only alternative; rather, they represent one of several classes of intermediary 
institutions that stand between the individual and the national state.562 As Tocqueville 
suggested, the Republic will generally benefit from having a wide variety of such 
institutions as part of a robust civil society.563 
The American states may be an attractive form of intermediary institution 
precisely because they do not have volks. As Vicki Jackson points out, “because state 
lines do not necessarily correspond to lines of ethnic, racial, or religious identity, which 
can be more deeply divisive, maintaining the significance of state governments may help 
foster civic identities that overlap with more deeply felt identities in ways that create 
                                                      
559 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
560 Levy, supra note 23, at 465. 
561 SMITH, supra note 94, at 4; see also FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 14, at 11. 
562 See generally John O. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville’s America: The Rehnquist Court’s 
Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 CAL. L. REV. 485 (2002); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Is There 
a Distinctive Conservative Jurisprudence? 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1383, 1384 (2002); see also 
Ernest A. Young, The Conservative Case for Federalism, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 874, 883-86 
(2006). 
563 See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA ___. 
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cross-cutting allegiances.”564  She concludes that “[t]hese allegiances, in turn, could 
increase the prospects for tolerance and accommodation in the face of profound 
disagreements.”565 States also derive certain advantages from their status as governments. 
Unlike many religious bodies and nongovernmental organizations, states have well-
developed mechanisms of democratic accountability, and they are bound to respect the 
constitutional rights of their members. It may be considerably more difficult for 
individuals to hold the Roman Catholic Church or the Sierra Club accountable for their 
actions and positions. 
Daniel Elazar has written that “there is no federal system that is commonly 
viewed as successful . . . whose people do not think federal, that does not have a federal 
political culture and a strong will to use federal principles and arrangements.”566 This 
federal culture requires meaningful attachments and loyalties to both the center and the 
subnational units. If that is true, then a revival of state identity may be attractive under 
modern conditions. The more difficult questions concern how that is to be done. Those 
questions, however, must await a companion essay to this one. It will be enough for now 
simply to suggest that reports of state identity’s death are greatly exaggerated, and that 
that is good news. 
Conclusion 
 In the preface to his collection of essays on each of the several states, Matt 
Weiland asks, “who hasn’t marveled at the richness of lives we don’t know?”567   The 
answer may be, not enough of us. Academics at national law schools, and lawyers in 
national law firms, think we know that Americans’ lives are becoming increasingly 
homogeneous. As Mr. Weiland puts it, “it’s very easy . . . to feel as though the whole 
                                                      
564 Jackson, supra note 154, at 2221; see also Mark C. Gordon, Differing Paradigms, Similar 
Flaws: Constructing a New Approach to Federalism in Congress and the Court, YALE L. & POL’Y 
REV. & YALE J. REG. (Symposium Issue) 187, 217-18 (1996) (“America has managed to maintain 
stability even in an era of robust individual rights precisely because the divisions that define our 
political structure (i.e., states) do not coincide with the divisions that define our social and cultural 
structure (such as racial and ethnic groups and economic and national interests).”); SHAPIRO, 
supra note 142, at 123-24. 
565 Jackson, supra note 154, at 2221-22. 
566 DANIEL J. ELAZAR, EXPLORING FEDERALISM 192 (1987).  
567 Matt Weiland, Preface, in STATE BY STATE, supra note 3, at xiii.  
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country’s becoming more homogeneous—it is! There’s no doubt about that.” But the 
glass, while no longer full, is also not empty: “[I]t’s important to recognize how resilient 
independent stores, independent magazines, local culture, accents, cults, and private 
forms of religion are. . . .  [I]f you actually look around it’s a wonder the country isn’t 
even more homogeneous than it is.”568 The “varied carols” that Walt Whitman heard 
American singing in the mid-nineteenth century are still audible today.569 
 In this essay, I have endeavored to collect evidence that the American states 
remain more diverse and distinctive than people sometimes think, and that Americans 
continue to identify—to at least some extent—with their states. I have also suggested that 
this distinctiveness and sense of identity is crucial to the health of our federal system. 
That system relies not only on exit and voice, but also loyalty. The attachment of citizens 
to their states as political communities fuels debate and innovation, and it drives both the 
political and administrative safeguards of federalism. Like any other institution, 
federalism will endure only if people have a reason to care about it. 
 The general persistence of state distinctiveness and attachments should be 
reassuring, whether or not one identifies strongly with a state. A decline of those 
sentiments would threaten the stability of a system that produces many other virtues. 
Although federalism may often arise, historically speaking, out of profound cultural 
difference, the need for federalism as a constraint on central power will almost certainly 
survive the death of those differences. If that is right, then both politicians and scholars 
need to turn their attention to ways in which the divided loyalties of Americans—so 
integral to the Founders’ plan—may be preserved. A full exploration of the means by 
which this might be done must await a follow-on project to this one, but the short answer 
is that the “sovereignty” of the States ultimately depends on their “autonomy”—that is, 
on their continuing ability to make meaningful legislative choices on behalf of their 
citizens.  
                                                      
568 Matt Weiland, in Zach Baron, Interview: State by State’s Matt Weiland, VILLAGE VOICE, Dec. 
23, 2008, available at http://blogs.villagevoice.com/music/2008/12/interview_state.php (visited 
March 18, 2011). 
569  Walt Whitman, I Hear America Singing, in WALT WHITMAN, LEAVES OF GRASS: 
COMPREHENSIVE READER'S EDITION __ (Harold W. Blodgett & Sculley Bradley, eds., 1965) 
(1867). 
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Constitutional law can protect aspects of that autonomy, by limiting national 
power in extreme cases and by influencing the interpretation and implementation of 
federal statutory schemes. Much will depend, however, on the efforts of the states 
themselves. As Madison foresaw, the best way for states to maintain their role in our 
federal system is by being worthy of trust—by developing innovative and successful 
programs to meet the needs and preferences of their citizens, by respecting their citizens’ 
rights and sense of fairness, and by cultivating, preserving, and teaching the cultural and 
political heritage that makes each state unique. If they succeed in this, then perhaps New 
Jersey will no longer have citizens who are “Born to Run.” 
